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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Introduction and Background 
 
Georgia’s ‘National Integrity Systems’ are the institutions, laws, procedures, practices 
and attitudes that encourage and support integrity in the exercise of power in modern 
Georgian society. Integrity systems function to ensure that power is exercised in a 
manner that is true to the values, purposes and duties for which that power is entrusted 
to, or held by, institutions and individual office-holders. 
This report presents the results of the Open Society Institute / Open Society – 
Georgia Foundation funded project Georgian National Integrity Systems Assessment 
(GNISA), conducted in 2005–2006 by Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and 
Development, Transparency International Georgia, Georgian Young Lawyers 
Association, in close cooperation with Griffith University Institute for Ethics, 
Governance and Law (Australia), and Tiri Group (UK), into how different elements of 
integrity systems interact, which combinations of institutions and reforms make for a 
strong integrity system, and how Georgia’s integrity systems should evolve to ensure 
coherence, not chaos in the way public integrity is maintained. Nevertheless all 
participants of the research may not share some conclusions given in the GNISA report. 
The term ‘National Integrity System’ was coined by the foundation managing 
director of Transparency International, Jeremy Pope, to describe a changing pattern in 
anti-corruption strategies in which it was recognised that the answer to corruption did 
not lie in a single institution, let alone a single law, but in a number of agencies, laws, 
practices and ethical codes (Figure 1). 
The GNISA research was based on a range of new methodological issues and a 
new approach to integrity system assessment that were first elaborated in Australia and 
applied for the integrity systems study in Georgia. These include: how integrity should 
be defined; how relevant integrity institutions should be identified (including as ‘core’ 
or primary institutions; ‘distributed’ or dispersed strategies); and how the many 
institutional and non-institutional elements of an integrity system should be described. 
The assessment resulted in a useful new, natural metaphor – a bird’s nest, in which a 
multiplicity of small elements make up the system, often individually weak, but clearly 
interdependent and stronger as a whole (Figure 2). 
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Fig. 1:  Transparency International’s NIS Greek Temple (Pope 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Bird’s Nest (Sampford et al. 2005) 
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Sectoral Studies 
 
The study had involved political and public institutions which can be structured 
into eight sectors according to their nature and functions: 
 
• Parliamentary Institutions 
• Executive Institutions 
• Judiciary and Court Related Institutions 
• Special Institutions 
• Donor and International Institutions 
• Nongovernmental Organizations 
• Media 
• Local Government. 
 
The Assessment — Consequences, Capacity, Coherence 
 
The new methodological framework developed by Griffith University IEGL and 
Tiri Group and used by the GNISA project was based around assessing the 
integrity systems’ ‘consequences’ (or impacts), ‘capacity’ and ‘coherence’. A 
combination of empirical research, documentary analysis, existing literature and 
expert workshops under these three themes were used to identify shape, strengths 
and problems of Georgia’s integrity systems: 
 
1. Consequences 
 
Current strengths and opportunities 
 
• Use of centralised controlling tools to monitor effectiveness 
• Strong commitment of the leadership to combat corruption 
• Executive oversight institutions 
• Activity and efficiency performance measures 
• High social trust to the governmental policies. 
 
Challenges and further action 
 
• Trust in leadership: the ultimate measure? 
• Fragmented and uncoordinated data gathering 
• Limited cooperation with NGOs 
• Centralization of authority 
• Weak public relations policies. 
 
2. Capacity 
 
Current strengths and opportunities 
 
• Financial accountability systematization and standards implementation 
• Law enforcement agencies role enlargement 
• Financial and human resources in core investigation agencies 
• Technical infrastructure and working environment conditions 
improvement in public sector 
 x 
• Expertise and knowledge accumulation in civil society 
• Donors and international organizations readiness to assist reform 
processes. 
 
Challenges and further action 
 
• Parliamentary leadership and integrity 
• Whistleblower protection 
• Civic education, awareness and rights 
• Electoral integrity and political parties. 
 
3.  Coherence 
 
Current strengths and opportunities 
 
• Growing acceptance of mutual accountability 
• Ministers, ministerial advisors and the public service 
• Relations between core and distributed integrity institutions. 
 
Challenges and further action 
 
• Policy and operational coordination between core integrity agencies 
• Parliamentary leadership and integrity  
• Parliamentary oversight committees 
• Business sector regulatory coordination 
• Civil society organizations structural problems. 
 
Summary of Recommendations 
 
The assessment resulted in range of recommendations for government, civil society 
groups and international organizations concerned to ensure continual improvement 
in Georgia’s integrity systems. All project participants look forward to monitoring 
progress towards the increasingly effective, capable and coherent integrity systems 
envisaged by this report. 
 
Capacity 
 
1. The provision of human, financial, material and technical resources to the 
state agencies need to be improved and distributed to public sector 
institutions according their actual needs. (Parliamentary, Executive, 
Special, International and Donor Organizations) 
 
2. Sharing of knowledge, experience and good practices among institutions 
involved in the reform processes along with the examination of 
successful anticorruption reform of foreign countries with the aim of 
introducing these reforms in Georgia is needed (Parliamentary, Judiciary, 
International and Donor Organizations); 
 
3. The cooperation with international organizations needs to be extended 
with the aim of developing ethical practices in state agencies (especially 
 xi 
law-enforcement agencies). (Parliamentary, Judiciary, International and 
Donor Organizations) 
 
4. Partnership of state agencies with Georgian nongovernment organizations 
should be increased to ensure minimization of deficiencies caused by the 
shortage of qualified analyst personnel. (Parliamentary, International and 
Donor Organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations) 
 
5. Shared electronic databases should be created to provide quick 
information and expertise exchange between individual agencies. 
(Executives, Judiciary, International and Donor Organizations) 
 
6. Reforms in the education system must ensure preparation of qualified 
specialists in particular fields and the conduit of civic values to engender 
high personal integrity in public offices, media and nongovernmental 
organizations. (Executive, Judiciary, Special, International and Donor 
Organizations, Media) 
 
7. Enhance the powers of special institutions (Ombudsman Office, Central 
Elections Commission, Audit Chamber, General Inspections, Financial 
and Asset Declarations Bureau) from a simply oversight functions to the 
ability to monitor the implementation of their recommendations by 
government. (Special Institutions, International and Donor Organizations) 
 
8. The legislative basis for the operation of various integrity institutions 
should be improved. (Parliamentary, Special institutions, International 
and Donor Organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations) 
 
9. A proper distribution of roles and functions and instructions within state 
agencies should be developed to ensure the achievement of uniform 
operational procedures across institutions. (Local Government, 
Nongovernmental Organizations, Media) 
 
10. Professional contacts, personnel exchange programmes and collaboration 
between domestic and foreign institutions should be intensified. (Media, 
International and Donor Organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations) 
  
Coherence 
 
1. Cooperation between state agencies on public relations policies and 
planning as well as increased cooperation on common development and 
implementation mechanisms. (Parliamentary, Executive, Media) 
 
2. Special unit to scrutinize decisions made by the executive should be 
created. (Parliamentary, Nongovernmental Organizations) 
 
3. Interaction with local government units should be intensified. 
(Parliamentary, Nongovernmental Organizations) 
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4. Partnership between NGOs and higher education organizations must be 
improved in order to heighten public awareness of corruption and 
promotion of civil values. (Parliamentary, NGOs, Executive, 
International and Donor Organizations) 
 
5. Proper mechanisms of checks and balances should be developed to avoid 
overlaps and interference with the responsibilities of a public institution 
by other institutions (Parliamentary, NGOs, Executive, International and 
Donor Organizations) 
 
6. Parliamentary oversight of the performance of law-enforcement agencies 
needs to be improved. (Parliamentary, NGOs, International and Donor 
Organizations, Media) 
 
7. International organizations and NGOs should intensify their joint efforts 
in promoting models of good governance. (NGOs, International and 
Donor Organizations, Local Government) 
 
8. A system of mutual controls should be developed to improve the 
institutional environment and ensure balance between punitive and 
preventive anticorruption policies. (Judiciary, NGOs, International and 
Donor Organizations) 
 
9. Parliamentary ties with public interest groups should be tighter thereby 
ensuring public interest groups’ influence on policy formation and 
implementation. (Judiciary, NGOs) 
 
10. Tighter cooperation between the Judiciary and Court-Related institutions, 
on one hand, and with NGOs and media, on the other, is needed to 
improve the efficiency of the litigation process and increase publicity of 
court proceedings. (Judiciary, Special institutions, NGOs, International 
Organizations, Media) 
 
11. Enhancements are needed in the development and application of internal 
and external control mechanisms for the public sector (with the 
participation of NGOs through public control mechanisms) to ensure that 
these controls accord with the goals of institutional effectiveness. (NGOs, 
Special institutions)  
 
Consequences 
 
1. While the use of investigative-coercive methods is an effective way to 
combat corruption in the current situation as a short-term solution, public 
education and preventive anticorruption strategies are very important 
tools for the longer term. (Parliamentary, Judiciary, NGOs, International 
and Donor Organizations) 
 
2. The adoption of just, transparent and common vertical mobility policies 
and procedures (based on qualification, merit, and personal integrity) for 
public sector employees is needed. (Executive, Judiciary, Special 
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institutions, International and Donor Organizations, Local Government, 
NGOs) 
 
3. Public awareness of corruption, citizen’s obedience to the rule of law, and 
promotion of civil values are essential for strengthening Georgia’s 
national integrity system. (Judiciary, NGOs, International and Donor 
Organizations, Media) 
 
4. Common approaches towards reforming the state governance system 
need to be adopted, based on cooperation between government and non-
governmental sector (NGOs); 
 
5. Legislation must clearly define legal frameworks for central government 
institutions’ intervention into public life (social and economic policies) as 
well as formulate proper procedures and rules for these activities to occur. 
(Local Government, NGOs, International and Donor Organizations). 
 
The above represents only a brief summary of this project and its outcomes.  For a 
more complete coverage of this research, interested parties are referred to the 
complete final report of the GNISA project which explains in detail the background 
to this project, its methodology and findings in greater detail.   
 
Proposed Process for Handling Recommendations 
 
1.     Each organization involved in the Georgian integrity system and each should: 
• Consider their individual response in terms of the content of the report and the 
action they will take to respond 
• List those organizations with whom they need cooperate and coordinate and 
publish this list 
• Designate officials to discuss improved cooperation and coordination and 
publish  
• Monitor the changes they put in place unilaterally and in concert with 
organizations with which they cooperate and publish these results.    
2. International and donor organizations should consider which 
recommendations that they are in a position to further through financial and 
or technical assistance 
3. The Government of Georgia should seek to provide moral support for the 
process as a whole as well as addressing issues identified in the report. 
4. The Government of Georgia should, with the support of donors, establish a 
permanent ‘Governance Reform Commission’ whose composition would put 
it beyond party politics.   
• The GRC should be permanent. It may be initially a larger body to cope with a 
backlog of necessary reforms or to deal with a major corruption problem. During 
its later, mature stage, it would receive new commissions from the government 
and have the responsibility of reviewing all areas of reforms already introduced. 
Ideally, it should have an independent board which could provide other briefs. 
• The Governance Reform Commission (GRC) would be served by a secretariat 
which would assist the GRC to propose alternatives, canvas expert and popular 
feedback and draft reports for legislative consideration 
• It should not see itself as necessarily, or even primarily, a law reform body. Even 
if it reports on all its findings to parliament, it should be expected to make 
proposals about the way that existing institutions operate.  
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• It should look to the overall coherence of the system and the way that the 
different reforms interact with each other.  
 
 A.  Introduction 
 
A.1 National Integrity Systems Assessment: Towards 
Public Integrity Reform 
 
It is widely accepted that public integrity reform is best pursued and achieved by 
means of a three-pronged attack on those issues which can stand in the way of 
reform, namely poor legislation or judicial practices, non-existent or badly 
designed public institutions not properly enabled or supported to carry out their 
roles and a lack of established ethical values and standards.  In recent times, this 
trilogy of key requirements for public integrity reform has become known as the 
‘Sampford Trinity’ of legal reform, institutional reform and ethical standard 
setting.1   
 
A.1.1   What is a National Integrity System? 
 
A National Integrity System (NIS) can best be described as: 
 
… the institutions, laws, procedures, practices and attitudes that encourage 
and support integrity in the exercise of power’ in any given society.  Thus 
Integrity Systems function to ensure that power is exercised in a manner that 
is true to the values, purposes and duties for which that power is entrusted to, 
or held by, institutions and individual office-holders. 2 
 
The term ‘National Integrity System’ was first used by Jeremy Pope, the 
foundation Managing Director of Transparency International, who expressed 
diagrammatically the notion of what has become known as the ‘Greek Temple’ of 
integrity reform (Figure 1).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1
   Sampford, C. and Wood, D. (1992), ‘The future of business ethics? Legal 
regulation, ethical standard setting and institutional design’, Griffith Law Review 
1: 1, 56–72.  
2
  Brown et al (2005), Chaos or Coherence: Strengths, Challenges and 
Opportunities for Australia’s National Integrity System (Brisbane: KCELJAG/TI), 
1.  
Deleted: pubic
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Figure 1: Transparency International’s NIS Greek Temple (Pope 2000)3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This notion stressed that a system is not stable, nor likely to yield public 
integrity, unless it is supported by strong institutions (pillars) each effectively 
carrying out its necessary societal integrity functions (e.g.: an effective and 
independent judiciary, an Auditor General whose reports are heeded by those in 
power).  Pope stressed that it was important to recognize that integrity reform and 
the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies cannot be left to depend upon any 
single institution, nor any single law, but what was required was a set of strong 
integrity agencies, an effective package of appropriate laws, proper practices and 
established ethical standards.   
As Pope’s diagram suggested, where you have strong pillars supporting 
public integrity, the country concerned can enjoy the fruits of that situation through 
the benefits of sustainable development, the predominance of the rule of law and of 
a decent quality of life for its people.  A situation can exist where not all of the 
necessary pillars operate effectively enough to ensure such stability and integrity 
and thus there is a risk of the Temple developing a significant lean which can put at 
risk these key societal benefits, which then may balance precariously and be at the 
mercy of events or of bad people.  One might interpret the worst case scenario as 
being where, in a so-called ‘failed state’, the roof of this Temple has tumbled and 
lies flat on the ground such that the above benefits are non-existent and can only 
then be regained through massive efforts at integrity reform designed to again prop 
up the pillars and the Temple. 
Since the late 1990s, the focus on finding ways to assist societies to reform 
their integrity systems has been approached by various research agendas.  Two 
such agendas, in particular, have contributed significantly to this pursuit.  
Beginning in 2001, a new research agenda was commenced by Transparency 
International (TI) which sponsored a research methodology to assess national 
                                                
3
  Pope, J. (2000), Confronting Corruption: The elements of a National Integrity 
System (TI Source Book) (Berlin and London: Transparency International).      
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integrity systems.  This approach involved the so-called ‘NIS country studies’, led 
by Professor Alan Doig of the Sheffield Business School.4  These country studies 
basically utilised a ‘checklist’ approach that searched to match what was present in 
the country in question with a standard list of integrity institutions as might be 
expected within a traditional Western context.  These studies were documented by 
reporting on the presence or otherwise of these various institutions within the 
country studied and offered a commentary on their general effectiveness.  This 
research was primarily guided by Pope’s notions of the requirements of a National 
Integrity System.  At this stage, there have been some 71 such country studies 
carried out.5  During 2002, a further 10 country studies were carried out by the 
Open Society Institute in Eastern Europe, using an adapted version of the TI 
methodology.6 
In parallel with the above considerable body of work, an expanded 
research methodology was being developed by researchers from (and affiliated 
with) the Key Centre for Ethics Law Justice and Governance at Griffith University 
in Australia in partnership with Transparency International Australia.  The 
resulting project, spanning some five years of work, was primarily funded by the 
Australian Research Council with supplementary finding from TI (Australia) and 
the Office of the Public Service in the Australian state of Queensland.  This 
expanded approach, known as the National Integrity Systems Assessments (NISA) 
methodology, has been a more extensive and ambitious process of assessment.   
 
A.1.2  Understanding Integrity Systems: from NIS to NISA 
 
Over time the thinking behind the NISA process and its methodology has been 
refined in various ways.  Firstly the apparent ‘Western’ representation emanating 
from the ‘Greek Temple’ model has been seen to be potentially inappropriate in 
some cultures, so there was a need to find different ways of representing these 
ideas.  Additionally, the ‘Greek Temple’ model did not emphasise the importance 
of the inter-relationships between integrity institutions, to show the importance of 
their working together in mutually supportive ways in order to achieve results.  
This has been approached more recently by describing the NISA work in terms of a 
‘Rubik’s Cube’ model such as that shown in Figure 2 below. 
                                                
4
   See for example:  Doig, A., and McIvor, S. (2007 forthcoming), ‘Assessing Integrity 
systems and Honest Government’, in A.J. Brown, B. Head and C. Connors Promoting 
Integrity (Aldershot: Ashgate); Doig, A. (2003), ‘The Matrix of Integrity: Is it 
Possible to Shift the Emphasis from Compliance to Responsibility in Changing 
Contexts? – Lessons form the United Kingdom’, in P. Bishop, C. Connors, and C. 
Sampford (Eds.) Management, Organisation, and Ethics in the Public Sector 
(Aldershot: Ashgate); Doig, A., and McIvor, S. (2003), ‘The National Integrity 
System: Assessing corruption and reform’, Public Administration and Development, 
23:4, 317–332; Doig, A., and Moran, J. (2002), ‘Anti-Corruption Agencies: The 
Importance of Independence for the Effectiveness of National Integrity Systems’, in C. 
Fijnaut, and L. Huberts (eds.) Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International); Doig, A., and  Mclvor, S. (1999), ‘Corruption and 
its control in the developmental context:  An analysis and selective review of the 
literature’, Third World Quarterly 20:3, 657. 
5
   Transparency International (TI) 
<http://www.transparency.org/index.php/policy_research/nis/regional>. Accessed 16 
May 2007.  
6
  Eumap.Org. <http://www.eumap.org/topics/corruption>. Accessed on 16 May 2007. 
Introduction 4 
This model seeks to show the different dimensions of the NISA work by 
describing the different planes and emphases possible in such research.  On one 
dimension is the sectoral breakdown.  On another, is the attention to the three now 
well-recognised reform foci of legal regulation, institutional design and ethical 
standard setting.  On the third plane is the ‘geographic’ or scope of coverage from 
personal behaviours through to global impacts.  Even more recently this model has 
been adapted to apply these ideas to the integrity system within a single 
organisation.   
Another, more complex model, is that described as a ‘Bird’s Nest’ view of 
NISA, as shown in Figure 3.  This has added the analogy of a bird’s nest as an 
‘Integrity System’.  Each single twig or entity on its own is weak and unlikely to 
sustain any resistance, whereas when these twigs are strategically woven together 
(as in a bird’s nest) the strength of the whole very much exceeds the sum of its 
individual parts (each twig). The same can be said of Integrity systems in countries 
or in organisations.  What is needed is an interwoven network of mutually 
supportive elements (‘twigs’) to ensure that integrity is protected and sustained, 
even under the most severe onslaught against it.  7 
 
Figure 2: Brown, A.J. et al (2005), Chaos or Coherence: Strengths, Challenges 
and Opportunities for Australia’s National Integrity Systems.  
 
 
 
                                                
7
  A more detailed explanation of how these processes were implemented in Georgia 
is given below under ‘NISA methodology for GNISA’ which explains how the 
NISA methodology was adapted for use in Georgia, since its precise application 
needs to differ to meet the needs of the particular country under study. 
 
Integrity Systems by 
Dimension / 
Type 
Integrity Systems by Sector 
Personal / Familial / 
Communal 
Societal / National 
International 
Integrity Systems by 
Level & Jurisdiction 
Subnational / 
Regional / Local 
---------------------Legal Regulation ----------------------- 
---------------------- Institutional Design ------------------- 
--------------- Ethical Standard-Setting ------------------------------------ 
Professional / Organisational 
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Figure 3:  Integrity Systems represented as a ‘Bird’s Nest’ 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 1.3  The Australian application of the NISA methodology 
 
While it may be surprising in some quarters that such work has emanated from 
Australia, in view of its reasonably high reputation in terms of public integrity, in 
fact Australia certainly does not have an unblemished history in the issue in this 
regard.  It is arguable that the first attempts to try to create a reformed public sector 
in Australia, in modern times, was those actions emanating from the Coombs’ 
Report (Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration) in 1976 .9  
The influence of the Coombs Report, however, did not extend beyond the 
Australian Public Sector itself (that is the Federal sphere) and was not focused on 
ethics.  It was not really until the late 1980s that these issues again surfaced and 
were brought back clearly into focus.   
In fact, in two states of Australia (Queensland and Western Australia) the 
lack of public integrity through the period immediately prior to the 1990s became 
evident following two major upheavals in those states.  In Western Australia and 
Queensland, these developments brought about two separate Royal Commissions 
into public integrity.  These two major inquiries are commonly referred to as the 
1989 ‘Fitzgerald Inquiry’ in Queensland 10 and the 1991 ‘WA Inc’ Royal 
Commission in Western Australia 11 respectively.  These inquiries yielded dramatic 
                                                
8
  Sampford, C., Smith, R. and Brown, A.J. (2005), ‘From Greek Temple to Bird’s 
Nest: Towards a Theory of Coherence and Mutual Accountability fro National 
integrity Systems’, Australian Journal of Public Administration  64:2, 96–108.   
9
   Coombs, H.C. (1976), Report of the Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration  (Canberra: AGPS).   
10
  Fitzgerald , G. (1989), Report of Committee of Inquiry Pursuant to Order in 
Council (Brisbane: Government Printer). 
11
  Kennedy, G. (1992), Report of the WA Inc. Royal Commission (Perth: Government 
Printer); Shacklock, A. (1994), ‘Ethics Reform in the Western Australia Public 
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outcomes, resulting in the ousting of the then Queensland Government and the 
gaoling of the Police Commissioner in that state 12 and in Western Australia the 
ousting of the Government and the eventual gaoling of both the Premier and 
Deputy Premier of that state (Shacklock, 1994).  These revelations caused a major 
public outcry out of which have come some significant reforms in these two states.   
The Queensland Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry recommended major 
reforms to the processes of government and of public sector management in that 
state and prompted the establishment of the Electoral and Administrative Review 
Commission 13.  This body, coupled with the work of the concurrent Parliamentary 
Committee for Electoral and Administrative Review was a cornerstone of later 
public sector ethics reform Australia wide 14  Commenting on the outcomes of 
EARC, Wiltshire (1992) argued that EARC was ‘one of the most successful 
innovations introduced into Westminster systems during the twentieth century’15. 
Following this, in the case of Queensland, strong legislation was brought 
into force represented by means of its Public Sector Ethics Act 1994 and 
Whistleblower Protection Act  1994, supported since then by significant awareness 
raising and training in ethical standards.  The Fitzgerald Royal Commission and 
EARC also resulted in the setting up of a central agency to sustain public integrity, 
the then Criminal Justice Commission (since renamed the Crime and Misconduct 
Commission) as well as the appointment of an Integrity Commissioner to advice 
government on these issues at the highest levels.  In Western Australia an Office of 
Public Sector Ethics (OPSE) was established in 1992 within the then WA Public 
Service Commission to commence major new standard setting and integrity 
building processes during the period 1992-94.  The OPSE later evolved into the 
current Office of the Commissioner for Public Sector Standards Commissioner 
(Shacklock 1994; OPSSC, 2007).  Both of these states have since established a 
strong reputation as models of public integrity.  In other Australian jurisdictions a 
variety of similar actions have established effective central integrity building and 
policing agencies, such as the Independent Commission Against Corruption and 
the Police Integrity commission in the state of New South Wales.  Sector-wide 
                                                                                                                         
Sector’, in N. Preston (ed.) Ethics for the Public Sector: Education and Training 
(Sydney: Federation Press).  
12
  See Fitzgerald, G. (1992), Electoral and Administrative Review Commission, 
Queensland: Report on the Review of Codes of Conduct for Public Officials 
(Brisbane: Queensland Parliament.); Preston, N. (ed.) (1994), Ethics for the public 
sector: Education and training (Leichhardt: Federation Press); Preston, N. (1995), 
‘Public sector ethics in Australia: A review’, Australian Journal of Public 
Administration 54: 4, 462–470;  Preston, N. (1997), ‘Institutionalising ethics in the 
Queensland public sector: Discussion of research into ethics education for public 
officials’, International Journal of Public Administration 20:7, 1317–1340; 
Sampford, C., Preston, N. and Bois, C-A. (eds.) (1998), Public Sector Ethics: 
Finding and Implementing values (Leichhardt: Federation Press); Preston, N., 
Sampford, C, and Connors, C. (2002), Encouraging Ethics and Challenging 
Corruption (Leichhardt: Federation Press).   
13
  Prasser, S., Wear, R. and Nethercote, J. (eds.) (199O), Corruption and Reform: the 
Fitzgerald Vision (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press.) 
14
  Queensland (1993), Report of the Parliamentary Committee for Electoral and 
Administrative Review (Brisbane: Queensland Parliament).  
15
  Wiltshire, K. (1992), ‘Reform of the Bureaucracy: An Assessment‘, in A. Hede, S. 
Prasser and M. Neylan (eds.) Keeping Them Honest (Brisbane: University of 
Queensland Press). 
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codes of conduct are now the norm in the Australian context, which are mandatory 
and carefully monitored for their effectiveness in ensuring public sector integrity. 
Perhaps partly as a result of these experiences, the NISA methodology has 
been tested and refined in the Australian setting.  A major study across four 
Australian jurisdictions(Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and the Federal 
sphere), over a five year period from 2000 to 2005, culminated in a major report on 
Australia’s own integrity system.  This report entitled: Chaos or Coherence: 
Strengths, Challenges and Opportunities for Australia’s National Integrity Systems 
presented 21 recommendations for reforms to the Australia’s integrity system 
(Brown et al 2005).  
This work has also led to further activity to extend the impact of integrity 
building mechanisms in the Australian setting16   
 
A.1.4  The NISA Methodology Explained 
 
The NISA methodology examines in some detail the dynamics of a country’s 
public integrity system and differs in significant ways from the earlier NIS country 
study methodology.  Firstly, NISA recognises that there are very likely to be 
substantial differences in the ways in which societies achieve integrity and that 
these may not always be entirely based upon the same set of institutions as we have 
seen in Western integrity systems.  The cultural difference, societal structures, 
fundamental values and traditions may yield a different set of institutional 
arrangements which may be effective for that particular society.  While this 
recognition does not suggest the abandonment of basic principles, values or human 
rights, it does recognise that there will be differences between countries and that it 
is not enough to simply tick the boxes against a Western model or template. 17  
In this sense, NISA is not primarily based upon searching for integrity 
institutions that may be found in other societies, rather than looking firstly at what 
already exists in the country under study, what is working and what is not.  In 
taking this approach, NISA recognises that there may well be institutions that fit 
the needs of one society but not another and that the mix of integrity institutions 
that make up the systems may differ.   
The NISA process involves ‘mapping’, describing and assessing the 
effectiveness of the entire set of integrity institutions which exist in the country.  
NISA takes a wide view of what constitutes an integrity institution and is, to some 
extent, guided by local knowledge in this respect, but this term includes all 
organisations or bodies which can, do, or could play a role in contributing to the 
                                                
16
  See for example: Shacklock, A. and Lewis, M. (2007), ‘Leading with  Integrity: a 
fundamental principle of integrity and good governance’, in C. Sampford and C. 
Connors (eds.) World Ethic Forum 2006 Conference Proceedings (Brisbane: 
IEGL); Shacklock A., Connors, C. and Gorta, A. (2007 forthcoming), ‘Exploring 
the public-private divide: an initial comparison of integrity assessment tools’, in 
A.J. Brown, B. Head and C. Connors (eds.) Promoting Integrity (Aldershot: 
Ashgate); Shacklock, A. (2004), ‘The Pursuit of integrity’, Paper presented to the 
International Association for Business and Society 15th Annual Conference, 
Jackson Wyoming, 3–7 March. 
17
  Having said that, it is important to note that these issues were brought into focus 
due to the major contribution made through the earlier NIS country studies work 
and owes its birth to that very valuable body of work. 
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achievement, enhancement and maintenance of public integrity and the reduction 
of abuses of power, unethical conduct or corruption.   In so doing, NISA looks not 
only at the existence of integrity institutions and their own capacity to do their own 
job effectively, but also to their inter-relationships with other such institutions 
within the society.  It is this interconnectedness, involving both systemic and non-
systemic interactions, that is at the heart of the coherence or otherwise of the 
system.  Such factors as missing integrity functions, overlapping roles, mutual 
support mechanisms between institutions and conflicts between them are of 
importance in this analysis.  These issues are best unearthed by posing a range of 
very focused questions which examine the operational interactions between 
institutions.  Finally, NISA seeks to measure the consequences of the arrangements 
in place, which is the success or otherwise to date of the system in delivering sound 
and effective integrity measures appropriate for the country under study.  All of 
these considerations, in turn, enable recommendations to be made for strengthening 
and reinforcing the best elements of the existing National Integrity System and for 
the removal of those elements which are counter-productive to the integrity goals. 
 
A.1.5     NISA’s assessment of Capacity, Coherence and Consequences 
 
The methodological framework developed by NISA is based upon assessing a 
country’s existing national integrity system in terms of its current capacity, 
coherence and consequences (impacts).  This in is done by means of combining 
substantial desk research and documentary analysis, literature reviews of relevant 
issues (such as corruption prevention, best practice in ethical standard setting etc.), 
empirical research and data collection through interviews, and expert workshops.  
These various strategies are balanced to suit the particular situation and together 
have the potential to provide a rich information base upon which to make 
assessments and recommendations for enhancement of the integrity system. 
By this means, NISA seeks to determine in some detail the capacity, 
coherence and consequences of the current integrity system in a country.  
‘Capacity’ refers to the resources being made available to individual integrity 
institutions (financial resources, human resources, skills training etc.), plus the 
legal underpinning that provides the power, sanctions and political will (including 
freedom from political interference in their activities).  ‘Coherence’ is the extent to 
which the integrity institutions work as a system, that is to say the levels of mutual 
cooperation and support, coordination and integration (or the lack thereof) that 
exists in the system, the sum total of jurisdictional coverage, overlaps or gaps in 
jurisdictions or operations and the overall effectiveness of these elements in 
dealing systemically with corruption and other abuses of power and thus ensuring 
compliance with the society’s integrity rules and regulations.  Finally, the notion of 
‘Consequences’ refers to the functional effectiveness of these integrity institutions, 
the level of public awareness and trust in the system, the public’s experience of the 
institutions and the experience of management and staff in the institutions .18 
                                                
18
  See Brown, A.J. and Connors, C. (2007 forthcoming), ‘Consequences, Capacity 
and Coherence: An overall Approach to Integrity System Assessment’, in A.J. 
Brown, B. Head and C. Connors Promoting Integrity (Aldershot: Ashgate.).   
Brown et al (2005), Chaos or Coherence: Strengths, Challenges and 
Opportunities for Australia’s National Integrity System (Brisbane: KCELJAG/TI). 
Brown, A.J., Uhr, J., Sampford, C., Shacklock, A. and Connors, C.  (2005), Public 
Sector Integrity: A Framework for Assessment (Paris: OECD) 
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A 1.6       Goals, Aims and Steps in the NISA Process 
 
The broad goals of a NISA project can be summarised as follows: 
 
• Identifying and describing the elements of the national integrity system 
currently in place; 
• Assessing the cooperation and coordination currently in operation across 
and between institutions as this affects the coherence of the integrity 
system;  
• Considering the limitations of the system as uncovered through the 
assessment process;  
• Identifying areas of potential risk for corruption to develop; and 
• Recommending changes to the system, and/or its various elements and 
institutions, required to address limitations that have been revealed by the 
study. 
 
The specific aims can be detailed as: 
 
1. To identify the range of institutions and mechanisms which make up a 
country’s current ‘integrity system’, that is those entities which already 
exist with roles designed to enhance accountability in public and business 
governance, raise ethical standards and performance, ensure public and 
corporate powers are used for the purposes for which they are intended, 
and make corruption more difficult. (At that stage there is no value 
judgement made or assessment as to effectiveness.) 
2. Through desk research, to describe each of these institutions and 
mechanisms in their operational context and document the legislation, 
rules and codes that govern them and the communal values that supports 
them. 
3. To carry out face-to-face interviews with key representatives of each of 
these entities in order to gain answers to a wide range of questions 
designed to provide an assessment of the effectiveness of the institutions 
themselves and the system as a whole. 
4. Through the examination of these data, to identify the ways in which the 
various elements of the current system interrelate and any gaps or 
overlaps between them, indicating the extent to which the institutions 
operate truly as a ‘system’. 
5. To utilise the above data to produce a ‘map’ of the integrity system. 
6. To determine the strengths and weaknesses of the current integrity system 
in order to assess its capacity, coherence and the consequences of its 
efforts to date. 
7. To identify areas of potential risk from which threats to integrity might 
develop (e.g. corruption risks). 
8. To make suggestions for strengthening the country’s integrity system at 
the national and more local levels whether by strengthening individual 
existing institutions, strengthening institutional co-operation and/or 
oversight or the development of new institutions. 
 
In order to achieve these goals and aims, specific steps in the NISA process 
are followed to ensure results.  These are described in some detail, below: 
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A1.6.1  Initial Meetings of the Research Team 
 
Meetings of the research team to clarify the terms of reference of the NISA study 
and to determine its specific scope and coverage to guide the application of the 
methodology in the country involved, in particular determining what needs to be 
adjusted to meet local needs. 
 
A1.6.2   Preliminary Integrity System Mapping 
 
An initial workshop and meetings schedule is held to help cement political and 
stakeholder support and commitment and to conduct a limited preliminary 
‘mapping’ exercise to identify as many ‘elements’ as possible which make up, or 
bear upon, the current integrity system.  Usually workshop participants would 
include participating researchers, in-country experts, experienced officials from 
key integrity agencies and NGO representatives.   
The mapping process includes the identification of the institutions and 
mechanisms that constitute the integrity system and their classification in terms of 
Core Institutions; Distributed Institutions; Contextual Institutions; and Key ‘Extra-
Institutional’ Elements.19   It then seeks to describe the roles that these institutions 
play (or are supposed to play) and the most likely interrelationships that they would 
need to have in order to create a system of integrity. 
 
A1.6.3  Choice of Integrity Assessment Tools (IATs) 
 
Following the mapping workshop or as part of it, the Research Team devises draft 
interview questionnaires to be used by interviewers to enable them to gather first-
hand evidence of current perceptions and experiences of corruption and integrity.  
This is done within the national and perhaps provincial integrity institutions as well 
as with relevant civil society organisations, such as NGOs, the media, religious 
organisations, development donors, international organisations, unions etc., as 
these are relevant in the country in question.  For this reason usually two different 
(but overlapping) questionnaires are required, one for use within government and 
one for external institutions.20 
 
                                                
19
  Core Institutions: established largely or solely for the promotion of integrity, 
including investigative and public management agencies (e.g. integrity & anti-
corruption commissions, governance review councils, independent parliamentary 
select committees). Distributed Integrity Institutions: the sections or areas of other 
organisations (public agencies or companies) with primary responsibility for the 
promotion of integrity within those organisations. Contextual Institutions: political 
or regulatory actors with direct influence over integrity matters or who 
occasionally play important roles in integrity issues, including non-government 
actors. Key ‘non-institutional’ or ‘extra-institutional’ elements: important social 
forces with a direct bearing on the ability of integrity systems to develop and 
function, including economic factors and sources of social or cultural values such 
as education systems or religious institutions. (Brown et al 2005).  
20
  This work also serves a direct capacity-building function by helping in-country 
researchers and officials develop appropriate tools for ongoing monitoring and 
improved management practices within their own organisations.   
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A1.6.4  Conduct of Interviews  
 
The interview process will usually involve the following steps: 
 
• A first round interviews with senior personnel in a selection of key 
integrity institutions (elements); 
• An interview summary prepared after each interview showing the broad 
findings and a reflection by the interviewers regarding the suitability of 
the interview questions and of the process; 
• A review and evaluation of the interviews and processes to ascertain what 
worked and what did not.  From this, it can be assessed whether the 
questionnaires require revision. 
• New questions are finalised, the questionnaires redesigned and, if 
necessary, new interviewees are determined and added to the initial list. 
• The remaining interviews are conducted, summarised and evaluated. 
 
A1.6.5 Assessing the Coherence, Coherence and Consequences of 
the existing system 
 
The results of the interviews will be subjected to network analysis to establish a 
more complete picture of how the different institutional elements of the integrity 
system interrelate through both desktop analysis and direct empirical assessment.  
 
A1.6.6  Research Findings Workshop and Meetings 
 
The culmination of the assessment activity is usually a recommendations workshop 
and other necessary meetings in which results are presented, reviewed and 
validated.  This process gives researchers and other interested parties an 
opportunity to provide suggested recommendations through which individual 
institutions might be improved, inter-institutional cooperation might be enhanced, 
and/or coordination of the institutions can be more effectively managed.  
Sometimes a second workshop is arranged to determine the final suggestions for 
system strengthening that flow from the NISA.  Members of integrity institutions 
would usually be invited to attend this workshop. 
 
A1.6.7  Final Report 
 
The final step is when the Research Team presents its findings and 
recommendations in a report to the project funding agency and/or Government 
concerned, which may then or later be supported by a formal public launch of the 
report. 
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A.2. The Georgian National Integrity Systems Assessment 
(GNISA) Project 
 
A.2.1 Origination and Launching of the GNISA Project 
 
The GNISA project originated as a result of discussions between the Open Society 
Georgia Institute (OFGF) and Mr Jeremy Pope, a principle of ‘Tiri’, a London 
NGO which focuses its efforts on integrity building projects.21  
The GNISA project commenced in May 2005, funded by the Open Society 
Institute (Soros Foundation) through its Georgian arm, the Open Society Georgia 
Foundation (OSGF).  The first event was a visit by four members of the research 
team, namely Professor Charles Sampford and Dr Arthur Shacklock from Griffith 
University in Australia and Messrs Jeremy Pope and Martin Tisne from Tiri.  
During their 2 week visit they met with numerous key people from government and 
civil society, particularly NGOs, to determine the right path to take with GNISA.  
A workshop was then held at the end of this period to bring together experts from 
within Georgia to guide the research team in several ways, such as the choice of 
local partners and interviewers, the development of draft questionnaires for use by 
GNISA and the proposed timing and schedule of activities needed to best achieve 
the objectives of the project. 
At the conclusion of this week, three NGOs were selected to be local 
partners to work with Griffith University and Tiri on GNISA.  These were:  the 
Caucasus Institute for Peace, Development and Democracy (CIPDD), the Georgian 
Young Lawyers Association (GYLA) and Transparency International (Georgia).   
Tentative interview teams were established and two draft questionnaires were 
developed, also during this 2 week period.  One questionnaire was designed for 
interviews with representatives from core government institutions from the 
Executive, Parliamentary and Judicial arms of government.  The other 
                                                
21
  Tiri is an independent non-governmental organisation that works with 
governments, business and civil society to find practical solutions to making 
integrity work. Improvements in integrity offer perhaps the single largest 
opportunity for sustainable and equitable development worldwide. Tiri's two 
groundbreaking networks are the Public Integrity Education Network (PIEN) and 
the Network for Integrity in Reconstruction (NIR). Tiri is working to strengthen 
existing networks among chief judges and chief election commissioners. In 2007 
Tiri launches the Business Integrity Education Network (BIEN). 
(http://www.tiri.org/) The Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF) is committed 
to programs that respond to political and economic change and contribute to the 
long-term development of open society in Georgia. To this end, the foundation has 
cooperated with local and regional partners, focusing on governance, 
anticorruption, and the rule of law, women’s rights, mass media, economic 
development, education, public health, regional collaboration, and conflict 
resolution initiatives. More specifically, the foundation’s activities have included 
organizing training programs for new council members; building democratic 
relationships between representatives and constituents; encouraging transparency 
and accountability; raising public awareness about human rights; educating young 
people as leaders; connecting schools and education organizations to the Internet; 
promoting patients’ rights; and supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises 
through policy, legislation, and training initiatives. 
(http://www.soros.org/about/foundations/georgia) 
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questionnaire was for those external to the national government sector which 
included a wide variety of civil society entities such as NGOs, the Media, the 
Church and Local Government. 
 
A.2.2 Specific Aims of the GNISA Project 
 
The aims of GNISA included the following: 
 
• To map and evaluate the performance of Georgia’s integrity institutions 
and practices, identify their strengths and weaknesses and to provide the 
basis for recommendations for further reforms, aimed at making existing 
laws, mechanisms and institutions function more effectively rather than 
creating new ones. 
• To assess the performance of the existing institutions against a standard 
set of established ‘good practice’ functions, examining why a particular 
institution was established, what its mandate is, how effective its 
performance has been in providing outputs for other parts of the system 
and the performance of other parts of the system in providing that 
institution with the inputs envisaged by a coherent system.  (Such analysis 
can then lead to conclusions about whether the current institutions and 
practices cover all functions adequately, and thus inform and stimulate 
further reforms as well as highlighting progress (strengths and 
weaknesses) in performance made to date).  
• To identify conflicts of interest (e.g. where one institution is responsible 
for two distinct and ethically-contradictory functions), duplication (e.g. 
when one function is carried out by several institutions) or omissions (if 
certain functions are not covered at all or covered inadequately). Most 
importantly, tracking the performance credits (what the institutions are 
providing to others within the system) as well as the deficits (the extent to 
which they are failing to do so). These credits and deficits provide clear 
signals as to where problems lie, and the extent or otherwise of the 
success of a reform programme. 
• Through these actions, to significantly assist the leaders of reform efforts 
in Georgia and provide a means for tracking the successes of present 
reforms by repeating the mapping exercise from time to time, with 
international institutions and donors being involved in constructively 
assisting those institutions that are closest to their economic and 
developmental mandates.  
 
While the GNISA project has been a stand-alone activity with finite and 
specifically targeted funding, it was always envisaged that it would be ideal if this 
NISA process could be repeated every 3 to 5 years to provide both a re-assessment 
and evaluation of progress over time as well as serving as a continuing stimulus for 
current and future reformers. 
The final stage of the GNISA has been the preparation of this report for 
submission to the government and to the institutions that have been included in the 
assessment process, for comment, prior its finalisation, publication and release. 
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A.2.3  Steps Taken in the GNISA Project 
 
While the project originally was tasked to be finished in 2006, it soon became 
evident that this was a highly ambitious goal.  This was largely brought about by 
the difficulty in getting some very senior and very busy interviewees to the 
interview table.  These difficulties were exacerbated by the unavoidable need to 
change team members and reduce the team numbers in Georgia in unexpected 
ways during the process.  As a result, the interviews were not concluded until very 
late in 2006. At the same time it is very important to note that the report suggested 
to the reader reflects situation of 2006 and does not include analysis of 
institutional reforms that took place late 2006 or in 2007. For instance structural 
changes occurred in the Ministry of Finance, when its major units Customs 
Department, Taxation Department and Financial Police were merged are not 
reflected in the document. Consequently assessment of the process or its 
consequences is not given in the report.   
However, the results of this work were most encouraging in other ways.  
Altogether 83 interviews were conducted within the various sectors as follows: 
 
 Executive Institutions:  28 
 Parliamentary Institutions:    9 
 Judiciary and Court Related Institutions:    8 
 NGOs:  14 
 International and Donor Institutions:  10 
 Media:    4 
 Local Government:    3 
 Special Others:    7 
 
This substantial body of data emanating from these interviews was dealt 
with firstly by translation into English to facilitate discussion between the Georgian 
Research Team and other GNISA researchers.  An initial batch of 26 interviews 
was analysed by the Griffith researchers in early 2006 (primarily by Ms Carmel 
Connors) in order to determine the quality of responses and to suggest any 
variations to the interview process or write-ups and in order to set up a suitable 
process for this purpose to be used by the Georgian Team as other interviews 
progressed.  In this way, interviews were being written-up and analysed 
continuously, while new interviews were being conducted.  This proved to be a 
very time-consuming and resource-intensive process, which took several months to 
complete, far longer than had originally been anticipated.   
In order to canvas the findings and review the content emanating from 
interviews, three focus groups were organised by the Georgian NISA team, one of 
which focused particularly on Local Government issues.  In the latter case, some of 
the recommendations regarding that sector emanated from this focus group process.  
All three of these focus groups were comprised of representatives from 
governmental institutions (Audit Chamber, Public Service Bureau, Office of State 
Minister for Reforms Coordination issues, Ombudsman's Office, and the High 
Council of Justice) as well as representatives from NGOs (Caucasus Institute for 
Peace, Democracy and Development, International Center for Civil Culture, 
Georgian Young Economists Association, Georgian Young Lawyers Association, 
United Nations Association, Urban Institute and the Local Government 
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Association). This process was then helped by a further unscheduled visit by Mr 
Martin Tisne in 2006, to assist the Georgian Team in furthering this process. 
Following the completion and initial analysis of the 83 interviews and their 
outcomes, a second workshop was help in Tbilisi, in November 2006 to analyse the 
data with local researchers and experts in order to synthesise the GNISA findings 
into draft recommendations.  This workshop was conducted by Dr Arthur 
Shacklock and Mr Martin Tisne, with the valuable assistance of OSGF staff as the 
local partners and members of the Georgian Research Team. 
As a result of this work and subsequent work from afar between the 
various team members, a draft report was completed in May 2007 which outlined 
the broad findings of the GNISA project and summarised recommendations made 
by the various people interviewed as regards the actions needed in Georgia to 
enhance the integrity system.  This resulted in 26 overall recommendations being 
made, for consideration by the Georgian Government for future action to enhance 
the integrity system.   
The report which this introductory chapter now prefaces covers the sum 
total of the work on the GNISA project.  Its findings and recommendations are 
submitted and commended for consideration. 
 
A.3 Summary of GNISA Recommendations 
 
Recommendations are given in full under each sector in Part C of this report.  
Provided here is a brief summary of those recommendations.  Where a number 
appears in brackets, eg: (3), this indicates that this recommendation emanated from 
more than one sector of the current integrity system.  The recommendations are not 
listed in any particular order of priority.  
 
Useful Anti-corruption Websites and Publications  
 
Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) Website: <http://www.gyla.ge/>. 
ICAC Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption Website: 
<http://www.icac.org.hk/eng/main/>.  
Independent Commission Against Corruption (NSW) (1994), Unravelling corruption 
(Sydney: ICAC). 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (NSW), (2000), What is an ethical culture: 
Key issues in building an ethical organisation. (Sydney: ICAC). 
Key Centre for Ethics Law Justice and Governance and Transparency International (2005), 
Australian National Integrity Systems Assessment: Queensland Handbook 
(Brisbane: Griffith University). Available at <http://www.griffith.edu.au/kceljag>. 
Office of the Commissioner for Public Sector Standards (OPSSC) (2001),. Public Sector 
Standards in Human Resource Management (Perth; Office of the Public Sector 
Standards Commissioner). Available <http://www.wa.gov.au/opssc/>. 
Office of the Commissioner for Public Sector Standards (OPSSC) (2007), Website 
<http://www.opssc.wa.gov.au/>. Accessed 16 May 2007. 
Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF)  Website: <http://osgf.ge/>. Accessed 16 May 
2007. 
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Sampford, C., Shacklock, A., Connors, C. and Galtung, F.  (2006), Measuring Corruption 
(Aldershot: Ashgate). 
Transparency International (Georgia) Website: <http://www.transparency.ge/>. Accessed 
16 May 2007. 
Transparency International (TI) Website: 
<http://www.transparency.org/index.php/policy_research/nis/regional> Accessed 
16 May 2007.  
 B: Historical and Cultural Background  
 
B.1. Introduction  
 
This section provides a background to the National Integrity System Assessment of 
Georgia.  It deals with some on the theoretical and empirical issues regarding both 
the public and private sectors and their relationships in the pursuit of integrity and 
anti-corruption activities. 
Georgia’s struggle for independence in late 1980s led by nationalist 
dissidents was supported by the majority of Georgian society not only because of 
the strength of nationalistic ideas, but also because of the inefficiency and 
corruption of Soviet state institutions. The situation, which had not improved much 
since Perestroika began, encouraged lower and middle layers of the Georgian 
society (as in other societies of the Soviet Union) to look for ways out of the Soviet 
deadlock. The ‘Trinity’ of ‘Independence’, ‘Democracy’ and ‘Fair State’ that 
emerged in the public mind was conceived by society as the only way to end the 
abuse of social and economic benefits by the Communist Party elite. 
Nevertheless, the state building process did not develop in a way imagined 
by Georgian society. The first decade of independence with citizens tormented by a 
military coup and civil wars was at the very beginning of Georgian Statehood and 
showed that the system built by the country’s political elite was not ‘Just’, ‘Fair’ 
and ‘Democratic’. This gap between societal demands and aspirations on one hand 
and the existing political system on the other hand – existing for more than a 
decade – resulted in a strong social upheaval at the beginning of the millennium 
and ended with the Rose Revolution in November 2003. 
In trying to explain these defects of the Georgian and, generally, Postsoviet 
development, experts began to pay more attention to the role of past governing 
elites. Professor Charles Fairbanks points out that processes went wrong because 
changes were driven by groups, which represented the corrupt decision maker class 
of the previous Soviet system. Such groups included those pragmatic 
‘Aparatchiki’ 22  who adapted themselves to the new political and economic 
conditions while maintaining their political power and continuing to use formal 
State institutions to fulfil their private needs and goals.23 Fairbanks argues that the 
State and its functions had been remoulded into the patron-client relationship 
network that permitted minority access to political, economic and social benefits 
that were closed for the majority of the society.  
Such a situation raises the following questions: 
 
1. What type of state and government had emerged in Georgia since its 
independence? What was the pattern of the political system and state 
administrative system coherence? How was the ‘Public Sphere’ structured? 
Was the ‘Public Sphere’ provided by a set of the formal institutions that 
would regulate relations between political, economic and social dimensions?  
 
                                                
22
  Soviet definition of the managerial class. 
23
  Fairbanks Ch. ‘The Feudal Analogy’ // Journal of Democracy. №3, July, 2000, p. 
34. 
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2. What had happened to the State in terms of the corrupted ‘trinity’ of ‘Political 
Power’ – ‘Governance’ – ‘Property’? How was this ‘trinity’ to determine the 
process of social and economic systems development? What was the pattern 
of ‘State-Society’ relationship: was it based political, economic and social 
demands of equal transfer into the society’s formal institutional system by 
social groups; or was it tied to the private interests of groups formally 
representing the functions of state institutions, and aimed at maintaining and 
strengthening their political influence and control over economic resources 
and benefits provided through the State system? 
 
3. What kind of inclusion/exclusion mechanisms had evolved in this system? 
Who could access formal institutional services and to what extent? And, 
considering all these issues was there any ‘Public Sphere’ in Georgia at all? 
 
 
B.2. Public Space and State Functions: Theoretical-
Normative View and Its Relationship to the Georgian 
Situation in 1990s 
 
Institutionalization and formalization of the interests of private citizens ensure that 
all citizens have equal access to public services. Formalization of these private 
interests are based on written norms and rules and occur across vertical and 
hierarchical dimensions of society. Hence, there emerges an environment in which 
private roles are structured and separated from institutional functions. There are 
producers, consumers and distributors of the public good (material, social or 
cultural) in this system of social exchange. Based on affirmation of a fair and just 
system, citizen support for this system of social interaction provides legitimacy for 
the social and political structures, and builds trust and social capital across the 
system. The society’s ability to secure formal institutional functions from being 
usurped by private interests provides an appropriate environment for individual and 
group inclusion in the system of production and distribution of social and economic 
goods. In this sense, the State, as one of the functionaries of the ‘Social System’, 
plays a significant role.  
The State as a political organization is justified on the basis that it emerged 
from an imaginary social contract.  It comprises a set of formal institutions with 
delegated power to execute societal demands. The State as a construct is justified 
on the basis that it meets the public needs of society. The function of the State is 
widely seen as fulfilling societal needs and promoting the public good (and in 
constitutional democracies the nature of the public good being contested and 
subject to popular determination through constitutional means). In this sense, state 
institutions may be seen as emerging from social demand and represent its 
continuance into the political dimension. The institutionalization of the relationship 
should not allow the needs of the social groups served to be neglected or ignored. 
In this public sphere, formalized practices are represented as field of activities in 
which one acts not in terms of the personal monopolized power, but in terms of the 
institutionalized functions which delegate certain levels of power to its agent. 
Therefore, the State is the institution that organizes the delegation of power to the 
agency level. Organizational roles determine the various hierarchical and 
horizontal relationships. Consequently, the State is the institution that provides 
security within the public space. Equal access to services for private citizens and 
their inclusion in the institutional environment are regulated by the State. In this 
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way, through inclusion of broad social layers, the State should provide depth to the 
public space. This connection between State and ‘Public Space’ ensures citizens’ 
compliance with state institutional processes, improves legitimacy of the system, 
and provides stability to State operations: citizens belief in the capacity of state 
institutions to provide efficient allocation of social, political, economic and cultural 
demands improves identity with and loyalty to the State.24 Otherwise loyalty and 
identity are counter productive and undermine stable functioning of the intertwined 
social and political-administrative institutions.  
The question arises: given the high minded functions of the state, how is it 
that States can be remoulded into a threat to citizen, society and the public good? 
To put it another way: how is state power, created and justified to further the public 
good and entrusted to public officials abused for the purposes of the officials or 
their parties (i.e. corrupted)?  Or is the problem not the State as such, but the 
effects of State elimination from the ‘Public Space’? What happened with Georgia 
in this sense? 
In the twentieth century, Georgia’s political institutions, as generally with 
the USSR political institutions (Communist Party apparatus), were not formally 
separated from the administrative body of the State. Formally, party and executive 
bodies on each level of the administrative division25 existed separately from each 
other, but this separation was conventional, as executive bodies recruitment rules 
were regulated and the Communist Party determined governance policies. This 
situation provided real administrative power to high and middle rank members of 
the Party apparatus, thus creating a basis for the personification of administrative 
institutions. This kind of personification was not just soviet ‘know how’, but a type 
of private power inherited by the Soviet state from the Russian Empire. In this 
sense, the privatization of state functions had quite a long historical background as 
Georgia was a part of Russian Empire and (with a brief post-revolutionary hiatus) 
of the Soviet Union for 200 years.  
In the Soviet Union, the extent to which this private power could perform 
was stronger at the peripheries and at the lower levels of the administrative 
machine where central government control was less. Consequently, in Georgia, the 
degree of privatization of power was high and mostly at those state administrative 
levels which were closely tied to the daily needs of society. Privatized power 
displaced the State more and more and subordinated the ‘Public Space’, thus 
destroying it. ‘Public Space’ in the Soviet system was artificial and has not 
emerged through evolutionary processes. It was designed and constructed by a 
Communist Party ideology based elite. Even though this type of ‘Public Space’ 
guaranteed citizens inclusion in the social and economic systems of the Soviet 
State (through State regulated social projects and economic activities), this kind of 
‘Public Space’ was easily destroyed, as it was not opened to societal processes at 
the lower levels of public participation. Consequently, the institutional 
environment functioned independently from society and allowed governing elites 
to abuse power and to isolate state institutions from citizens needs. This situation 
assumes that within the Soviet system the ‘Public Space’ was easily constricted. 
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  State-Society Synergy: Government and Social Capital in Development / Ed. P. 
Evans. Berkley: University of California. 
25
  For instance, there were District Party Committee and District Executive 
Committee; City Party Committee and City Executive Committee; Regional 
(Oblast) Party Committee and Regional (Oblast) Executive Committee and so on, 
making-up the administrative-territorial division of the Soviet State.  
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Formal rules lost their universal character allowing private interest based power 
structures to enter into the public space. Citizens needing institutional services 
dealt not with the State but with certain groups of people involved in public 
institutions with completely privatized functions. That is why the only way for 
citizens to satisfy requests for public services was either to buy the service (i.e. 
bribery) or to be involved in private relationship networks with those who 
represented privatized institutional functions (through friendship, kinship or shared 
interests groups).  
The dynamics of privatized institutional functions in Georgia, exhibited 
through corruption, nepotism and patronage, reached its heights in 1970-1980s. At 
this stage, the social welfare services of the country were relatively stable and 
strong. The society was divided into those included in clientele networks and those 
who did not fit the criteria (wealth, kinship, friendship etc.) for inclusion in 
established relationship networks.  
At the beginning of the 1980s, strong support for the National 
Independence Movement by Georgian society can be explained by changes in 
social relations and attitudes towards the State, which were generated by the effects 
of the privatization of state institutions. The worsening economic situation, in 
which most parts of the society found itself, resulted in citizens being unable to 
benefit from state services and the growing social differentiation caused corruption 
to flourish and lessened the emotional ties of society with the State. Identification 
with and loyalty to the Soviet State was weak. Citizens supported an independent 
Georgia. This support was partly due to the reasons already discussed and 
evidenced by meetings and demonstrations organized by nationalist leaders who 
frequently expounded the dissatisfaction of those who suffered the effects of 
corruption by universities, labour unions26 or other institutions from which citizens 
did not receive proper/expected service. This support for the National 
Independence Movement was so broad and Communist regime was so discredited, 
that the election of October 1990 ended 70 years of rule by the Communist Party.  
A new national government led by the political group of the Round Table – 
Independent Georgia and its leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia  – began to discharge its 
commitment of building a just and fair state supporting an ‘ideal social justice’ 
system and the rule of law by excluding vast segments of the former communist 
nomenclatura and apparatus officials from the ‘Public Space’. These kind of ‘soft’ 
repressions were aimed at lessening corruption in state institutions but really had 
no effect, as people appointed to perform institutional functions by the new 
government were incompetent. They lacked an understanding of procedural routine 
and methods of institutional role execution. The process, which was aimed at 
combating state corruption and institutional inefficiency, ended in a chaotic process 
of redistribution of control over economic resources and property. Thus, new 
government anticorruption policy resulted in new waves of corruption, as it was 
based on exclusion from society of certain segments and undermined principles of 
the declared ‘Social Justice’ project.  
Meanwhile, it is very important to note that activities begun in the early 
1990s during Gamsakhurdia’s brief period was not determined just by ‘ill will’ or 
incompetence of the new political elite. Mostly, the processes were determined by 
an already existing situation in the administrative institutional system and its 
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connections with the economic system. For instance, the government attempted to 
separate private business activities from the role of state institutions (especially in 
industry sector which was run by the State). In the Perestroika period, many so 
called ‘Cooperative’ organizations emerged under coverage of different 
administrative and communist nomenclature clans and resulted in the collapse of 
this sector. Consequently, a vast segment of the society (newly formed class of 
property owners) was marginalized from the system and was transformed into its 
enemy. The weakness of the emerging institutional system was that it was to create 
a structured sets of norms and formal rules for state-business relationship 
regulation, 27 but it crudely cut already existing ties between state institutions and 
private business that, of course, were corrupted but represented effective 
mechanisms for servicing the needs of citizens. This mass of property owners, 
which emerged as a result of the economic policy of the Perestroika period, was 
totally dependent upon the private material interests of the governing communist 
elite. Economic infrastructure of the ‘Cooperative’ sector was built on the basis of 
the existing ‘State Economy Sector’ using and abusing its material-technical asserts 
(buildings and even raw materials). In most cases, ‘Cooperatives’ sold production 
made by State enterprises as their own. It permitted businessman ‘Cooperators’ 
(clans) in the state administration to use state property and material-financial 
resources for personal enrichment through non-transparent economic activities.  
Growing dissatisfaction of society with Gamsakhurdia’s state building 
policy (defined not only by the above mentioned aspects, but also his intolerance 
towards political opponents) was the ostensible reason for the military coup in 
1991–1992.  
In 1992, a new era in Georgia’s development began when the former 
Soviet minister of foreign affairs Eduard Shevardnadze was invited to lead a new 
government. Shevardnadze was a leader who emerged from a deal between 
different political groups involved in 1991–1992 coup. As he did not belong to any 
of these groups, he represented the status quo in the power distribution system. 
Shevardnadze did not have his own clan that would claim absolute power over the 
benefits provided by control over privatized institutions. A parliamentary republic 
declared by a new Georgian political elite was a guarantee that a single political 
group would not monopolize power. Nevertheless, it did not mean that the situation 
regarding the private character of public institutions would be changed. Groups 
based on diverse material interests controlled the parliamentary system. The 
government leader and head of parliament (in this case Eduard Shevardnadze) had 
symbolic power without the ability to interfere or regulate. Thus, different state 
institutions, from the customs office and including the communication sector, 
ministries of industry, the grain corporation and the banking sector, provided 
certain material benefits to groups that controlled them. In this system, chaos and 
anarchy resulted. The ‘Public Space’ was completely undermined by corrupted and 
privatized institutions and no public services were provided to ordinary citizens.  
Within this environment, totally corrupted and discredited political clans 
and public institutions deprived of their public character and isolated from public 
needs existed. At the same time, however, dissatisfaction with the existing situation 
by ordinary citizens was growing along with public awareness of the need for a 
stable and transparent State. This situation created the basis for the emergence of a 
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new wave of political groups working for State reformation. Shevardnadze 
disbanded his old political alliances.28 He created a new political party — Citizens 
Union of Georgia (CUG) — and gathered young political leaders such as Zurab 
Jvania and later Mikheil Saakashvili around him. This political action consolidated 
public approval for Shevardnadze’s efforts of state building. In August 1995, a new 
Constitution was adopted which transformed Georgia into a presidential republic. 
The popular acceptance of the reformation policy manifested itself in the 1995 
presidential election in which he received 72 per cent of the votes. In fact, these 
changes led to the monopolization of power around Shevardnadze and his group 
and the young reformatory flank remained as a front for the governing elite’s 
activities. In this environment, this group became marginalized inside the CUG 
party and became a basis for the party crisis and its split two years before the 
revolutionary upheaval in 2003.  
 
 
B.3. State Roles and its Place in Public-Private 
Relationships: Theoretical-Normative View and its 
Correspondence to the Georgian Situation in 1990s 
 
Establishment of a monopolized power relationship system, which was aimed at 
satisfying the particularistic economic interests of agents involved in this system, 
caused consequent changes in the ‘Public Space’ and ‘Private Space’ relationship, 
thereby altering State functions. 
The idea of ‘Public Space’ is based upon and emerged from an imagined 
‘Social Contract’ that is, from the field of activities, interrelationship and 
interdependencies of people who consider and recognize each other as equal 
members of the certain social, economic and cultural systems. The set of universal 
rules regulating the actions of agents provides for the exclusion of a single 
subjective will that emerges from outside the norms and rules established through 
mutual agreement. The role of state institutions in providing formal communication 
processes and enabling the efficient operation of the State in the public space is 
immense. The State functions of legislation, law enforcement, and 
administration/governance regulate the communication process amongst various 
social, economic and political agents inside the public space. The State provides 
the basis for broad individual inclusion within the public sphere. In such a context, 
the State performs social, economic and political stabilization functions. It provides 
equal access to the various societal agents for involvement and participation in the 
social, economic and political systems through interpersonal relationships with the 
systems of production and distribution/consumption of various benefits. 29 
Realization of this type of stabilization function is greatly dependent on the State’s 
ability/flexibility to be in touch with social demands and to resolve societal 
conflicts. If the State is unable to carry-out its stabilizing function when the public 
space is constricted, the universal character of formal laws is violated and the 
stabilizing function of the State is minimized as private personal or group interests 
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find satisfaction in informal networks of power and resource control that usurp the 
role of formal State institutions.30  
In these circumstances, separation of the private sphere of interpersonal 
relationships and networks is provided by a set of formal and universal norms 
which are shared by all parts of society. This set of norms, rules and principles 
regulates private activities in accordance with the functions of formal institutions. 
This separation formalizes individual and group relationships into interactions of a 
public nature. It remoulds the relationship into societal agents/agencies that are 
characterized by certain duties and functions. The definition and articulation of 
emerging interests in a private space are aggregated and satisfied in a public space. 
Consequently, the private interests of societal agents/agencies are regulated by and 
directed into a set of formal public institutions thus defining and constructing a 
system of formal horizontal and vertical relationships between a variety of societal 
agents/agencies which seek ways of achieving their private interests.31 Each of 
these agents/agencies is subordinated to the same service procedures defined by 
universal norms and rules of the formal institutional environment. In this case, 
institutionalization and formalization of relationships minimize the possibility of 
exclusion or elimination of some individual or group needs based on private 
assumptions or preferences of persons involved in the formal institutional 
environment. In a given context, private interests have to deal and interact with 
institutional functions not with certain individuals representing these functions.  
The State has a significant role (through its administrative functions) to 
play in the separation of the public and private sphere. It is supposed to organize 
and regulates economic and social interaction through guaranteeing the universality 
of principles and norms which evolved in the public space. The State provides an 
environment of equality in a society’s economic, political and social systems. 
‘Private Space’ is not immanent to the State. ‘Private Space’ retains the role of 
institutional care and concern, as the State provides a public space function and is 
the main institutional setting in which private interests are served. A ‘Just State’ 
guarantees access for the realization of demands and needs which emerge in a 
private space without differentiation between groups and while satisfying the 
interests of elements of the society without denying requests or excluding certain 
societal agents/agencies. Equality of access to the formal institutional environment 
of the public space as a guaranteed principle is provided through state regulation of 
just laws/rules that do not allow private (personal or group) stimuli to usurp state 
functions and destroy the formal institutional framework of public space.  
This theoretical overview shows that in the1990s the Georgian state was 
distant from a normative assessment of public space and its institutional framework. 
In the Georgian case, the State carried out its functions and brought certain benefits 
to a small part of society while excluding the majority of citizens. Destruction of 
the institutionalized environment of economic and social interaction and 
relationships was followed by an expansion of private, particularistic interests into 
the public space. The administrative-managerial state functions which served the 
demands of society were usurped by the particularistic interests of individuals to 
whom these functions were delegated. Privatization of state institutions allowed the 
leading political elite and associated clans to isolate most parts of Georgian society 
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from the economic and social systems, thereby remoulding state mechanisms and 
resources to achieve the private material interests of the Georgian elite.  
In this sense, it is worth discussing some aspects of the Georgian 
government’s economic policy, especially aspects of state property management 
and privatization of the mid 1990s under Shevardnadze that illustrate incidents of 
corruption and state institutional collapse. The beginning of the economic sector 
liberalization process and the building of a free market economy in Georgia 
resulted in the emergence of a closed system of economic relationships open to a 
very small part of the Georgian society. Instead of a state controlled economic 
infrastructure, clans emerged which were strongly tied to political groups and 
administrative officials whose economic activities and wealth were built on 
speculative and sometimes criminal dealings with the State in property or trade 
transactions. The beginning of 1990s was characterized by a fierce economic crisis 
in Georgia as a result of the soviet economic system collapse and the economic 
actions of the Georgian political and economic elites. Industry production fell 27 
per cent in 1992 compared with 1991, and 32 per cent compared with 1989 
production.32 In this critical situation, control of the administrative institutions and 
access to state property management offered high profits to the political elite and 
the old soviet upper economic class which had financial resources and still 
controlled the existing economic infrastructure that allowed them to become a new 
property owner class in Georgia. Bankrupting state enterprises and then privatizing 
them at undervalued prices was very beneficial to this group. In this sense, the state 
property upper managerial class under Shevardnadze really determined the 
character of the economic liberalization process and corrupted the state 
administrative system.  
For instance, in 1992, before the state property privatization process began, 
the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Georgia adopted a new rule for 
financing of industry sector ministries. By Order N4 ‘About the Rules of 
Ministerial Apparatus Expenditures Financing’, all state enterprises were obliged to 
pay 1.5 percent of the balance income per month. For example, it meant that if a 
factory or plant had 1,000,000 roubles33 of balance income, it had to pay 15,000 
roubles per month to the budget; when the pure income was 1,000,000 roubles, the 
balance income was 10,000 roubles and 5,000 roubles was required to be paid from 
the basic capital of the enterprise. In that period, part of the Georgian state property 
infrastructure owned tens of millions in balance incomes. It is very difficult to 
imagine what amount of money was paid by 1,365 large and medium industrial 
units (not to mention smaller enterprises); how these flows of money were 
managed; and, who controlled it. One thing is obvious:  this action helped to 
bankrupt state owned enterprises and created a basis for their undervalued 
privatization.  
Additionally, ‘Branch Industrial Concerns’, in which the old soviet upper 
managerial class and new political groups were involved, were created. The formal 
aim of the ‘Concerns’ was to optimize existing economic infrastructure, reform 
them and create a basis for the profitable privatization of the state owned industrial 
units — that is, profitable for the State. In fact, these ‘Concerns’ served the private 
material interests of the people involved in the operation. The only achievement of 
this group was the investment of government funds in state industries without any 
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positive effects for the country. The result of their actions was the confiscation of 
the development funds of the industrial units and the requisition of 60 per cent of 
the circulation funds that enabled state owned industrial units managers to sell raw 
materials and even the means of production. In this situation, the collapse of the 
economic infrastructure and the subsequent bankruptcy of the ‘Concerns’ was the 
only result. Consequently, on the eve of state property privatization in 1994, 
Georgia’s industry production capacity was 15 per cent of its 1989 size.34  
In this situation, the fiscal policy of the government also helped clans and 
their political lobbyists to strengthen control over the economic sector privatization 
processes. In 1992, instead of soviet Roubles, the Georgian government issued 
coupons.35  The economic crisis exacerbated coupon hyperinflation and assisted 
those who — in alliance with corrupted public officials — were involved in non-
transparent economic activities. The Georgian National Bank was allowed to issue 
long-term multi-million credits. In these circumstances, inflation rapidly 
depreciated the value of the coupon. Thus, it was possible to speculate with fiscal 
policy. It is very important to note that these kinds of activities were open only to 
the certain groups of people involved in corrupt networks. It is worth noting that 
the aim of the newly emerged class of property owners (former soviet industry 
managerial class and state political/administrative elite) was not to maintain the 
profile of the purchased industries, but to remould the property into a financial 
capital asset. According to the statistics, 135 privatized industrial units out of the 
672 established did not function at all in 1997, and others functioned with only 8–
12 per cent of their potential production outputs.36 Most parts of the privatized 
factories and plants were deconstructed and sold as building materials or scrap 
metal.  
The above-mentioned processes of merging state administrative tools with 
the economic activities of certain groups remoulded the state administrative system 
into a system of material benefits circulation with horizontal and vertical offshoots 
serving the economic interests of agents/agencies at the top level. Middle and 
lower layers of this system were allowed to serve their own interests because of the 
pyramidal structure of the patron-client relationship. For instance, someone who 
was a regional governor or taxation system official, and who was bounded by 
corrupted ties of nepotism with business people, could create their own clientele, 
thus strengthening influence and increasing wealth. But even in this case, a person 
on the middle or lower layers of the system remained as someone’s client on the 
top level thus increasing the wealth of the patron. If there was any deviation in this 
pyramidal structure of patron-client relations, it was followed by the exclusion of 
the deviant agents — whether that be state officials or businesses under their 
protection. 
A consequence of these actions was a loss of public faith and trust in state 
institutions. Social surveys provide data showing that the society’s prior concerns 
were based on economic problems that were caused by a corrupt state 
administrative system. According to the results of the sociological survey 
conducted in October 2001, 37  answers to the question: ‘What are the most 
important problems of Georgia nowadays?’ reveals the following: 
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  Georgia’s Statistical Year-Book, Tbilisi, 2000. 
35
  Temporary monetary unit. 
36
  Georgia’s Statistical Year-Book, Tbilisi, 2000. 
37
 Public Education Project, Exit Survey Results // GORBI, Tbilisi, Oct. 2001.    
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The data shows that the public mind was led to assume that problems 
connected to the well being of the society were more than a problem of corruption. 
Though, in this case, we should take into account how corruption is understood by 
society. Is it understood in its narrow definition as bribery, or generally as different 
types of particularistic activities connected with the abuse of delegated power? The 
above-mentioned survey does not reflect on this issue. However, if we take into 
account that economic stagnation and mass unemployment were caused by the 
corruption of state institutions and their ties with criminal entrepreneurship, thus 
causing state inability to create an environment for free market economic relations 
and the encouragement of individual economic initiatives, it becomes obvious, then, 
that economic problems in the public mind are related to corruption problems. 
Consequently, this interconnection can be shown by data illustrating who benefits 
from this situation. A survey conducted by the Georgian Opinion Research 
Business International (GORBI) sociological group in 200238 shows the question, 
‘How did the economic situation in Georgia change during last two years?’ to 
reveal the following answers: 
 
Economic situation got better  1.3 % 
Economic situation got slightly better 16.4 % 
Economic situation remains being as it was 27 % 
Economic situation got worse 32 % 
Economic situation worsened too much 22.9 % 
 
As shown, an absolute minority of the respondents expressed their 
contentment with the existing economic situation while 54.9 per cent (if the 
responses are aggregated for those who thought that situation ‘got worse’ and ‘got 
much worse’) felt disappointment with the established processes. More perplexing 
are answers to the same question for a six months period: only 0.9 per cent 
expressed an opinion that the situation ‘got better’, and 9.6 per cent that the 
situation ‘got slightly better’.39  
Such attitudes towards the existing situation that was assumed to be unjust 
should destabilize a regime. Nevertheless, the system built by Shaverdnadze and 
his political-economic group functioned until November 2003 and easily survived a 
political crisis in 2001 when the young reformatory flank of the CGU opposed the 
regime because of the existing economic situation and state system corruption. 
Why did the regime not collapse in 2001?  
The state administrative system functioned under monopolized private 
control. Stability was provided through the harmonization and satisfaction of the 
mutual interests all the agents/agencies involved in the system. In this sense, the 
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  Corruption, Exit Survey Results // GORBI, June, 2002. 
39
  Corruption, Exit Survey Results // GORBI, June, 2002. 
Economic problems  59.3 % 
Unemployment problems  42.5 % 
Problem of territorial integrity 33.4 % 
Problem of corruption 16.5 % 
Political problems 14 % 
Peace problem 12 % 
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ability of the system to realize these needs was engendered through the loyalty of 
agents to the system itself.  
The monopolization of private control over the state administrative system 
was based on client relationships as the universal form of interest achievement. It 
gave a clan-informal character to the relationships inside the system based on 
group loyalties (kinship, friendship, regionalism/tribalism etc.). In this situation, 
some groups were allowed to participate in the production and distribution of 
benefits while some were not; or some groups were allowed to control most of the 
beneficial economic activities and sectors, while others, because of their group 
associations, loyalties and consequent ties with their patrons on middle or lower 
levels of the power/control distribution, participated in more minor economic 
activities. For instance, President Shevardnadze family members could control or 
possess energy sector businesses (fuel or gas import), communication sector 
businesses (cellular phone communication, transportation), mining or raw material 
businesses; while clans built by governors or other regional officials were allowed 
to control/possess less strategic but also very beneficial economic sectors such as 
tourism, trade, customs. On the lower level of the state administrative system, the 
main activity was bribery and centred on the acquisition of financial or material 
benefits. The stable functioning of the Shevardnadze period clan system was 
dependent upon its feudal character. Loyalty of the agents/agencies involved in 
gaining and distributing material benefits was guaranteed by granting them the 
right to usurp the state administrative system from the top in accordance with their 
ability to serve the economic interests of the top political-economic class. This 
situation was mutually beneficial for all sides. The exclusion/isolation of a large 
part of society from access to state administrative services deprived them of the 
ability to control the functions of the state administrative system and ensured 
stability for the existing system. But such actions only deal with stability inside the 
system. Corrupted political-administrative-economic ties between agents/agencies 
(a minority of the society) involved in the system vertical-horizontal structures 
provided stability from inside, but isolation of broad society from the state 
institutions created an environment of instability in which system had to function. 
In this sense, the system had no internal crisis. Spontaneous social upheavals did 
not undermine its ability to maintain stability even in the autumn of 2001. It 
survived although there were popular protests against it as it was supported from 
within the system itself. The CUG young reformatory group led by Zurab Jvania 
and Mikheil Saakashvili voiced concerns of existing problems of corruption and 
the consequent inefficiency of the state administrative system. As mentioned 
previously, at that time, the system survived, as the new leaders did not risk leading 
a social upheaval. But events that took place at that time (the CUG split and the 
emergence of powerful opposition movement against the regime) created a basis 
for the Rose Revolution in November 2003.  
 
 
B.4. State and Society in 1990s Georgia: Interest Fulfilment 
Mechanisms and its Patterns — Problems of 
Corruption  
 
As previously argued, public space is a sphere of societal agents/agencies 
relationships in vertical and horizontal dimensions. These interactions provide 
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formality and institutionalization of activities in which societal actions are 
legitimized by a common understanding of the public good that is achieved through 
individual interest realization in an institutional environment based on universal 
and general norms and principles. These processes provide equal access to and 
inclusion in this institutional network. When this institutional environment of 
public space merges with the private sphere of societal activities and particular 
private interests dominate the functioning of public institutions, public space 
institutions become part of the private sphere of certain societal agents/agencies. In 
this sense, as public institutions are remoulded into the tools of certain groups, 
private interests satisfaction and the private interests of other societal groups 
become excluded as they are deprived of access to the institutional environment of 
problems solving and interests realization. To satisfy their interests, excluded 
societal agents/agencies are forced to find other means to realize needs from the 
existing institutional environment.  
In terms of the privatized institutional environment, the private interests of 
a variety of societal agents/agencies — not included in the vertical-horizontal 
systems of benefits calculation and distribution — were perceived in accordance 
with their ability to benefit those involved in and representing this system. The 
conditions under which the externals would participate in the calculation and 
distribution of benefits were decided at a later stage. The patterns of this kind of 
interaction between those who did not represent administrative-political clans of 
different levels and those who needed their services were dependent upon the 
nature of the service. For instance, if the private interest was in business or 
property ownership, the profits should be shared with those who would serve this 
interest; if the private interest was for some daily needs or public services such as 
education, health care, civic register etc., bribes should be paid or personal contacts 
used.  
This process carried out in the public space causes exhaustion of trust and 
social capital. It increases the vulnerability of the public space to corruption. Trust 
loses its universal character and becomes a tool for the regulation of interpersonal 
relations inside informal social groups. Interactions are remoulded into the 
prescriptive characteristic of the groups based on private relationships (kinship, 
friendship, and other prescriptive allegiances). The effects of such interaction on 
societal development in Georgia had occurred in a society with a strongly 
fragmented horizontal structure and clan based power structure distributed 
vertically in the public space. Destruction of public space as a sphere of formalized 
communication among a variety of private interests made individuals seek ways to 
realize needs in informal relationships.40  
The domination of the informal networks of communication over formal 
avenues targeted at interest accomplishment is shown by data gathered through 
sociological research in 2000 of the trust level measurement of formal social and 
political-administrative institutions. The research data provides material for 
comparing the situation in 1998 and 2000. The level of trust is measured by an 
index ranging from 1 (‘do not trust’) to 4 (‘strongly trust’): 
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  B. Kapustin, ‘Postcommunism as a Postmodernity’. Polis (Russian Political 
Science magazine) N5, 2001. 
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It is obvious from the response to the survey that, in Georgian society, trust 
was diminishing for all formal institutions, especially state-administrative and 
political institutions. 
In this situation, the only way to realize a request was either through 
criminal activity in a direct sense or through bribery of the public officials, which 
formally is a crime. But during that period, dishonesty was the universal principle 
connecting citizens with the State. Corruption was not seen as an anomaly or 
against the law, rather it was perceived as the only basis upon which state 
administration and economic relations were built. According to the transnational 
research conducted in 2002 in Georgia, the acceptability of corruption to Georgians 
was amongst the highest of the eight countries surveyed.42 
 
Countries Corruption 
Acceptability Index in 200243 
Albania 3 
Georgia 3 
Croatia 2.5 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2.8 
Bulgaria 1.7 
Macedonia 2.5 
Monte Negro 1.9 
Romania 1.9 
Serbia 2 
  
The research shows that the respondents interacting with public officers 
were forced to pay bribes or give some services in return to: customs officers (70 
per cent of cases); taxation officials (70 per cent of cases); police (70 per cent of 
cases); prosecutors (65 per cent of cases); courts (63 per cent of cases); ministries’ 
officials (54 per cent of cases); chamber of control officials (52 per cent of cases); 
local government officials (49 per cent of cases); health care system workers (34 
per cent of cases); university teachers (16 per cent of cases); journalists (11 per 
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  ‘Judicial Reform in Georgia: A Study of Public Opinion’. Final Report. GORBI, 
Tbilisi, 2000.  
42
  Georgia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Monte Negro, 
Romania, Serbia and Croatia were chosen according to the similarities in state 
building processes. 
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  Corruption: Exit Survey Results // GORBI, Tbilisi, June 2002. 
 1998 2000 
Trust family and friends 3.8 3.86 
Trust the Church 3.24 3.45 
Trust the private media 2.57 2.84 
Trust state owned media 2.52 2.34 
Trust lawyers 2,51 2.17 
Trust the President  2.47 2.28 
Trust security services 2.28 2.09 
Trust courts 2.22 1.93 
Trust Parliament 2.14 1.98 
Trust the prosecutors office 2.14 1.89 
Trust Ministries 2.05 1.88 
Trust the police 2.0 1.78 
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cent of cases). 44 Thus, it is clear why Georgia was leading the list of surveyed 
countries measuring the prevalence of corruption. 
 
Countries Corruption Prevalence Index in 
200245 
Albania 7 
Georgia 7.4 
Croatia 5,3 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 6 
Bulgaria 6.4 
Macedonia 6,8 
Monte Negro 6 
Romania 6.9 
Serbia 6 
 
Though Georgia led the surveyed countries for corruption acceptability and 
prevalence, nevertheless, from a moral viewpoint, most people interviewed during 
this research expressed negative attitudes towards corruption as a way of achieving 
personal interests. In response to the question: ‘How admissible is it to receive 
money for solving one’s problem?’ the answers were: admissible (5 per cent); 
rather admissible (9 per cent); not admissible by any means (9 per cent); not 
admissible (70 per cent); could not answer (7 per cent). In response to the question: 
‘How admissible is it to receive a present in return for the provided service?’ 7 per 
cent answered positively; rather admissible (16 per cent); not admissible by any 
means (16 per cent); not admissible (53 per cent); could not answer (8 per cent). In 
response to the question: ‘How acceptable or admissible is it to receive services in 
return for solving a problem?’ 5 per cent answered positively; rather admissible (10 
per cent); not admissible by any means (17 per cent); not admissible (48 per cent); 
could not answer (10 per cent).46 The index of corruption sensibility showed that 
the Georgian people’s readiness to deny certain moral principles remained high but 
it was not the highest amongst the surveyed countries.  
 
Countries Corruption Sensibility Index in 
200247 
Albania 4.5 
Georgia 3.5 
Croatia 2.6 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2.9 
Bulgaria 2.5 
Macedonia 3 
Monte Negro 2.6 
Romania 3.7 
Serbia 2.7 
 
By comparing data gathered through public opinion surveys of citizens 
attitudes towards corruption and their personal participation in corrupted networks, 
it can be noticed that corruption was not an immanent phenomenon of the social 
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  ibid. 
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mentality; rather, it was the tool for interest realization determined by the existing 
social situation and imposed by a privatized state-administrative institutional 
environment. 
 
 
B.5. Conclusion 
 
On comparing the actual shape of public space described in this report with its 
ideal shape in terms of normative-theoretical aspects of how public institutional 
environments and their social functions should be realized, it is obvious that, in 
1990s Georgia, formal institutions of public space did not function for the public 
good; rather, these institutions served the economic and political interests of a 
minority. In this sense, the situation shows that the operation of the State was based 
on the total corruption of political-administrative institutions. The society’s 
awareness of a fair system of social and economic relations created a destabilizing 
environment for a privatized and corrupted system. In November 2003, the 
discredited and illegitimate regime fell because of the Rose Revolution. Public 
approval towards the new political elite’s state building policy allowed the new 
government to implement an aggressive anticorruption policy. Even violations of 
procedural laws on the detainment of corrupt public officials, politicians and 
businessmen (associated with them through corrupt and non-transparent networks) 
were not challenged by Georgian society.  
What should be done to overcome the situation established in 1990s? 
Firstly, mechanisms should be developed to separate private from public space:  
 
• Civic unions and NGO sector-leading organizations should be developed to 
undertake watchdog functions.  
• As it is difficult to determine whether there are any social resources 
remaining after the society had been stripped by a corrupt political system, 
social agencies generating civic virtues and norms should be strengthened 
(possibly through NGO activism).  
• The institutional environment should be enhanced through the separation of 
political and administrative state functions. Such an action would deprive 
political groups of the necessary mechanisms to intervene in economic 
activities through a privatized state administrative system. Also, the 
administrative system would not be allowed to intervene in economic affairs 
because of its separation from the political system. The political institutions, 
in this case, would carryout a watchdog role over the administrative system. 
Thus, as mentioned in the introduction, the ‘trinity’ of political power-
administration-property would be destroyed. 
• In above-mentioned sense, it is obvious that interests generated in a private 
space should be secured through fair laws and an independent judiciary 
which is a guarantee that the political and administrative institutional 
structure will carry out their functions as designated by law, thus providing 
universality to the formal rules regulating institutional and societal group 
relationships. 
 
The achievement of these goals, which partly were declared by the post 
revolutionary Georgian government, should help Georgia to overcome its 1990s 
situation of a failed state and progress from the public space design established 
from the very beginning of the soviet times.  
 C. Integrity Institutions 
 
C.1. Parliamentary Institutions 
 
C.1.1 Roles and Functions in Ensuring Integrity  
 
The Parliament, representing the legislative body of the State/Nation as a Polity, is 
the key institution within Georgia’s National Integrity System.  Its functions in 
providing and ensuring integrity are defined by its roles, as follows:  
 
• To represent various societal and economic group interests through the 
political participation of formalized political agents (political parties, 
party coalitions and social-political movements); 
• To provide political stability through the provision of an environment 
whereby political actors have equal access to and are included in the 
decision making and law-making processes; 
• To devise general strategies for the state’s political development, based 
upon the general political will determined by consensual politics among 
various actors within the political process;  
• To embed its political will and vision of developmental strategies into the 
legislation that regulates the operations of the executive and judiciary 
branches of the government and provides benefits for society in general; 
and 
• To monitor the efficiency of the legislative function in state and public 
life and receive feedback through the various channels of political 
interaction in order to modify legislation.  
 
The above parliamentary roles particularly those relating to the 
parliament’s anti-corruption capacity are determined by broader goals of the 
parliament as an institution. These goals are:  
 
• Representation of diverse social and economic interests through political 
participation, which reflect the full range of interests across the social-
political spectrum; 
• Provision of an inclusive political environment through consensual 
politics that allows the inclusion of, and respect for, a variety of interests 
and prevents monopolization of decision-making and law-making by 
certain political actors; 
• Provision of a political environment which facilitates equal access and 
inclusiveness in decision making and legislative processes and allows 
enhanced transparency (as various conflicting interest groups participate 
in decision making) and minimizes the risk of non-transparent/unilateral 
decision-making which can be corrupted by leading/major political 
actors; 
• As political decision-making involves all sides of the political process, the 
strategies/legislation derived through consensus places responsibility on 
all the participants, thus strengthening general political will and enabling 
a politically stable environment in which these strategies will be 
implemented; 
• Ensuring the involvement of competing political and social groups in the 
decision-making and legislative process also allows monitoring of the 
efficiency of the policies implemented.  Criticism or complaints raised by 
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participants who represent certain social groups in the decision-making 
process is the most effective way to receive feedback from the public and 
to modify adopted strategies. 
 
The areas of Parliamentary responsibilities in which these integrity 
functions and roles are demonstrated and fulfilled include: 
 
• Law-making; 
• Definition of foreign and internal policies (ratification of international 
agreements, formulation of fiscal policies and policies for improving 
transparency); and 
• Oversight of government functions in accordance with the legislation and 
policies defined by the Parliament.  
 
The various actors involved in Parliament participate in its operations, 
either directly or indirectly.  Political Parties elected by Georgian citizens to 
represent their interests are involved in the Legislative process directly.  Other 
actors who provide certain services are involved indirectly, for example 
information/analysis support, financial-technical support, or human resources 
development via aid programs targeted at Parliamentary staff and departments.  
Such aid program providers include the various international donor organizations, 
Georgian or international non-government organizations, and the mass media 
(which provides publicity and reflects public opinion). 
The indirect involvement of the above-mentioned actors is also aimed at 
influencing parliament to adopt certain strategies and policies, or to provide 
feedback from the public and the international community, as follows: 
 
• International Organization feedback is provided through– 
∼ Analysis and recommendations for designing and implementing 
certain programs or drafting laws; 
∼ Monitoring and analysis of international agreements and 
recommendations and their implementation, through law making and 
harmonization of Georgian legislation with international standards, 
and through the design of suggested action plans to aid 
implementation or improve current legislation. 
• Public feedback, mainly by NGOs and social organizations, is through– 
∼ Supplying research and analysis to parliamentary institutions; 
∼ Criticism of certain legislative policies and relaying public 
complaints; and 
∼ Lobbying by citizens and various economic interest groups. 
 
Individual citizens or groups of citizens (without mediation of NGOs and 
other social organizations) provide public feedback through personal meetings with 
MPs or through representatives of political parties delivering citizens complaints 
and petitions to parliament. 
 
C.1.1.1 Grouping of Parliamentary Institutions by Roles and 
Functions 
 
The Parliamentary institutions involved in Georgia’s Integrity System may be 
divided into the following groups:  
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• Those developing policies and overseeing the work of executive agencies 
in their respective fields such as parliamentary committees;  
• Those facilitating the work of the Parliament, such as certain 
administrative departments and offices of the Parliament. 
 
The role of Parliamentary committees within Georgia’s Integrity System is 
well defined by their functions, as follows:  
 
• To create the legislative base for the various aspects of public life;  
• To provide an oversight role for policy implementation by executive 
institutions within the areas of their responsibility; 
• To monitor the execution of decisions made by Parliament; and 
• To advance specific political initiatives. 
 
There are various means and procedures by which parliamentary 
committees fulfil these roles: 
 
• Through committee hearings on a range of matters mainly to clarify 
important issues at a given time; 
• Through meeting with private citizens and representatives of social 
groups; 
• Through performing short-term research tasks within their area of 
responsibility;  
• Through organizing committee hearings with the participation of 
executive government officials, as requested by the committees; 
• Through setting up temporary investigative commissions composed of 
parliament members; and 
• Through collaboration with various international organizations and 
Georgian NGOs. 
 
The roles and functions of the parliamentary institutions, which are not 
involved in law-making processes, but which facilitate the operations of 
parliamentary committees and the parliament as a whole, are to: 
 
• Provide technical and analytical support to the parliamentary committees; 
• Carry out administrative functions; 
• Manage staff and undertake human resources development; and 
• Undertake budgetary planning and manage finances in accordance with 
committee requests. 
 
The means and procedures for accomplishing these roles are through: 
 
• Providing, at the request of parliamentary committees, analysis and 
recommendations on issues; 
• Solving technical problems through infrastructure planning and service 
provision; and 
• Undertaking staff recruitment and training. 
 
C.1.1.2 Specific Functions of Each Institution 
 
The following details the current roles and functions of each of the key 
parliamentary institutions examined by the Georgia NISA. 
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Budget and Finance Committee  The main function of this Committee is 
consideration of draft laws in the areas where this particular committee exercises 
oversight, as follows: 
 
• State Budget; 
• Monetary Policy; 
• Tax and Customs’ Codes; and 
• Various laws related to these areas. 
 
This Committee monitors the execution of laws and decisions adopted by 
the Parliament by various state institutions such as, the Ministry of Finance 
(Taxation Department, Financial Police, and Customs Department), National Bank 
of Georgia, and the Chamber of Control.  Monitoring can be conducted through 
establishing special commissions and working groups in order to study a particular 
issue. 
 
Human Rights and Civil Integration Committee  This Committee’s role is to draft 
laws within its area of responsibility and to monitor the existing situation in that 
field.  This function is aimed at two main goals: to improve human rights 
protection and to facilitate the civil integration process (especially as regards ethnic 
and religious minorities). These goals are achieved through improving the 
legislative base by initiating amendments to existing laws after committee hearings 
and discussions of the parliamentary plenary sessions; political assessment of the 
situations of human rights violation (through information collection in Georgian 
regions); and, providing law enforcement agencies and the Ombudsman’s office 
with analysis and recommendations regarding human rights issues.  
 
Defense and Security Committee  This Committee’s role is to draft laws 
within its area of responsibility and to analyse draft laws submitted by the 
Government; to oversight functioning of institutions within the defence and 
security domain (Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs and their 
subordinated bodies).  These roles are achieved through: Committee hearings and 
the invitation of relevant officials and experts to clarify issues of interest to the 
Committee; initiating recommendations (especially regarding the Georgian Army 
reform and NATO standards achievement, Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflict 
resolution problems and Defense expenditures); gathering and analysing 
information on military service conditions (social and human rights issues in the 
Georgian army) and, through investigations and meetings with private citizens. 
 
Regional Policy, Self Government and Mountainous Regions Committee   This 
Committee’s role is: lawmaking within its sphere of responsibility; supervising 
execution of laws passed by Parliament regarding self-governance; and, monitoring 
the operations of local authorities in Georgia’s regions.  These functions are 
achieved through:  
 
• Information gathering and analysis; 
• Committee hearings and definition of actual problems; 
• Devising recommendations for the national government and local 
authorities; and 
• Designing priority areas for self-governance reform and drafting laws in 
accordance with these aims.  
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Legal Issues Committee  This Committee’s role is to review draft laws presented to 
and discussed by the Parliament and to prepare its conclusions in accord with the 
overall legal system and constitution of Georgia.  It also prepares draft laws, 
especially those laws on ongoing institutional reforms. The Committee also 
monitors and evaluates the justice system: Ministry of Justice (including its 
subordinate penitentiary system), Ministry of Internal Affairs, General Prosecutors 
Office and the Court System. The Committee also oversees the execution of laws 
adopted by Parliament for these institutions.  
 
Procedural Issues and Rules Committee  This Committee’s role is to supervise the 
execution of decisions adopted by the Parliament from the inputs of executive 
bodies into the legislative process.  There are certain obligations on the ministries 
to arrive at conclusions and recommendations regarding laws that should be passed 
by the Parliament.  The Procedural Issues and Rules Committee ensures that 
ministries provide parliament with their recommendations and amendments to the 
adopted or discussed laws.  Another major function of the Committee is to oversee 
the functioning of Parliament in accordance with the requirements of Parliamentary 
Rules and Procedures.  To this end, the Committee monitors the observance of 
procedures for passing laws, and the compliance of individual MPs actions with the 
law. These functions are achieved through: 
 
• Information collection and analysis of ongoing procedural issues; 
• Committee hearings and consultations with various ministries; 
• Monthly reports to the Parliament Chairman and committees; and 
• Cooperation with the Parliamentary Bureau. 
The committee is also responsible for overseeing submission of financial and asset 
declarations by MPs and also for tracking MPs’ attendance records. 
 
Parliament Staff Office  The main function of the Parliament Staff Office is to 
provide material-technical support for to the Parliamentary Bureau, Committees, 
factions, commissions and other parliamentary bodies. The office prepares plenary 
sessions, provides MPs with information and draft laws for discussion, drafts 
memos and publicizes documents adopted by parliamentary bodies. 
 
Parliament Legal Department  The Department is a subordinate body of the 
Parliament Staff Office with the following main functions: 
 
• Carries out legal analysis of the draft laws to be submitted to the plenary 
session for voting; 
• Provides legal consultancy to the parliamentary entities (committees, 
factions, individual MPs); 
• Represent the Parliament and its apparatus in courts; and 
• Edits draft legal acts. 
 
Parliament Budget Office  The Parliament Budget Office is a Parliament 
Staff Office subordinate body and its role and functions are to:  
 
• Provide Parliament with analysis of the budget and legal documents 
related to the budget; 
• Analyse budget-related and financial reports submitted to the Parliament 
by the executive and auditing institutions; 
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• Conduct long-term and short-term research into problems of the 
budgetary system; and 
• Comments and make recommendations for parliamentary entities 
(committees, factions, individual MPs) interested in these issues 
(particularly, the Budget and Finance Committee). 
 
C.1.1.3  Scope of Institutional Authority 
 
The roles and responsibilities of Parliamentary Institutions are regulated by the 
Constitution of Georgia and by the Parliamentary Rules of Procedures.  A variety 
of laws, by-laws and charters, specific to individual committees and temporary 
investigative commissions, underpin the functioning of the various parliamentary 
institutions.  Examples of these include: 
 
• Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in the Civil Service; 
• Law on Public Service; 
• Labour laws; 
• Electoral Code; 
• Law on Referenda; 
• Committee charters.48 
 
Individual Members of Parliament (MPs) representing various political 
parties and factions are allowed to be members of several parliamentary 
committees and investigative commissions simultaneously.  According to the 
Parliamentary Rules of Procedures, MPs are obliged to be involved in at least one 
Committee.  The Committee composition and number of members is defined 
according to the proportion of the political factions represented in Parliament.  
However, the Parliamentary Bureau should defer decision on the composition of 
these committees and commissions 49  until the Parliamentary Committee on 
Procedural Issues and Rules defines the number of seats to be held by particular 
political factions.  
In the case of the Temporary Investigative Commissions, their creation has 
to be recommended and justified by the Speaker of the Parliament, the individual 
Political Faction or Committee, and at least by one quarter of the total number of 
MPs, and approved by a majority in the Parliament.  The supporting background 
information for the creation of the Temporary Investigative Commissions can 
include: 
 
• Violation of the law by State Agencies or their representatives that 
undermines state security and its political and economic interests; 
• Misuse of public funds accumulated in state or local budgets; and  
                                                
48
  These laws define the activities of individual Parliamentary staff members and MPs 
and are determined by the positions that they hold.  Individual MPs participate in 
committees, temporary investigative commissions and political factions formed by 
political parties.  
49
  The Parliamentary Bureau consists of the Speaker of the Parliament and his/her 
deputies, political factions and Committees heads. The Bureau function is to prepare 
agendas for plenary sessions and approve the charters of Committees and Temporary 
Commissions, and register Political Factions. 
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• Issues the investigation of which are regarded as important by the state or 
the public — these issues, in certain cases, can be identified by those MPs 
who initiate setting up a commission. 
 
Prescribed activities undertaken by the Committees and Commissions in 
accordance with their responsibilities include:  
 
• Commencing an investigation; 
• Undertaking research, discussing and analysing issues of concern 
(regarding oversight and supervision of the execution of decisions taken 
by Parliament within the sphere of responsibility of the particular 
Committee/Commission); 
• Performing short-term research tasks; and 
• Reporting to the Parliament on activities undertaken and their results and 
making recommendations for improvement. 
 
Where Parliamentary institutions do not perform functions based on 
political issues and agendas, their charter –The Parliament Staff Office Charter – as 
approved by the Parliament defines their authority.  The Parliament Staff Office 
coordinates and oversees the work of the committees, commissions, factions, the 
chairperson and his/her deputies, and the staff of the Parliament’s Bureau.  It also 
oversees the activities and monitors the efficiency of its own subordinate units and 
in the case of the violation of procedural norms, negligence in exercising statutory 
responsibilities or lack of professionalism that causes defects in the operations of 
Parliament, the Office commences investigation and implements measures for 
improvement. Measures undertaken in this sense include: 
 
• Determining reasons for misconduct and devising an action plan for 
correction; 
• Determining the seriousness of the misdemeanour; and 
• On basis of this, devising the form of penalty (either reprimand or 
discharge). 
 
Usually the Parliament Staff Office carries out these activities on the 
Parliamentary Bureau instructions. 
 
C.1.1.4  Accountability and Reporting Arrangements  
 
Similarly to the Committees and Commissions Parliamentary Institutions, 
Parliament Staff Office units are obliged to report to the Parliamentary Bureau on 
ongoing processes within the areas of their responsibility and activities undertaken 
by them. Parliamentary committees and commissions are first and foremost 
accountable to the Parliament as a whole, while the Parliamentary Bureau has an 
intermediate role.  The Bureau receives reports from the Committees and 
Commissions on various issues from session to session, thus organizing the 
reporting process that takes place in Parliament’s Plenary Sessions.  The 
Parliament Staff Office Units facilitate the Committees and Commissions reporting 
processes through provision of support, such as: 
 
• Material support: providing clerical/administrative support (including 
record-keeping); 
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• Expertise support: providing information (including information 
exchange with other government agencies) and providing analytic 
material (on legal, economic or criminal issues) needed for particular 
cases; and 
• Organizational support: providing services for the reporting processes, 
including delivering hardcopies and other materials, informing MPs and 
experts invited to Plenary Sessions, providing facilities etc. 
 
According to Georgia’s Constitution, MPs are accountable to the people of 
Georgia for activities undertaken by them.  Symbolically, this accountability is 
expressed through the Parliament’s self-evaluation reports.  However, there are 
other closer and more effective means through which Parliament as an institution 
and individual MPs report to their electorate.  These include: 
 
• Visits of Parliamentary working groups and Committees to the regions;  
• Regular reports by individual MPs on their electorates; 
• Meetings of Parliamentary factions and party representatives with 
citizens’ groups and individuals; 
• New political initiatives and agenda campaigns aimed at gaining public 
support, when Parliament also reports to society at large through the 
mass-media and Civil Society sector on policies implemented; and 
• Live broadcasting of plenary sessions thereby rendering parliamentary 
operations more transparent and publicized. 
 
Some of the reporting mechanisms mentioned above, especially those 
involving direct interaction with society, do not occur regularly; for example, live 
broadcasting of plenary sessions take place rarely and are usually related to special 
issues under discussion in Parliament.  These live broadcasts more frequently take 
place ahead of elections. 
The responsibilities of individual MPs include accountability not only to 
the Parliament as a whole (through participation in Committees and Commissions) 
but also to the party and political faction s/he represents.  
Staff appointment mechanisms also define the forms of accountability and 
reporting.  In the case of the election and approval of Committee and Commission 
heads and their deputies, there are several mechanisms: 
 
• A faction, the parliamentary majority, or the minority names a candidate 
for head of a committee or a commission after the parliamentary approval 
by two thirds of the total number of members of the particular committee 
or commission; 
• The Committee or Commission head is elected by a majority vote; and 
• The Committee or Commission head deputies — there are 2 deputy 
positions in each committee and 1 in commissions — are nominated and 
elected by the Committee or Commission. 
 
According to these mechanisms, MPs holding various positions in 
Committees/Commissions are accountable to parliament through these units. 
Consequently, there is also a gradation in penalties. The Committee or Commission 
heads can be dismissed by a vote of Parliament and deputies through a vote within 
Committees or Commissions. 
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C.1.2    Assessment of Capacity 
 
C.1.2.1  Adequacy of Institutional Resources 
 
In terms of the capacity of Parliamentary institutions, the situation varies widely 
among Parliamentary committees and Commissions. There is also a difference in 
terms of types of available resources. While some Parliamentary institutions 
expressed their satisfaction with staffing levels, there was a common complaint of 
insufficient financial resources, and that, in this sense, Parliament is not sufficiently 
well resourced. 
There is a need for HR issues to be addressed so as to enable an efficient 
organizational environment for the Parliament Staff Office, Parliamentary 
Committees and Commissions. The problems identified were: 
 
• Shortage of personnel– 
∼ Most MPs do not have assistants due to inadequate resourcing; 
∼ Inadequate technical staff for the Parliament Staff IT and Economic 
Supplies department; and 
∼ There is a scarcity of experts that could assist parliamentary 
committees and individual MPs to undertake their roles. 
• Qualifications and professional skills– 
∼ Low competency levels and technical skills among most of the 
support personnel; 
∼ Training opportunities are not available for most of the personnel 
involved in the operations of parliamentary institutions again due to 
insufficient financial resources; 
∼ A general lack of clerical experience and consequently the skills 
required are not in keeping with modern clerical/administrative 
standards. 
• Problems related to staff recruitment– 
∼ It is difficult to maintain experienced staff (again due to insufficient 
financial resources); 
∼ It is difficult to attract experienced professionals (again due to 
insufficient financial resources); and  
∼ The existence of informal mechanisms (nepotism), which interfere in 
staff recruitment processes. 
 
The issues relate primarily to the provision of adequate funding for the 
efficient and effective functioning of Parliamentary institutions. The Parliamentary 
institutions responsible for solving this problem are:  
 
• The Finance Department of the Parliament’s Staff Office, which is 
responsible for financial accounting and the calculation of annual 
expenditures, estimates the Parliament’s annual budget; and  
• The Economic Department of the Parliament’s Staff Office is responsible 
for the proper functioning of parliamentary institutional processes by 
estimating needs and supplying resources.  
 
Cooperation between these two institutions cannot solve all problems 
related to technical infrastructure development and financial supplies improvement.  
Parliamentary expenditures depend upon the annual state budget in which the 
government defines the rules and means of financing parliament’s expenditures.  
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Material-technical problems are solved by international organizations that finance 
parliamentary IT and technical infrastructure development through targeted direct 
aid.  Various projects led by NGOs and International organizations support 
individual MPs in improving their office facilities. These kinds of projects are 
sometimes intended to support experts, in this case MPs, through work 
environment improvement (e.g. lending or granting computers, printers, copy-
machines).  At the same time, there are some problems that are not assisted either 
by state financing improvements or on international aid; for example, a serious 
problem is the supply of office space that restricts Parliament’s ability to hire and 
accommodate adequate numbers of personnel.  
As noted above, the provision of adequate financial resources to enable 
Parliamentary institutions to function is dependent upon the State Budget capacity 
to re-allocate sufficient finances for Parliament. Though the Parliament Staff 
Office and the Finance Supplies Department calculate what financing should be 
requested, the amounts required and recommended are restricted by the annual 
State Budget. The most critical resources for the parliamentary units are: 
 
• Funding to hire external specialists (i.e. legislative drafters, foreign 
experts to carry out legislative analysis); 
• Funding to allow Committee members to travel to regions to 
communicate with constituents or outside Georgia to study international 
practices; 
• Training funds especially for research and committee support staff. 
 
One issue that needs to be especially noted relates to salaries.  MPs salaries 
were increased but still present a problem. Most MPs regard salaries as inadequate. 
Parliamentary staff salaries have been slightly increased recently, but middle and 
lower level personnel salaries still remain very low, and because of staff shortages 
the workload of these personnel is heavy. 
 
C.1.3.   Assessment of Coherence 
 
The efficiency of interagency interaction of parliamentary units varies according to 
the types and levels of interaction.  There are different types of institutional 
interactions: normative-procedural and policy-operational, that occur in the 
following sectors: parliamentary; general government and public sector; 
international organizations, civil society and the media.  
 
C.1.3.1  Interaction between Parliamentary Institutions 
 
Institutional interaction between parliamentary institutions is based on information 
exchange and the provision of expertise and technical assistance. Within the 
normative-procedural framework, the activities of parliamentary units do not 
undermine the policy-operational capacities (efficiency and quality of output) of 
the parliament.  However, certain inadequacies are cause by a lack of cooperation 
between parliamentary policy-making and administrative units. These 
shortcomings can be explained by the lack of institutional resources (discussed 
above). Nevertheless, these gaps are filled, more or less effectively, through the 
cooperation of Parliamentary institutions with international organizations and local 
NGOs. 
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C.1.3.2  Interaction between Parliamentary and Other State Agencies  
 
Institutional interaction in this sector indicates some variations depending on the 
variety and levels of responsibilities. Individual parliamentary institutions report 
different levels of support received and provided by state agencies. The types of 
interactions include: expertise and information exchange on the oversight of the 
implementation of government policies in accordance with standards defined by 
the parliament; joint discussions on strategies to be designed; monitoring the 
functioning of the judiciary through information exchange with courts and court 
related institutions; the involvement of public officials in discussions and hearings 
on issues within their areas of responsibility. These types of interactions are mutual 
and imply reciprocity in that as support is received so assistance is provided.  
There are differences in the assessment of the adequacy of the existing 
interaction networks. Generally, Parliamentary institutions express satisfaction 
with the assistance provided and received. However, some committees pointed out 
that it would be desirable to create special ministries coordinating the interaction of 
executive and parliamentary institutions in order to fill gaps caused by the shortage 
of resources. 50 
 
Budget and Finance Committee  This committee has direct and fixed 
interactions as defined by the normative procedural frameworks, these being: 
 
• Ministry of Finance Customs and Taxation Departments: exchange of 
information, analysis and recommendations; 
• Chamber of Control: exchange of information, analysis and 
recommendations; and 
• The National Bank of Georgia (Financial Monitoring Service): exchange 
of information, analysis and recommendations for mutual exchange. 
 
Interaction defined by policy-operational needs involves the following institutions: 
 
• President’s Development and Reform Fund: information exchange; 
• Financial Declaration Bureau: submitting declarations; 
• President’s Office: information exchange and making recommendations 
within its area of responsibility; 
• Prime Minister’s Office: information exchange and making 
recommendations within its in area of responsibility; and 
• Ombudsman Office: information exchange. 
 
Human Rights and Civil Integration Committee The committee has direct and 
fixed interaction defined by a normative-procedural framework as follows: 
 
• Ombudsman’s Office: exchange of information, analysis and 
recommendations, also coordination of activities; 
• Ministry of Justice (Penitentiary Department): exchange of information, 
analysis and recommendations; and  
                                                
50
  These problems are not perceived to be one sided, and it is recognized that 
parliamentary institutions also can provide efficient support to government agencies 
through similar reciprocal mechanisms. 
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• Judiciary System: exchange of information, analysis and 
recommendations. 
 
Interaction, defined by policy-operational needs, involves the following 
institutions: 
 
• Ministry of Internal Affairs: exchange of information and 
recommendations; 
• General Prosecutor’s Office: exchange of information and 
recommendations; 
• State Minister’s Office on Refugees and Settlement Issues: exchange of 
information and recommendations; and 
• President’s Office: information provision. 
 
Defense and Security Committee The committee has direct interaction 
defined by normative procedural framework with the:  
 
• Ministry of Defense: exchange of information, analysis and 
recommendations; 
• Ministry of Internal Affairs: exchange of information, analysis and 
recommendations; 
• General Prosecutor’s Office: information provision; and 
• President’s Office: information provision. 
 
Interaction defined by policy-operational needs involves the following 
institutions: 
 
• Prime Minister’s Office: information exchange; 
• Chamber of Control: information exchange. 
 
Regional Policy, Self Government and Mountainous Regions Committee  The 
committee has direct interaction defined by the normative procedural framework 
with: 
 
• The President’s Office: exchange of information, analysis and 
recommendations; 
• The Public Service Bureau: exchange of information, analysis and 
recommendations. 
 
Interaction defined by policy-operational needs involves the following 
institutions: 
 
• Prime Minister’s Office: information exchange; 
• Governors’ offices: mutual exchange of information, analysis, 
recommendations. 
 
Legal Issues Committee  The Legal Issues Committee assists all executive 
institutions and provides legal expertise for drafting of legislative standard.  
 
Procedural Issues and Rules Committee  The committee has direct and 
fixed interactions defined by the normative procedural framework with: 
 
• Ministry of Justice: exchange of information and analysis; 
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• Ministry of Finance: exchange of information and analysis; 
• State Minister on Reform Coordination Issues Office: exchange of 
information and analysis. 
 
The Committee also assists and receives support from the Prime Minister’s 
and the President’s Offices (information and provision of expertise). 
 
Parliament Staff Office The committee has direct and fixed interaction defined by 
the normative procedural framework with: 
 
• The Public Service Bureau: provides information and receives analysis 
and recommendations; 
• The Ministry of Economic Development Procurement Service: 
procurements of parliament’s material-technical infrastructure 
requirements; and  
• Chamber of Control: reporting. 
 
Interaction defined by policy-operational needs involves the following 
institutions: 
 
• Prime Minister’s Office: information and expertise exchange; 
• Financial Declaration Bureau: reporting. 
 
Parliament Staff Office Legal Department The department cooperates with 
the President’s Parliamentary Secretary and the Government’s Parliamentary 
Secretary by providing legal expertise.  These secretaries are responsible for 
cooperating with the parliament on behalf of the President/Government. The 
Department’s functions also include representing parliament at the Judiciary, thus 
it has a close relationships with the courts. 
 
Parliament Staff Office Budget Office The Department has a direct and fixed 
interaction defined by the normative procedural framework with the Ministry of 
Finance and the Chamber of Control (on a daily basis from the Taxation 
Department) and receives and exchanges information on state expenditures. 
Interaction defined by policy-operational needs involves the following 
institutions: 
 
• Ministry of Finance Financial Police: Information exchange; 
• Ministry of Economic Development Procurement Service Agency: 
information exchange; 
• The State Commission on Efficient Governance and Territorial 
Arrangement: exchange of expertise and recommendations for the 
management of local expenditure. 
 
C.1.3.3  Interaction between Parliamentary and International 
Organizations, Civil Society Agencies and Media 
 
Types of interaction between Parliamentary agencies and these institutions are 
provision of direct targeted aid, oversight of joint projects and exchange of 
information/analysis. 
Direct targeted aid is provided by international and donor organizations 
such as the World Bank, UNDP, OSCE, European Commission and is aimed at:  
Integrity Institutions 46 
 
• The provision of expert advice by invited foreign experts on legislative 
improvement or the implementation of western standards for harmonizing 
Georgian legislation with Euro-Atlantic requirements;   
• Technical infrastructure development: IT development (especially digital 
databases creation and service) and improvement of administrative and 
clerical services; 
• Human resources development through improvement of parliamentary 
personnel training modelled on modern Western procedures and 
professional skills improvement based on similar Western values and 
standards; and  
• Supporting the Parliament in its involvement with International 
Organizations through the provision of expertise, advice and exchange of 
information. 
 
Great support is provided to the Parliament through joint projects and 
programs in which certain committees and individual MPs participate in 
cooperation with international organizations and local NGOs. These projects and 
programs designed for studying situations in certain areas of public life or for 
designing certain policies to be implemented, to some extent, coincide with the 
aims of the direct targeted aid provided by the International Donor Organizations. 
The difference is that, in the latter case, the scope of the strategies and actions 
undertaken are more specific and narrower than those previously mentioned. At the 
same time, it should be noted that interaction between these organizations and the 
parliamentary institutions is not always undertaken within the framework of the 
joint projects and programs. Networks established through joint projects and 
programs between parliamentary institutions and international and local NGOs 
remain active in the long-term (through institutional or personal ties and 
information exchange), thus allowing regularly provision and mutual exchanges of 
certain services (e.g. information and expertise). However, there are issues with 
this relationship. Parliamentary institutions consider some NGOs to be unreliable, 
overly critical, highly biased, and to run their own political agendas.  In this sense, 
parliamentary institutions prefer to categorize civil society sector institutions on the 
basis of reliability and to deal with them on a priority basis.  
Relationships with the media differ widely as regards the types and quality 
of interaction.  Most media organizations, especially amongst the print media 
outlets, lack professional ethics, which can partly explain their bias in favour of 
certain political groups.  This lack of a professional ethic is demonstrated by 
unbalanced criticism of some parliamentary institutions by the media. Nevertheless, 
a supportive relationship between the media and parliamentary institutions 
generally exists for government publicity. However, there are certain issues 
(especially those issues regarding corruption scandals in which individual MPs are 
accused or suspected) when parliamentary institutions display cautiousness and 
prefer to deal with the media in a selective way. 
 
C.1.4.   Assessment of Consequences 
 
C.1.4.1  The Efficiency of Institutional Functions 
 
Respondents, in general, assessed the efficiency of parliamentary functions 
positively. In this sense, efficiency is understood to mean the ability of 
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parliamentary institutions to carry out duties and obligations prescribed in the 
normative-procedural sense (i.e. legislative functions).  The legislative process was 
also assessed by the executive branch institutions to be effective. It was pointed out 
that the operations of parliament provide adequate support for the ongoing 
institutional reform processes with the pace of legislation fitting the timelines for 
reforms. However, respondents pointed out that speedy legislation could create 
difficulties; officials not familiar with new laws slow the implementation process 
and government agencies may sometimes exercise broad discretion in policy 
implementation. Consequently, new laws are not always adopted in the policy 
implementation process. 
Most experts considered the implementation of policy to be inefficient and 
parliamentary oversight to be unsatisfactory. They identified a lack of 
parliamentary independence to commence oversight activities and weak 
mechanisms of policy implementation and monitoring at the local level.  
Another issue raised regarding gaps in the functioning of parliamentary 
institutions was their unwillingness to participate in certain projects suggested by 
Georgian NGOs and International Organizations (e.g. projects aimed at increasing 
public awareness through informing the public of the roles of parliamentary 
institutions in the ongoing reform processes.)  The lack of a proper public relations 
strategy for Parliamentary institutions was generally identified as problematic in all 
government agencies. 
 
C.1.4.2  Risks of Corruption within Fields of Competence 
 
As the functioning of parliamentary institutions is based on multi-agent interaction 
and collegial principles of decision-making, the corruption risks are minimized. 
However, the representation of specific interests in the parliamentary group can 
create an environment for corruption through illegal lobbying which was identified 
as one of the main corruption risks in the operations of Parliament.  
Another risk of corruption is not related to the institutional design of the 
parliament and is caused by the personal characteristics of the officials.  A lack of 
personal integrity is a risk that can encourage corruption. Effective legislative tools 
to address corrupt behaviour in parliament have not yet been designed.  Frequent 
changes to legislation create an environment in which certain officials have the 
ability to manoeuvre and interpret their actions, relying on old laws not yet 
abolished or legitimising their actions through gaps not filled by new legislation.  
Frequent change and some ambiguities of the legislation can encourage corruption 
and cause officials to abuse their authority. 
Another risk is related to parliamentary weakness to control state 
procurement processes, especially in the military and national security areas.  
These sectors are among the most expensive parts of the national budget.  Apart 
from the Defense and Security Committee that is responsible for monitoring in this 
area, there is a special Parliamentary Trust Group (PTG) created for controlling 
military and security expenditures, and to whom the ministries of Defense and 
Internal Affairs are obliged to report.  However, a number of MPs and experts 
pointed out that the ability of the PTG to provide transparency in this sphere is 
weak, as it consists only of governing National Movement Party representatives.  
This situation exists because opposition MPs boycotted the sessions and refused to 
take over the post of deputy head of the Defense and Security Committee.  
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C.1.4.3 Anticorruption Capacities: Impediments and Assisting Factors 
 
The institutional environment in which they function determines the anti-
corruption capacities of Parliamentary Institutions. The success or otherwise of 
anticorruption policies is determined by factors that inhibit or support their 
operations.  
At the internal level, no institutional factor has been identified that would 
impede the operations of the parliamentary institutions. Some defects identified are 
related to the shortage of institutional resources, especially those dealing with 
material-technical and clerical support.  
At the external level, the factors that impede institutional operations are 
related to institutional weaknesses that are transient as reforms are ongoing.  
Institutional weaknesses are related to parliament’s operations in this revolutionary 
regime, as it tries to create a reform-oriented legislative base within a short time 
frame (e.g. in 2005 parliament adopted 453 new laws) to speed up institutional 
reforms.  Consequently, there are some normative-procedural gaps in the role 
execution of government agencies and in their interaction mechanisms.  Agencies 
have either not designed routine mechanisms of institutional cooperation therefore, 
interaction is conducted according to immediate policy operational needs — 
accordingly interrelationship is spontaneous and not systematic — or there is a 
shortage of institutional resources (e.g. qualified professionals) for determining 
ways to implement policies adopted by parliament.  Impediments created by this 
problem are expressed by a lack of cooperation on any issues that are not related to 
day-to-day standard reporting processes.  
The ruling National Movement Party serves as a facilitator of external 
level interagency relations. The party holds the majority of seats in the Parliament 
and holds leading decision-making positions, according to the rules defining 
committees and commissions formation. This party runs the government and 
undertakes roles and solves issues along party lines. In this sense, it is difficult to 
differentiate party and state agencies. For instance, the General Secretary of the 
National Movement Party heads the President’s Office that is responsible for 
overseeing the outputs of parliamentary committees.  This situation assists the 
speediness of the decision-making process, as the possibility of conflict regarding 
general strategies and policies between Parliament and Government are minimized 
due to the high level of the party consolidation and discipline.  However, there are 
some observable risks related to this issue especially regarding the transparency of 
decision-making processes, as opposition parties represented in Parliament have 
minimal influence. 
International organizations and local NGOs as external participants do not 
create any impediments for parliament. The efficiency of their support can only be 
judged on a case-by-case basis.  
 
C.1.4.4  Impact on the Efficiency of Anticorruption Policies 
 
The Parliamentary role in anticorruption policies is one of the most interesting 
issues. None of the respondents interviewed named Parliament as an institution that 
deals with the eradication of corruption.  This anomaly can be explained through a 
widely held point of view amongst the civil service sector and public in general 
that the overall effect of anticorruption activities depends on the diligence of 
executive agencies, especially law-enforcement institutions. At the same time, it is 
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obvious that without parliamentary support much less could be done regarding 
corruption minimization. By passing anticorruption legislation, the parliament 
legitimises the anticorruption activities of executive institutions. It also undertakes 
regular monitoring and assessments of the efficiency of the relevant legislation and 
makes changes to it, if necessary.  Through these actions, the parliament designs a 
strict procedural framework for the implementation of anticorruption policies to 
ensure the minimization of possibilities for abuse of authority by agencies 
implementing these policies. However, the application of laws regulating 
government agencies anticorruption activities, in practice, depends upon those 
institutions, particularly special/controlling institutions and the judiciary, who 
oversight existing policy implementation practices and their conformance with the 
legislation.  
Parliamentary institutions are in charge of monitoring the application of 
laws by the executive.  However, as mentioned above, these institutions have little 
capacity to undertake these functions. Though Committees are authorized to 
commence independent investigation without special permission, they rarely 
practice it.  The reason for this according to the MPs is either the shortage of 
resources (technical and human resources) or that MPs are overly busy with law-
making process (most of the MPs do not have assistants to ease their workloads).  
One effective mechanism for the parliament to fulfil its oversight functions is the 
establishment of temporary investigative commissions. Unlike the committees, 
these units deal with specific problems in certain areas of institutional operations 
during a set timeframe (defined by the Parliamentary Bureau) and do not conduct 
oversight activities regularly. The efficiency in addressing corruption by these 
temporary commissions is enhanced by the fact that political parties (both the 
parties represented in parliament, and those outside it) pay particular attention to 
their work (as commissions usually are created on specific issues of public interest). 
Public organizations and the media also monitor and publicize their work and by 
doing so influence public opinion and guarantee that the work of commissions is 
transparent and non-biased. 
Procedural tools available to parliament to influence anticorruption policies 
also include: 
 
• Reporting on execution by various state agencies of parliamentary and 
government institutions decisions; 
• Petition mechanisms allowing individual citizens and groups of citizens to 
address parliament on certain law violations and seeking assistance for 
parliament to mediate with various state agencies on issues of violated 
rights restitution: thus, parliament receives information on violations of 
the law and can initiate investigation if it is needed; 
• Requirement of ministries to commence investigation in certain areas of 
responsibility if requested and needed; and 
• In case parliament does not assess the government as functioning 
satisfactorily, the ability to demand dismissal of individual minister or the 
entire cabinet; 
• Integrity institutions accountable to the parliament, such as Audit 
Chamber and Ombudsman’s Office. 
 
Usually these tools do not have a critical influence on implementation of 
anticorruption policies but they remain as mechanisms that can be used for 
enhancing the effectiveness of anticorruption policies. To date, only the first two 
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mechanisms have been used in practice, while the other two have not been applied, 
though the law provides for their use.  
 
C.1.4.5  Ethical Impact of Parliamentary Institutions 
 
The Parliament’s role to advance integrity is defined by its general function to 
provide the opportunity for political interaction in which consensual politics are 
generated.  Consensus-based policies express the general political will of the nation 
through participants’ approval of the political process (the mandate).  Consequently, 
these policies must be adequate to meet the social, economic and political needs of 
the society in general.  The correlation of policies with public values and 
expectations ensures the creation of a stable environment in which these policies 
can be implemented by state agencies.  Accordingly, the question is whether this 
concordance is framed and imbedded in the institutional design of the legislative 
body of the nation, and if so, to what extent? Institutions designed for these 
purposes exist and function according to the normative basis defined by the 
constitution and legislation.  However, the manner in which these formal 
institutions and laws operate in society and their relevance to the ethical 
substantive purposes for which they were designed is assessed as inadequate by 
most of the respondents interviewed.  
Firstly, criticism is related to the political parties’ representation and 
participation in the operations of parliament.  The Law on Elections which defines 
the fundamental principles under which the Central Electoral Commission is 
formed and operates is considered to represent a major problem for the 
involvement of political parties in the legislative decision making process. 
Representation of the parties other than the National Movement in parliament is 
very weak.  The ruling National Movement party holds the majority of seats while 
opposition parties are represented as an absolute minority and are not able to 
influence the decision-making process.  The principles regulating party 
representatives’ involvement in Committees and their composition are based on the 
proportion of their representation in Parliament.  Consequently, the minor party 
MPs’ ability to drive through their initiatives is minimal.  This situation determines 
the nature of political interaction in the sense that political groups try to find other 
less institutionalised channels to transmit their initiatives.  These activities are 
mostly undertaken outside of the parliamentary framework and include, boycotting 
parliament, appeals to the public through protest activities and advocating civil 
disobedience towards certain segments of the political elite. These actions 
influence the stability of parliament and affect its ability to provide a stable 
environment to implement its reform and modernisation agenda.  
Most of the respondents pointed out the lack of parliamentary 
independence to initiate and develop policies.  Generally, Parliament is simply 
transmitting and adopting strategies suggested by Georgia’s post revolutionary 
government through the governing National Movement Party.  In this sense, 
Parliament acts not so much as an institution expressing a variety of interests and 
agendas, but rather as a body expressing a particular political group’s vision of 
state development.  This situation is underpinned by a strong party organization, 
discipline and the indivisible political will of the National Movement Party. 
The question is whether the alleged divergence between parliament’s 
ethical substantive purposes and the actual mechanisms for its operations counters 
the overall aim of state building.  According to the opinions retrieved through this 
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research, none of the arguments deny that the governing National Movement Party 
possesses resources (intellectual and skilled specialists) for fulfilling the afore-
mentioned goals.  As for the divergence between the policy-operational and the 
ethical-substantive aspects of parliament’s operations, this anomaly can be 
explained by a speedy reformation processes conducted by a leading political elite. 
 
C.1.4.6  Specific Contributions of Core and Distributed Institutions   
 
Several key parliamentary institutions are worth examining in terms of interagency 
interaction. Among parliamentary internal administrative institutions, the 
Parliament Staff Office leadership is the core institution managing the efficient 
handling and development of human and material-technical resources. It oversights 
subordinate departments in the operations of the Parliament Staff Office and 
ensures that probity issues are addressed when dealing with procurement, property 
and distribution of financial resources.  The Parliament Staff Office leadership 
monitors and controls the operations of subordinate departments through minutes 
received from other parliamentary institutions in relation to any violation of 
procedural or operational norms by any of the agencies.   
The Procedural Issues and Rules Committee as a core institution undertake 
the role of coordinating accountability processes among parliamentary institutions 
(the Parliament Bureau and Committees) and providing oversight of their 
operations.  This undertaking is a major role. The Committee’s function is assessed 
as very important as it provides a favourable environment for the Parliament to 
function effectively.  A new rule introduced by the Procedural Issues and Rules 
Committee requires Parliamentary Committees to present their reports to the 
Parliamentary Plenary Session. This report includes information about: 
 
• The number of sessions conducted by the Committee; 
• The number of draft laws initiated by the particular Committee; 
• The number of laws passed by the Parliament that were initiated by the 
particular Committee; and 
• The work the Committee oversighting the operations of executive 
institutions. 
 
The Procedural Issues and Rules Committee ensure that committee 
hearings and plenary sessions are conducted in accordance with the norms defined 
through legislature.  It also implements codes of conduct and behaviour in 
parliament, through the personal commitment and integrity provisions, thus 
improving the formal operational environment of parliamentary institutions 
(though, until recently, problems related to discipline have been very sensitive for 
the Parliament to address).  
At the external level of Parliamentary institutions operations, the core 
institutions identified as providing integrity support are the Legal Issues Committee 
and the Budget and Finance Committee.  Their functions are as follows: 
 
• The Legal Issues Committee is one of the major initiators of the reform 
process through supporting legislation and anticorruption strategies.  Its 
role in creating   a proper normative-procedural legal framework for 
anticorruption activities by government agencies is crucial and was 
identified as a primary role by law-enforcement institutions 
representatives interviewed.  The importance of the Committee’s role in 
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this area is strengthened by the fact that some of its members are leading 
politicians who define reform strategies; and 
• The Budget and Finance Committee’s role is fulfilled not only through 
observation of state budget projects delivered to Parliament by the 
executive branch of the government, but also through oversight on their 
delivery.  Special attention is paid to budget expenditure at the state 
budget drafting stage, as the Committee ensures that just principles of 
state benefits distribution are applied. Nevertheless, the Committee’s 
ability to oversight the operations of state agencies is very weak, as it 
lacks institutional mechanisms to conduct research in problematic areas 
and is totally dependent upon self reporting from government agencies.    
 
C.1.4.7  Emerging Issues 
 
Most of the respondents interviewed stressed several issues that reduce the 
efficiency of the parliament as an integrity system.  Among the problems 
identified, the most important were: 
 
• The absence of databases allowing information sharing and use of 
information technology to monitor and control agency operations and 
execution of parliamentary decisions; 
• The absence of budgetary controls (State budget and local budgets) 
between parliamentary and executive institutions; 
• The need to create a parliamentary ‘shadow cabinet’ to scrutinize 
decisions made by ministers and their staff;  
• NGO activities and their involvement in supporting parliamentary 
institutions operations is considered weak; 
• Parliament’s work in attracting public support and in soliciting public 
input into the legal-drafting process is lacking; 
• Drawn from above, another issue raised is related to the involvement of 
ethnic minorities in public life.  The lack of a state language knowledge 
among Armenian and Azerbaijan ethnic groups located within two 
regions of Georgia (Samtskhe-Javakheti and Qvemo Qartli) creates a 
fertile environment for corruption at the local administrative level  (public 
oversight is weak).  For this reason, policy implementation agencies are 
able to abuse the authority delegated to them by central government.  
Parliament’s role regarding a solution to this issue is identified as the 
necessity to oversight the design and implementation of education 
programs, as well as to provide political support for the protection of 
minorities by ensuring rights through the promotion of legitimate policies; 
and 
• Parliamentary links with local government units are considered to be very 
weak. 
 
C.1.4.8  Main Findings and Recommendations 
 
The general assessment of the situation is that thee have been positive changes 
since Rose Revolution. However, responses differed among respondents. Two 
main views were evident:  
 
• The situation has changed in the sense that corruption has become less 
visible (i.e. there has been a change in type of corruption); and 
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• The situation has changed in that corruption has disappeared from certain 
levels of the State Administrative system and moved to other levels (i.e. a 
level shift). 
 
Opinions regarding problematic areas also varied and in some cases it was 
said that corruption has now accumulated in the lower levels of government 
agencies.  In other cases, it was said that higher-level officials are more corrupt.  A 
reason for these varied assessments is the scarcity of official information provided 
by government agencies on the effects of anticorruption activities. As well as a lack 
of transparency in the operations of anticorruption institutions, there are difficulties 
in obtaining official data on the type and prevalence of corruption.  On the one 
hand, poor knowledge or lack of a common assessment framework/methodology 
among Parliamentary institutions regarding this particular issue can be explained 
by the pace of anticorruption policy development as well as the collateral effects of 
gaps in coordination (especially information exchange) between executive and 
parliamentary institutions.  On the other hand, these problems may be explained by 
the weakness of parliamentary institutions in adequately oversighting the 
implementation process (especially considering shortage of material-technical and 
human resources).  
The issue mentioned that gained general agreement and acknowledgement 
among respondents was that, in order to eradicate corruption, the efficient and 
effective implementation of anticorruption policies are totally dependent upon the 
commitment and support of the post-revolutionary political elite. Such a 
commitment at the highest level of the state administrative system can serve as an 
explanation of an argument that the corruption has shifted to lower levels of the 
public administration system.  At the same time, the willingness of the political 
elite to combat corruption encourages the same commitment at the lower levels of 
the state agencies through education-prevention or through investigation-coercion.  
According to the arguments expressed regarding efficiency of these anti-corruption 
tools, most MPs assume that, at this stage of state development, public awareness is 
not able to challenge corruption as Georgian society, through its historical 
experience, coexisted with corrupt governments. It is also argued that using 
coercive methods will have side effects expressed in adverse norms and procedures 
or by human rights violations.  To minimise these negative effects, it is vital to 
strengthen parliamentary institutions in order to improve Parliament’s ability to 
fulfil its oversight functions efficiently and effectively.   
In relation to these issues, the recommendations identified by MPs 
interviewed were: 
 
• To improve information technologies and create electronic shared 
databases that would allow speedy information exchange with other 
institutions; 
• To share foreign countries’ successful anticorruption experience and 
implement their practices in parliamentary operations– 
∼ To involve international organizations and local NGO experts in law 
drafting and adopting ‘world’s best practices’ in Georgian 
anticorruption legislature and strategies; 
∼ To receive assistance for improving parliamentary oversight 
mechanisms; 
• To improve the provision of resources (first of all, to acquire sufficient numbers 
of professional personnel adequate to the needs of Parliament);   
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• To extend cooperation with international organizations especially those focussed 
on human rights protection in order to provide for the development of ethical 
standards in law-enforcement agencies activities thereby lessening the possible 
effects of anticorruption coercion policies; 
• Parliament’s public relations strategic planning processes and implementation 
mechanisms should be improved; 
• There is a need to create a parliamentary ‘shadow cabinet’ to scrutinize decisions 
made by the executive; 
• The parliament’s ties with local governments should be strengthened;  
• The parliament needs to support local NGO efforts to participate in local level 
policy implementation processes. It would be mutually beneficial if NGOs could 
carry out watch-dog roles and provide parliament with much-needed information, 
thus minimizing the defects caused by the shortage of qualified analysts; 
• The use of investigative-coercive methods may be an effective way to combat 
corruption as a short-term solution; and 
• In the long-term, public education and a range of preventative measures are very 
important tools for combating corruption.  
 C.2.   Executive Institutions 
 
C.2.1   Roles and Functions in Ensuring Integrity 
 
The executive branch of the government is a key unit in the integrity process.  Its 
role in the Integrity System is defined by its decision-making and policy 
implementation functions. The executive’s role in the Integrity System is as 
follows: 
 
• To design strategies as well as specific policies reflecting the general 
political will and the legal framework set by the parliament while 
respecting the diverse interests expressed through the parliamentary 
process; 
• To design mechanisms for the development of policies that allow 
transparency and participation among agencies (including non-
government watchdog organizations) so as to prevent the monopolization 
of the policy-making process by individual political groups (state capture) 
and ensure adherence to the rule of law; 
• To design mechanisms for the development of policies which would 
ensure that the ethical principles imbedded in strategies and policies 
reflect the general political will generated through participatory 
consensual politics, and that such principles are not forsaken for the 
purposes of efficiency; 
• To design mechanisms to develop policies that provide for the fair 
distribution of services and benefits to the entire social spectrum of the 
nation. Such policies are likely to build citizens’ trust in the government 
and raise the government’s legitimacy and improve political stability; 
• To develop a system of monitoring the outcomes of implemented policies 
using an evaluation process which incorporates centralized 
control/accountability mechanisms and/or public feedback, and which 
allows for the modification of policies, or makes recommendations to 
parliament for the modification of legislative standards that may lower the 
effectiveness of policy implementation.   
 
The executive’s role in strengthening the state’s anti-corruption capacity is 
as follows:    
 
• Performing its functions through procedures that are compliant with the 
laws passed by the parliament, thus ensuring adherence to the rule of law; 
• Ensuring the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies by overseeing 
compliance of state controlling organizations with ethical standards 
imbedded in strategies devised by parliament and the executive; 
• Creating a favourable environment (material-technical and human 
resources improvement) for the efficient functioning of public services 
and developing control systems by improving anti-corruption institutions 
and accountability mechanisms to achieve a high quality of public 
services;  
• Ensuring regular coordination among institutions performing oversight 
and regulatory functions so as to validate the outcomes of 
oversight/monitoring requirements; 
• Publicizing the information about individual public institutions so that 
non-government watchdog organizations and social groups can monitor 
policy implementation and the quality of services delivered by these 
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institutions and give feedback to the government, including 
recommendations on policy change.  
 
The executive carries out the above functions and roles in the following 
areas of its responsibility:  
 
• Provides for the execution of laws passed by the parliament and secures 
compliance with these laws by the executive itself in order to ensure the 
adherence to the rule of law; 
• Is responsible for policy making and implementation both inside and 
outside the country with regard to– 
∼ Negotiating agreements with international organizations and 
individual states on cooperation in certain areas of state 
development;51 
∼ Defining areas of state operations that should be reformed and 
creating a normative framework for conducting reforms (situation 
analysis, recommendations, policy making/implementation, 
coordination of activities by individual institutions); 
∼ Establishing programs of financial and economic development, 
drafting the state budget, defining fiscal policies (in terms of anti-
corruption policies, the most important are those aimed at ensuring 
transparency in state budgeting, improving tax collection mechanisms 
and achieving the efficient management of state funds); 
∼ Coordinating anti-corruption and effective governance policies at the 
regional/local levels of state administration. 
• Exercises oversight of law-enforcement and state controlling 
organizations to ensure their efficiency and the compliance of their 
operations with the law, including procedural standards. 
 
The functioning of the executive — though carried out by institutions that 
are directly responsible for policy design and implementation — can be influenced 
to a certain degree by international actors (foreign states, international 
organizations), civil society and the media. These participants facilitate the process 
through various types of activities, such as: 
 
• Technical assistance– 
∼ Sharing ‘know-how’ and experience of successful administrative tools 
and management mechanisms; 
∼ Direct financial aid; 
∼ Joint programs aimed at developing areas that are part of the process 
of reform; 
∼ Provision of expertise through analysis, recommendations and 
assessment of implemented policies. 
• Feedback by the general public– 
∼ Providing information and analyses: assessment of the performance of 
the public service and its response to social needs, and public opinion 
regarding state efficiency; 
∼ Criticism and complaints of individual policies and government 
actions. 
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  T he most important agreements in the area of anti-corruption policies are those 
relating to the application of ‘western’ standards in state administrations. 
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Public feedback is also provided by individual citizens or groups of 
citizens without mediation of NGOs and other civic organizations through personal 
meetings and messages (delivering complaints and notes) with/to representatives 
of various levels of state institutions.  
 
C.2.1.1  Grouping of Executive Institutions by Roles and Functions 
 
Executive institutions involved in the Georgian Integrity System can be divided 
into following groups according to their functions:52 
 
• Those defining policies in general– 
∼ Institutions that develop action plans and strategies; 
∼ Institutions that coordinate the activities of policy-implementing 
institutions; 
∼ Institutions that provide analysis and develop recommendations for 
policy planning, implementation and coordination; 
∼ Institutions that establish normative criteria in the area of institutional 
operations, which are based on the experience of developed states and 
recommendations given to the Georgian government by international 
organizations.  
• Those defining procedures for policy implementation in the areas of their 
particular responsibilities– 
∼ Institutions that develop action plans in areas of their individual 
responsibilities in line with the overarching strategies developed by 
institutions responsible for defining policies in general (group1);  
∼ Institutions that control policy implementation by other institutions; 
these bodies also develop operational mechanisms required to 
undertake their role. 
• Those conducting activities at the operational level of policy 
implementation–  
∼ Subordinate institutions that design specialized and specific policy 
implementation plans in accordance with the law and the action plans 
designed by upper-level policy development units; 
∼ Subordinate institutions that deliver services to the public.  
• Those assisting policy implementing institutions– 
∼ Institutions (both within institutions and outside them) that provide 
material-technical resources or human resources; 
∼ Institutions that are involved in monitoring, data analysis and drafting 
recommendations for policy-implementing institutions in order to 
improve overall efficiency.  
• Those monitoring policy implementation and controlling policy-
implementing institutions in terms of their efficiency and their 
compliance with legal norms and procedures–  
∼ Institutions that monitor whether the coordination among policy-
implementing agencies is carried out in accordance with general 
strategies; 
∼ Institutions that monitor technical aspects of policy implementation, 
adherence to procedural standards and the level of organizational 
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  This grouping is not exact and does not mean that individual institutions are 
allocated to certain groups. For instance, individual institutions involved in the 
process of defining policies in general, can also be involved in the policy 
implementation and control processes.  
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discipline in institutions responsible for carrying out particular 
implementation functions. 
 
C.2.1.2 Specific Functions of each Institution 
 
The Government of Georgia Chancellery  The main function of the 
Chancellery is to assist various bodies of the government to fulfil their roles by 
providing information, and analytical and technical support. It facilitates oversight 
of the implementation of decisions taken and policies developed by various 
government institutions. It also: 
 
• Facilitates coordination between different ministries and their subordinate 
institutions;  
• Supports the development of controlling mechanisms; 
• Facilitates the achievement of social, economic and other state programs; 
• Supports legislative initiatives by the Georgian government; 
• Reviews legislation and regulations initiated by senior officials of 
individual executive institutions;  
• Provides research and analysis support to the prime minister; 
• Facilitates the prime minister’s interaction with the parliament, executive 
institutions, international organizations, civil organizations and political 
parties; 
• Supports interaction between the central government and local 
government bodies; 
• Represents the prime minister in court; and 
• Drafts recommendations on ongoing reforms and various programs 
developed by government institutions53. 
 
Office of State Minister for Reform Coordination  The Office is responsible 
for coordinating reforms in the government. The Office coordinates reform 
initiatives between different state institutions that do not fall under particular 
ministries, although it is involved in designing reform initiatives in specific sectors 
as well. The Office’s duty is to design the Georgian government’s interim action 
plan and to develop an approach that would unite policies of individual institutions 
under one unified general strategy which respond to the public’s concerns: 
 
• Mid-term action plans of individual ministries to streamline policy 
implementation;  
• Programs for Georgian government institutions in accordance with EU 
and NATO member-state standards; 
• Recommendations for reform-related draft laws and/or legislative 
initiatives that are agreed with the government before submission to the 
parliament. 
 
As part of the above approaches, the office provides expertise and 
technical assistance to the ministries. In particular, it initiates the establishment of, 
and participates in, various government commissions (e.g. the government 
commission on transport, the government commissions on energy etc.) that were 
established to develop reform strategies for different sectors.   
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 Though the Government of Georgia Chancellary formally is responsible for facilitating oversight of 
the implementation of reform policies and for drafting recommendations on ongoing reforms in 
individual sectors, some respondents question the efficiency of these roles performance.  
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The Office is also responsible for developing Georgia’s national anti-
corruption strategy and its implementation action plan, and for overseeing and 
reporting on its implementation. 
 
Office of State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration  The 
main responsibility of the agency is to coordinate the activities of individual 
ministries and other executive bodies in regard to the country’s aspiration to 
integrate with the Euro-Atlantic structures. The office participates in institutional 
reforms to bring the Georgian political system and legislation closer to EU and 
NATO standards. In this respect, the office provides expertise and 
recommendations to various state institutions, such as: the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs; the Ministry of 
Finance; the Ministry of Economic Development; the Ministry of Justice; the 
Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources; the Ministry of Healthcare and 
Labour; the Ministry of Science and Education; and their subordinate bodies. The 
assistance provided by the office is aimed not only at improving institutional 
operations and harmonizing Georgian legislation with EU standards but also at 
strengthening anti-corruption capacity in line with EU and NATO partnership 
programs. This function is carried out through a commission which oversees the 
implementation of programs in different areas of government activity. In this 
regard, the most important program initiated by the office in partnership with the 
Council of Europe is the Rule of Law Mission program EUJUST THEMIS 
implemented under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The aim of 
the program is to coordinate the government’s anti-corruption policies and foster 
regional cooperation in combating corruption. 
 
Ministry of Internal Affairs  The Ministry has a number of diverse functions: it 
deals with public order (policing functions) and is also responsible for state 
security and state border protection. The ministry’s roles include: 
 
• Oversight of laws related to the public order provision passed by 
parliament; 
• Prevention of the violation of law through investigation and criminal 
prosecution.  
 
These functions are carried out in the following areas: 
 
• Social order and public security; 
• Combating corruption in state institutions; 
• Anti-terrorist activities and counter-intelligence; and 
• Oversight of the achievement of constitutional norms by state institutions.  
 
The Interior Ministry’s specialized units undertake these functions: the 
Police; the Special Operative Department; the Department on Constitutional 
Security and Order; and Department on State Border Protection.  
The functions are conducted through: 
 
• Analysis and planning; 
• Coordination among the ministry’s subordinate bodies;  
• Investigation and operative work; and 
• Coordination with other law enforcement and state controlling institutions. 
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Ministry of Internal Affairs Analysis Department   The Department is a 
subordinate body of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its functions include: 
 
• Provision and analysis of information required by the ministry; 
• Preparation of analytical reports on the crime situation in Georgia and the 
assessment of the ministry’s efficiency to respond to it;  
• Drafting recommendations on the ministry’s institutional development; 
and  
• Publicizing statistical and analytical information on the above issues. 
 
The department also provides information to other state institutions. 
 
Ministry of Internal Affairs Special Operative Department The department is 
a body subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its function is to conduct 
activities (investigation and criminal prosecution) against organized crime and 
illegal business. In general, the department is authorized to conduct investigations 
on all issues that are within the ministry’s responsibility. Its roles are: 
 
• To fight against organized crime, such as drug dealing and drug 
trafficking, illegal migration and trafficking in humans, and illegal arms 
trading; 
• To conduct activities against money laundering and illegal incomes; and 
• To protect witnesses of the state prosecution.  
 
Ministry of Finance Financial Police  The Financial Police is a subordinate 
body of the Ministry of Finance. Its function is to conduct preventive, operative-
investigative and analytical activities in relation to financial and economic crime. 
One of the main responsibilities of the Financial Police is the prevention of 
violation of administrative law in relation to, for example: 
 
• Tax evasion; 
• Customs regulations, including smuggling. 
 
The Financial Police conducts oversight of government institutions and the 
Ministry of Finance for the following purposes:  
 
• Information gathering and provision of analysis on corruption issues; 
• Prevention, investigation and criminal prosecution in the cases of 
administrative crime and corrupt dealings in government, in the areas of 
finances and economy; and 
• Ensuring that civil servants and ministerial staff are not engaged in 
dealings that violate laws. 
 
These functions are achieved through activities, such as: 
 
• Conducting financial inspections of relevant organizations; 
• Requesting information from various state institutions operating in the 
financial-economic field; 
• Information analysis and strategic action planning; and 
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• Carrying out inspections and inventories in private businesses and 
government organizations suspected of engaging in criminal activities. 54  
 
Ministry of Finance Customs Department  The Department is a subordinate 
body of the Ministry of Finance and is responsible for the protection of state 
economic sovereignty and the provision of economic security. At the same time, its 
role is to collect customs payments (customs tariff, surplus value, excise, licensing 
tariff) and to transfer funds to the state budget. The department monitors export-
import and transit processes; controls excise procedures on certain imported goods; 
collects and analyses information on collectable payments; collects customs tariffs; 
provides information and analysis regarding these fields to the Ministry of Finance 
and other government institutions involved in the financial-economic sector. It also 
provides expertise to the government and parliament in relation to state budget 
drafting.  
 
Ministry of Finance Taxation Department  The Department is a subordinate 
body of the Ministry of Finance and is responsible for tax collection and its transfer 
to the State budget. Its role is to monitor and gather information on existing 
businesses and services, analyse data and define the scope of the taxes that should 
paid to the state. Accordingly, the Department is obliged to develop a strategic 
action plan relating to the activities of taxation department units (management, 
coordination and oversight) and to define mechanisms (methods and programs) for 
taxation control.  
One of the major functions of the Department is to provide expert advice to 
legislators through:  
 
• Assisting with the drafting of laws; 
• Participating in parliamentary hearings on draft laws relevant to the 
Department’s field of expertise; and 
• Analysing the impact and efficiency of amendments made to finance 
related legislation. 
 
The Department’s function is also to assist judicial institutions with regard 
to cases on taxpayers’ claims. 
 
Ministry of Justice Information Bureau on Public Officials Property and Financial 
State  The Bureau is a subordinate body of the Ministry of Justice and its main 
function is to oversee the implementation of the Law for the Public Service and the 
law of Georgia on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service, which is 
designed to create a public service environment that reduces the opportunity for 
private economic interests of public officials to interfere with their public functions. 
This goal is achieved through: 
 
• Creating a list of public officials that should provide information relating 
to property owned by them and/or their family members and businesses 
owned in Georgia or abroad; 
• Regular gathering of information regarding property ownership by public 
officials includes– 
∼ 2000 public officials who should provide information annually; 
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  The Financial Police are allowed to detain suspects, question witnesses and use 
force, if necessary. 
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∼ Information of property ownership by public officials collected prior 
to appointment to public office and updated regularly. This includes 
the period when an individual official is dismissed from his/her office. 
 
The bureau makes the information gathered publicly available. The Bureau’s only 
responsibility, however, is to ensure that the respective government officials submit 
their financial and asset declarations in time.  The Bureau does not scrutinize the 
submitted declarations. 
 
The Ministry of Justice National Agency of Public Registry  The National 
Agency of Public Registry is a subordinate body of the Ministry of Justice. Its main 
function is the registration and recognition of citizens’ property rights. Accordingly, 
it is responsible for:  
 
• Gathering information on properties owned by Georgian citizens and 
creating and updating registry databases;  
• Making this information publicly available; 
• In the context of ongoing institutional reform, carry out activities 
designed to develop a modern unified Public Register system. (There are 
currently 68 offices of the Public Register National Agency in the 
Georgian regions, and the Agency is obliged to install standards to 
coordinate office activities with the aim of achieving greater efficiency.) 
This coordination role is achieved through– 
∼ Drafting a general budget for the Agency system: controlling the 
expenditure of subordinate units; developing operational management 
mechanisms; establishing unified standard models for quarterly and 
annual financial accounting processes that are compulsory for all 
subordinate bodies of the Agency; 
∼ Organizing centralized material-technical provisions for the Agency 
system and providing centralized economic management; 
∼ Overseeing the use of disciplinary processes and carrying out 
corruption prevention activities using internal control mechanisms (for 
example, consideration of complaints received from citizens and 
government institutions). 
 
The Ministry of Justice Civil Registry Agency  The Agency is a subordinate 
body of the Ministry of Justice and its functions are: 
 
• To form a unified register of Georgian citizens living in the country and 
abroad, and foreign subjects living in Georgia; 
• To gather information and create electronic databases that increase the 
efficiency of the Agency and other institutions using the data; and 
• To measure the efficiency of its own work and to design 
recommendations for legislative reform.  
 
The Agency’s role is to register a range of civil acts, but most important 
among them are: 
 
• Issue and registration of legal documents confirming identity (as 
Georgian citizens or foreigners); 
• Issue or alteration of passports; and  
• Registration and archiving of citizenship, civil acts and migration 
information 
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The Ministry of Justice Legal Aid Commission  The Legal Aid Commission 
answers to the Ministry of Justice. Its activities are based on rules drafted as part of 
the reform process.  The aim of the reform is to provide legal support to socially 
unprotected citizens, offering them free legal services at public expense. The 
availability of the legal personnel to provide this service is one of the main 
components of the reform.  
The Legal Aid Commission has two offices where it offers its free services 
to citizens55 in Tbilisi’s Gldani-Nadzaladevi district and a western Georgian town 
of Zestaponi. Lawyers working at these offices provide legal advice and provide a 
free legal defence to citizens who are not able to pay for lawyers. 56  
 
The Ministry of Justice National Forensic Bureau  The Bureau is a 
subordinate body of the Ministry of Justice and its role is to provide expert advice 
to public institutions (primarily to law enforcement agencies and the judiciary). 
The Bureau provides information (evidence) to lawyers, prosecutors and judges to 
assist with the development of investigations/discussions in the appropriate manner. 
The Bureau controls the provision of expert services through:  
 
• Monitoring of the professional activities of personnel to ensure such 
actions correspond with prescribed standards;  
• Improving forensic examination methodologies and material-technical 
facilities.  
 
The National Bank of Georgia Financial Monitoring Service  The Financial 
Monitoring Service is a subordinate body of the National Bank and its main task is 
to facilitate the prevention of the legalizing of illicit income. The function of the 
Financial Monitoring Service is: 
 
• To create an information network, systemize and analyse the information obtained, 
and to ensure the creation and proper functioning of the relevant database;  
• To forward at its discretion the information (including confidential information) 
and relevant materials to the Prosecutor General’s Office; and 
• To participate in drafting and reviewing acts concerning the economic security of 
the country. 
 
These goals are achieved through various functions delegated to the 
Financial Monitoring Service:  
 
• To obtain additional information (of relevance to the cases explored by 
the Service) from other monitoring entities to avoid legalizing illicit 
income;  
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  The offices were piloted as part of the reform, and the decision on whether or not 
they would continue their operations would be made after their effectiveness would 
be assessed. Law on Legal Aid Commission was adopted by the parliament in 2007 
and it seems commission offices will be established in most districts of Georgia.  
56
   According to the respondent, selection of the above districts for trial purposes was 
based on ongoing judicial case levels. In Gldani-Nadzaladevi district, the caseload is 
high, while in Zestafoni it is low. One of the aims of the experiment is to determine 
sufficient technical, human and financial resources for the Commission to function 
efficiently after the law is adopted. 
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• To provide information to the supervisory and law enforcement agencies; 
• To issue acts and regulations on the conditions and procedures for 
submission, processing and forwarding of information within the scope of 
its responsibilities; 
• To obtain information from all state (including local government) bodies 
and agencies, as well as from any individual or legal entity, that exercises 
public legal authority granted by the legislation, for the purpose of 
implementing the assigned functions. 
 
The Ministry of Defence Legal Department  The Department is an 
institutional unit of the Ministry of Defence. Its function is to assist the Ministry to 
implement its policies in accordance with the laws adopted by the parliament. This 
function is achieved through: 
 
• Analysing civil-military relations and drafting and implementing coherent 
plans for their improvement; 
• Conducting control and analysis of documentary proceedings in the 
Ministry and to consult ministry decision makers on legal issues; and 
• Analysing ongoing reform processes in the Ministry and developing 
recommendations for legislative improvement. 
 
The Ministry of Economic Development State Procurement Agency  The 
State Procurement Agency is a Ministry of Economic Development subordinate 
body and its functions are:  
 
• To create legislation and standards for tender applications and coordinate 
these Acts and standards with international norms; 
• To collect and analyse information from purchaser agencies regarding the 
country’s procurement needs and drafting strategic plans for presentation 
to the President of Georgia for decision making; 
• To create databases on completed procurements and organized tenders; 
• To provide expertise and recommendations to the procurement agencies; 
• To develop legislation for transparency of the procurement processes; and 
• To oversee the legality of procurement processes and to define 
procurement regulation policies. 
 
Achievement of these functions is accomplished by the State Procurement 
Agency by the following processes: 
 
• Improving the methodological basis of the procurement and 
accountability procedures; 
• Organising the training of Agency personnel, thus improving their 
qualifications; 
• Coordinating its activities with the financial bodies of the government in 
order to share information; 
• Improving the monitoring of state procurements and coordinating 
activities with law enforcement agencies for corruption prevention; and 
• Improving control of procurement organizations’ accountability 
procedures and developing mechanisms for operational feedback.  
 
The Internal General Inspectorates of Ministries  Organizations interviewed 
were: 
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• The Ministry of Economic Development General Inspectorate; 
• The Ministry of Finance General Inspectorate; 
• The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources General 
Inspectorate; 
• The Ministry of Labor and Healthcare General Inspectorate; 
• The Ministry of Education and Science General Inspectorate; 
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs General Inspectorate; and 
• The Ministry of Justice General Inspectorate. 
 
The main function of the General Inspectorates is to oversee the activities 
of ministerial staff regarding adherence to the Administrative laws of Georgia. The 
Inspectorates’ roles are: 
 
• To control disciplinary and legal issues applicable to ministerial units and 
public law legal entities subordinated to the ministry; 
• To prevent and expose violations of the law; 
• To analyse the efficiency of ministerial staff activities and to develop 
recommendations for achieving ministerial efficiency;  
• To provide financial control of the ministerial units; 
• To receive complaints about violations of law or disciplinary breaches 
and report to the minister on these issues; 
• To review reports and decisions, relevant to particular areas of expertise, 
received from the General Prosecutor’s office, Judiciary and other 
institutions on behalf of the minister and making conclusions on these 
issues. 57 
 
The Tbilisi Internal General Inspectorate for Law Protection58  The General 
Inspectorate function is to monitor financial and economic management of 
municipal resources.  
There are two ways in which monitoring is conducted: 
 
• Planned monitoring conducted at the beginning of each year (these 
activities are led by the inspection group); 
• Thematic monitoring occurs either when the inspectorate receives 
complaints from citizens, members of parliament, media organizations or 
NGOs about the quality of municipal services, or when major concerns 
arise, requiring investigation of particular institutions. (These activities 
are led by the Special Task Department.)59  
 
                                                
57
  Actually roles and responsibilities of general inspectorates of individual ministries        
differ, but they can be generalised in given way. 
58
  The local government bodies usually do not have their own general inspectorates but 
Tbilisi government due to its special status (capital city of Georgia) and economic 
considerations. (Most of the economy actors are concentrated in Tbilisi and the city 
budget is much bigger than any other local budget and has its own internal control 
unit.) 
59
  Procedures to monitor the management of municipal resources have not yet been 
designed, as there has been no previous experience of such an institution operating 
at the municipal level. It is anticipated that regulations will be developed towards the 
end of 2006. Meantime, in the absence of these procedural regulations, the role of 
the inspectorate is determined by the Tbilisi Mayor’s office.  
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C.2.1.3 Scope of Institutional Authority 
 
This section aims to explain the technical, procedural and legal framework and 
environment within which the executive institutions operate in order to fulfil their 
various roles.  
The Constitution of Georgia and the Law on the Government Structure and 
Functions are two major documents that define the functions of executive 
institutions. A number of laws, by-laws and charters/statutes specific to individual 
executive integrity agencies underpin the operations of various executive 
institutions. Examples of these include:  
Legal documents defining standards and procedures for the functioning of 
the state administrative system, such as: 
 
• The General Administrative Code;  
• Law on the Public Service;  
• Customs Code of Georgia; 
• Taxation Code of Georgia; 
• Law of Georgia on the State Budget; 
• Law on Local Governance and Self-Government; 
• Law on Civil Acts Registration; 
• Law on the Police; 
• Law on the Financial Police; 
• Law on the Development and Reform Fund; and 
• Law on State Procurements. 
 
Legal documents regulating anti-corruption activities of the executive 
integrity institutions: 
 
• Law of Georgia on Facilitating the Prevention of Illicit Income 
Legalization; 
• Law of Georgia on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Civil Service; 
• Criminal Procedural Code; 
• Civil Procedural Code; and 
• Law on Organized Crime and Extortion. 
 
These laws define the roles of individual executive institutions and 
determine procedural frameworks for activities conducted by their representatives 
in relation to the positions they hold and functions prescribed by these positions. 
The scope of the authority regarding anti-corruption capacity provisions varies in 
accordance with the general functions of each executive institution. In this sense, 
government agencies included in this set of institutional units can be divided into 
following groups: 
 
a. Those providing strategic definition of the ongoing reforms and anti-
corruption policies, as well as coordination of the activities of anti-
corruption institutions generally or in the particular sectors of 
policymaking and implementation. Some of these institutions may also 
directly affect the efficiency of anti-corruption policies through their 
capacity to define the ethical norms and values embedded in reform goals. 
(Government of Georgia Chancellery; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Office 
of the State Minister for Reform Coordination; Office of the State 
Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration.) 
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b. Those providing state administration functions, especially in economic 
and budgetary areas in which oversight by special bodies are most 
intensive. (Ministry of Finance Customs Department; Ministry of Finance 
Taxation Department; The Ministry of Economic Development State 
Procurement Agency.) 
c. Those providing legal services to society in general, ensuring protection 
of property rights and other civil rights. The collection and accessibility 
of information relating to anti-corruption policies enables ‘watchdog’ 
organizations to protect civil rights from abuses of authority. (Ministry of 
Justice Public Register National Agency; Ministry of Justice Civil 
Register Agency; Ministry of Justice Legal Aid Commission; Ministry of 
Justice National Forensic Bureau.) 
d. Those providing for the implementation of anti-corruption policies. 
(Ministry of Internal Affairs; 60  Ministry of Internal Affairs Special 
Operative Department; Ministry of Finance Financial Police; The 
Ministerial Internal General Inspectorates.) 
e. Those providing support to anti-corruption institutions through the 
collection of information and provision of analytical services, aimed at 
improving the operational capacity of the integrity institutions and 
agencies directly involved in the implementation of anti-corruption 
policies. In addition to this, several of these institutions are directly 
involved in anti-corruption activities through monitoring provisions. 
(Ministry of Internal Affairs Analytic Department; Ministry of Justice 
Information Bureau on Public Officials Property and Financial State; The 
Ministry of Defence Legal Department; The National Bank of Georgia 
Financial Monitoring Service.) 
 
Institutions representing the first group of agencies (a), defining policies in 
general and coordinating their implementation in particular sectors of state/public 
life, are not authorized to instigate investigations of violations of procedural 
standards, or to conduct corruption prevention activities.61 They are authorized to 
carry out a general oversight on ongoing reform processes related to anti-
corruption policies, and to provide coordination and analytical support to the policy 
implementation agencies. Assessment of internal systems and personnel activities 
is carried out through hierarchical reporting mechanisms and accountability 
processes of subordinate institutions. These organizations make a contribution to 
the general improvement of integrity through: 
 
• Participation in the development of anti-corruption policies and drafting 
of action plans in accordance with relevant expertise and analytical 
capacity; 
• Oversight of the adaptation and conversion of defined strategies into 
specific institutional action plans. This includes analysis of the relevance 
of these particular strategies in relation to the defined general anti-
corruption policy strategies; and 
• Providing oversight of the policy implementation process, by reporting to 
the relevant ministry (as required) and providing recommendations for 
necessary actions (as required). 
 
                                                
60
  As the Ministry has as policy defining (including interagency activities 
coordination), it is logical to include this institution in both groups. 
61
  The Ministry of Internal Affairs is an exception.  
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The above institutions impact upon other agencies’ abilities to meet their 
reporting obligations within specified timeframes. Data and analysis retrieved 
through this process is intended to enable the Government, as a whole, to control 
and plan for the efficient achievement of defined functions. (One of the most 
important functions of these institutions is to provide operational data/analysis 
collection and transmission.)  
The institutions representing second (b) and third (c) groups of the 
government agencies are subordinate bodies of the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Economic Development and Ministry of Justice. Consequently, these organizations 
are not authorized to commence investigations focused on violations of procedural 
norms or corruption (committed by their personnel). The activities of these 
institutions must be undertaken in accordance with the legislation defining their 
functions. These activities are checked and controlled by general inspectorates of 
the government institutions to which they are subordinated, and by external 
controlling bodies.  
The institutions representing the fourth group of government agencies (d) 
are either bodies focused on defining anti-corruption strategies or overseeing the 
implementation of policies. Consequently, these institutions are responsible for 
planning and conducting investigations into the activities of government bodies. 
These investigative activities are not tied exclusively to the area of their own 
particular ministry (except Internal General Inspectorates that do not commence 
investigation on disciplinary and procedural norms violation outside the institution 
to which they are subordinated).  
The institutions representing the fifth group of government agencies (e) 
monitor ongoing processes through data collection and analysis in the particular 
ministerial units to which they belong (except the National Bank’s Financial 
Monitoring Service62 and the Ministry of Justice Information Bureau on Public 
Officials Property and Financial State), 63  for the purposes of assessing the 
efficiency of the subordinate ministerial bodies.64 The scope of the authority of 
these institutions does not include commencing investigation, however the services 
provided by them support the agencies carrying out anti-corruption prevention 
policies and investigative activities as information and analysis produced by these 
units can be of interest to law enforcement agencies. 
 
                                                
62
  The National Bank of Georgia Financial Monitoring Service function is to monitor 
all economic subjects’ functioning in accordance with legal framework regulating 
economic activities and to collect information regarding these issues. In this sense, 
this institution provides analytic service to anti-corruption policy implementing 
institutions. 
63
  The Ministry of Justice Information Bureau on Public Officials Property and 
Financial State is not bounded to the Ministry of Justice exclusively; it collects 
information from various government agencies.  
64
  The Defense Ministry Legal Department is not a solely analytic centre in the sense 
of information collection and analysis; but due to its responsibilities to provide legal 
support to the ongoing reform process for the military in relation to military service 
rules, procurement/provisions organization issues, institutional design improvement 
and NATO standards implication, it carries out certain oversight and analytic 
functions for related ministerial units.  
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C.2.1.4  Accountability and Reporting Arrangements  
 
Accountability and reporting mechanisms and structures are derived from a 
hierarchical institutional system. Consequently, types of accountability/reporting 
mechanisms are based on the institutional level and scope of authority, and the 
operational purposes of individual institutions. The reporting system has a 
pyramidal structure and is arranged along formal hierarchical lines. Personnel of 
internal units of Ministries are accountable to their direct heads; the latter are 
accountable to the Minister and Ministers have responsibility to report to the Prime 
Minister, Cabinet of Ministers and ultimately to the President. In addition to this 
structure, there are key institutions responsible for anti-corruption policies in the 
economic sector of the state and for ensuring that transparency mechanisms are 
implemented that require direct reporting to the President or dual reporting to the 
head of the Ministry and the President simultaneously.65 Some institutions that also 
deal with economic issues of the state report to the appropriate Minister and the 
Prime Minister.66  
This pyramidal structure of accountability mechanisms within the 
executive branch of the government extends to reporting relationships with the 
parliamentary and special/controlling institutions, in the following ways: 
 
• Executive agencies report to the appropriate parliamentary committees 
and temporary commissions (if they are created by parliament for specific 
investigations) by providing analytical reports on issues of parliamentary 
interest and participation in committee/commission hearings. Executive 
agencies report to ministers on an ongoing basis at annual parliamentary 
plenary sessions (termed the ‘government hour’). In some cases, 
particular Ministers are required to report to the Parliament urgently on 
special issues concerning the legislative body; 
• Executive agencies report to the Ombudsman’s Office if the latter 
requires information on issues within its jurisdiction. These circumstances 
includes where the Ombudsman has received information (e.g. this may 
be in the form of a complaint) relating to a particular institution and 
requests further particulars to clarify whether procedures and activities are 
being conducted in accordance with constitutional and legislative 
standards;  
• Executive agencies, those providing internal control in Ministries, are 
obliged to report to the General Prosecutor’s Office or the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs in cases where violations of procedural 
standards/regulations by ministerial personnel are deemed to be a crime; 
and 
• Executive agencies report to the Audit Chamber as part of the planned 
complex inspection process conducted by the Audit Chamber. If during 
the internal reporting process of individual executive agencies violations 
of procedural norms are discovered, this reporting process allows for the 
Audit Chamber to conduct a thematic inspection to further clarify the 
situation.  
 
                                                
65
  These institutions are: the Ministry of Economic Development State Procurements 
Agency, Financial Police of the Ministry of Finance, The National Bank of Georgia 
Financial Monitoring Service.  
66
  These institutions are: the Ministry of Finance Customs and Taxation departments.  
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Currently, Georgia is reforming its budgetary system in accordance with 
the Medium Term Expenditure Framework policy. This policy requires all state 
institutions funded from the state budget to prepare program-based budgets for the 
Ministry of Finance and Cabinet of Ministers. The budgets sets out information 
about the state institution, including its goals for the next budget year, required 
resources, expected outcomes and evaluation criteria. This information is 
incorporated into the Basic Data Document that is then used as the baseline 
document for formulating the draft state budget. At the end of each financial year 
all state institutions are obliged to report on their activities over the past year and 
their compliance with the original plans and targets. This reporting system ties 
government institutions to the Ministry of Finance, the Cabinet of Ministers and 
parliamentary committees through the Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
policy. This process eases budgetary planning pressures and requires institutions to 
justify their activities in accordance with the declared goals of the particular 
institution.  
Individual institutions define internal accountability mechanisms within 
the institutions, as there are no unified procedures applicable for all institutions. 
There are no strict rules set for internal reporting. (This issue is of most relevance 
to the ministerial internal inspectorates.) In some institutions, reporting occurs 
annually or biannually; in others, it takes place on a monthly basis. In some 
instances, Ministers can require reporting on particular issues on a weekly basis.  
In relation to high-level government agencies, reporting occurs on an 
annual or biannual basis based on legislative requirements. In addition to this, 
when deemed necessary by the Prime Minister and/or the President, these agencies 
can be required to report on identified issues.  
Apart from the standard procedural framework of accountability/reporting 
arrangements, there is a regular reporting process related to the operational 
dimension of agency functions. Reports cover: 
 
• Prescribed obligations of the initial action plans of institutions, details of 
the activities undertaken, the effects and outcomes of the activities, and 
expenditure;  
• Regular internal/external controls on personnel activities to ensure that 
they are in accordance with the functions prescribed to them; and 
• Issues that emerge during the monitoring of institutional functions, which 
are deemed to require external attention. 
 
On the basis of these types of accountability processes, vertical and 
horizontal mechanisms used in the Georgian system can be understood. A vertical 
reporting structure prevails in this system and generally it coincides with 
normatively designed accountability mechanisms. (This does not take into account 
the hierarchical accountability system to the parliament found at the highest levels 
of the state system.) The accountability process is a system of information 
exchange that is based on regulating control and monitoring by high-level decision-
making units of agencies to the subordinate bodies.  
Even in relation to horizontal accountability mechanisms, the vertical 
structure of reporting remains crucial. When external institutions require reporting 
or clarification on particular issues, they deal with the decision-making units at the 
ministerial level (Minister or his/her deputies). Consequently, the minister/deputy 
minister accomplishes the task by addressing directives on particular issues across 
the vertical hierarchical structure of the institution. Horizontal accountability is 
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practiced only at the top level of the institutional system and can be explained 
either through specific institutional design or through the government’s ‘team 
principle’.  
The accountability/reporting mechanisms are also evident in the staff 
appointment/replacement mechanisms. The Ministers appoint heads of the 
subordinated ministerial units while the Prime Minister, with presidential consent, 
appoints the Ministers. Ministers are responsible for ministerial staff appointment 
and dismissal. According to Georgian law, dismissal of an individual Minister does 
not result in ministerial staff replacement. 
 
C.2.2   Assessment of Capacity 
 
C.2.2.1  Adequacy of Institutional Resources 
 
The adequacy of resources differs among institutions. Generally, the majority of 
respondents expressed satisfaction with the existing provision of resources in 
human, material-technical and financial areas. Nevertheless, there are some 
institutions, especially among ministerial internal control units, in which the 
shortage of resources is a major concern. For instance, the Ministry of Economic 
Development is one of the largest Ministries; it unites twelve sub-sectors, a large 
number of sub-entities, fifteen legal entities of public law, as well as a large 
number of regional and district departments. However, four people operate its 
internal general inspectorate and the inspectorate sometimes has to inspect 
ministerial units within a week-long period. The same situation is evident in other 
Ministerial general inspectorates. 67  This situation affects the ability of internal 
auditing bodies to fulfil their tasks.  
A vastly different situation exists with regard to the resources of external 
controlling and investigative institutions of the State. The Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and its subordinate units, and the Ministry of Finance Financial Police 
reported that they are sufficiently well resourced with material-technical, financial 
and human resources.  
The difference in resource allocation between these two types of 
institutional control bodies (internal and external) highlights the government 
approach to the problem of corruption and the means for combating it. The 
government apparently takes the view that strong investigative and coercive 
policies are more efficient. This approach may be justified by the overall 
effectiveness of the operations of these institutions, compared with those adopting 
internal checking and monitoring controls.  
Agencies that are designed to collect and analyse information in areas of 
particular institutional responsibilities (that is: the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
Analytic Department; Ministry of Justice Information Bureau on Public Officials 
Property and Financial State; the Ministry of Defence Legal Department; the 
National Bank of Georgia Financial Monitoring Service) are also sufficiently well 
resourced. The support to enhance institutional efficiency is provided not only 
through the national government but also through International Donor Organization 
                                                
67
  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs General Inspectorate is run by five people while the 
ministry’s subordinate bodies have 62 staff. The Ministry of Education and Science 
(which has a large number of educational and scientific centres in its administration) 
General Inspectorate has 15 employees. For comparison, only Tbilisi city municipal 
General Inspectorate has 30 employees.  
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programs targeted at the improvement of personnel qualifications and material 
infrastructure development of these institutions, within the framework of overall 
technical assistance to the Georgian government.  
Agencies operating under the Ministry of Justice and providing legal 
services to the public (that is: the National Agency of Public Registry, Civil 
Registry Agency, Legal Aid Commission, National Forensic Bureau) also report 
that they are sufficiently well to efficiently carryout their roles. These institutions 
also receive support from international donor organizations through personnel 
training, IT infrastructure and data analysis technology development.  
Agencies providing strategic support for ongoing reforms and anti-
corruption policies, coordination the activities of anti-corruption institutions 
generally, or drafting and implementing policy (The Government of Georgia 
Chancellery, Office of State Minister for Reform Coordination, Office of State 
Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration) are not well in comparison 
with other state agencies. The number of employees in the offices of the state 
ministers is small but respondents did stress that this number is sufficient to 
undertake the functions of the office.  
The institutions providing state administration functions, especially in the 
economic and budgetary sector (Ministry of Finance Customs Department, 
Ministry of Finance Taxation Department, Ministry of Economic Development 
State Procurement Agency) are not sufficiently well resourced. A shortage of 
qualified personnel in the Ministry of Finance and limited development of the IT 
infrastructure in the Ministry of Economic Development State Procurement 
Agency were identified as major problems. To overcome the human resource 
problem, the Ministry of Finance has implemented a policy for the creation of Staff 
Reserve databases in which information on potential applicants will be gathered. 
The Ministry of Economic Development State Procurement Service is negotiating 
with the World Bank regarding IT development (technical infrastructure and 
personnel training). 
 
C.2.3   Assessment of Coherence 
 
The anti-corruption roles of executive institutions are widely dependent on the 
types of institutional interactions and their quality and accordance with the 
procedural frameworks as defined by Georgian administrative legislation and the 
internal administrative regulations of the particular agencies. There are several 
types of interagency interactions including, administering/coordinating, 
controlling/investigative, analytical/supportive and those providing technical 
assistance. These interactions exist either through legislative/regulatory 
frameworks or through operational needs that exist beyond the scope of the initial 
normative framework. The sectors of institutional interaction include: among 
executive institutions; between executive institutions and parliamentary 
institutions; between executive and judiciary institutions; among executive 
institutions and international organizations, NGOs and media.  
 
C.2.3.1  Administering and/or Coordinating Interactions 
 
Administering/coordinating interagency interaction mainly occurs through the 
activities of Cabinet Ministers. Institutions involved in the interactions include: 
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• The Government of Georgia Chancellery interacts with– 
∼ All Ministries and Ministerial departments and internal controlling 
bodies, to obtain information on issues that the Ministries would like 
raised with the Government for further consideration. This interaction 
supports the coordinated implementation of policies, an approach 
which is carried out by the Cabinet and particularly by the Prime 
Minister; 
∼ The President’s Office, in order to coordinate the Cabinet agenda 
regarding future policy making and to define general strategies for the 
implementation of anti-corruption policies; 
∼ The Audit Chamber, in order to obtain information on the budget and 
the performance of associated institutions (this interaction is mutual 
— the Chamber also obtains information about the fulfilment of legal 
and regulatory acts by the State Chancellery); 
∼ The parliamentary institutions (committees and Speaker’s office), to 
coordinate general approaches and determine the common position 
regarding parliamentary support for legislative government activities; 
∼ International Donor Organizations (World Bank, USAID) regarding 
technical assistance for the promotion of ongoing institutional reform 
and to gain additional international support (including financial). 
• The Ministry of Internal Affairs interacts with– 
Internally 
∼ The Department of Constitutional Security and Order and Special 
Operative Department, in order to coordinate its activities with the 
policies and action plans of other internal and external 
investigative/law enforcement units (Ministry of Finance Financial 
Police; General Prosecutor’s Office). This interaction also assists with 
defining areas of the departments’ activities and further actions 
regarding the avoidance of institutional overlap, as well as carrying 
out general oversight activities as to their efficiency; 
∼ Internal General Inspectorate, in order to ensure Ministerial 
departments function in accordance with the legislative-regulatory 
framework and to monitor performance. 
Externally 
∼ The Government of Georgia Chancellery and the President’s Office, 
in order to inform the government of the general situation and 
activities in the ministries and to coordinate the agenda for future 
policy making and general strategies for the implementation of anti-
corruption policies; 
∼ The General Prosecutor’s Office, in order to exchange information on 
situations and cases where areas of expertise/interest overlap for the 
purposes of coordinating joint anti-corruption policies; 
∼ The Ministry of Economic Development Procurement Service, 
regarding material/technical infrastructure development as a means to 
support institutional performance; 
∼ The Audit Chamber, regarding information on Ministerial 
expenditures; 
∼ The Ministry of Justice Information Bureau on Public Officials 
Property and Financial State, regarding the timely submission of 
financial statements from high-ranked public servants in the 
ministries; 
∼ The Judiciary institutions, regarding investigative and procedural 
support for the state prosecution; 
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∼ The Parliamentary institutions, regarding information exchange and 
reporting on issues related to parliamentary committees (committee on 
legal issues, committee on human rights and civil integration issues, 
budget and finance committee); 
∼ The Ombudsman’s Office, regarding the provision of information on 
human and civil rights protection to the Ombudsman’s Office; 
∼ International Donor Organizations and NGOs, regarding analytical 
support for the development of policy making tools and public 
relations strategies and the design of ethical codes of conduct.68 
• Office of the State Minister for Reform Coordination interacts with– 
∼ The President’s Office, the Government of Georgia Chancellery, and 
all Ministries regarding the provision of policy and legislative 
recommendations for the drafting of official action plans and policy 
strategies. The Ministries provide the Office of the State Minister with 
background information and analytical data within their respective 
fields to support the office’s functions;  
∼ The Parliamentary institutions, in order to promote suggestions of the 
Office of the State Minister and obtain parliamentary support for the 
action plans designed by the Cabinet of Ministers and individual 
ministries on the basis of the Office’s recommendations. This 
interaction is designed to promote legislative initiatives intended to 
support the reform process; 
∼ International organizations and local NGOs, through mutual exchange 
of information and analysis regarding problem areas of the reform 
process. The Office also provides assistance to international 
organizations in co-ordinating projects based on cooperation with 
various government agencies. 
• Office of State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration 
interacts with– 
∼ The President’s Office, the Government of Georgia Chancellery, and 
all Ministries (most intensively with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of 
Justice), in order to provide suggestions and recommendations on 
institutional reforms that meet western standards and to promote 
policy strategies aimed at institutional procedures in line with those 
practiced by analogous institutions in the West;  
∼ The Parliamentary institutions (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Committee on European Integration Issues and Defence and Security 
Committee), regarding the provision of expertise for legislative 
improvements aimed at implementing standards recommended by 
NATO and the European Union; 
∼ International Organizations and local NGOs that are undertaking 
projects and programs within the expertise of the Office of the State 
Minister. Cooperation is expressed through information and analysis 
exchange as well as through the joint promotion of ideas to facilitate 
the ongoing institutional reform process. 
• The Ministry of Finance Taxation and Customs Departments interact 
with– 
Internally 
∼ The finance minister, regarding the coordination and definition of 
policies aimed at developing action plans that are based on strategies 
                                                
68
  The Ministry of Internal Affairs drafted Ethical Code in cooperation with the Liberty 
Institute. 
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agreed to with the Cabinet of Ministers, the Government of Georgia 
Chancellery and the President’s Office by the Ministry (including the 
implementation of anti-corruption strategies); 
∼ The Ministry of Finance Financial Police and Internal General 
Inspectorate, regarding control in these agencies over personnel 
activities and their adherence to the legislative framework; (In the case 
of the Financial Police, it also includes investigation and enforcement 
in situations of violations of the law related to abuses of positions of 
authority.) 
Externally 
∼ The Government of Georgia State Chancellery and President’s Office, 
regarding reporting on the achievement of action plans and the 
provision of information and analysis on budgetary 
incomes/expenditures; 
∼ The Audit Chamber, in relation to institutional state budget plans; 
∼ The Ministry of Internal Affairs, regarding the control of institutional 
performance so that it corresponds with the normative-procedural 
rules (in relation to investigation and enforcement following violations 
of the law by individual public servants); 
∼ International Donor Organizations, regarding technical assistance in 
relation to human resources and IT infrastructure development. 
• Ministry of Economic Development State Procurement Service interacts 
with– 
∼ All state agencies including local government units, that require its 
assistance regarding material/technical infrastructure development; 
∼ External controlling institutions (Audit Chamber, in the case of law 
violations, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the General 
Prosecutor’s Office) that oversee the agency functions to ensure that 
they comply with the legislative guidelines for institutional 
performance; 
∼ The President’s Office and the Government of the Georgia State 
Chancellery, for information exchange to permit the oversight of state 
procurement planning so as to ensure that this is in accordance with 
the expenditures prescribed for the individual institutions through the 
state budget allocation; 
∼ International donor organizations for technical assistance received 
related to the computerization of the state procurement system and 
shared electronic database creation that will increase the transparency 
and efficiency of the institution. 
 
C.2.3.2 Analytical and/or Supportive Interactions 
 
Analytical/supportive interagency interaction is mainly fulfilled through 
cooperation among subordinate institutions of the Ministries carrying out 
information collection and data analysis roles and providing information services to 
those performing administering/coordinating or controlling/investigative functions. 
These interactions occur in the following ways: 
 
• Ministry of Internal Affairs Analytic Department– 
∼ All internal inspectorates within the ministries: obtaining statistical 
information and reports on ongoing processes related to the field of 
expertise of the particular Ministry;  
∼ The Ministry of Internal Affairs subordinate law-enforcement 
departments (the Department of Constitutional Security and Order and 
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the Special Operative Department) for information exchange and the 
provision of expert advice; 
∼ The Ministry of Finance Financial Police: information exchange; 
∼ The General Prosecutor’s Office: information exchange; 
∼ The Ombudsman Office: providing information about requests made 
to the Ministry by the Office; 
∼ NGOs for the provision of data on various issues of interest. For 
example, the policies implemented through ongoing institutional 
reform in the ministries and their effects (measured by the particular 
department involved). This assistance includes the provision of 
statistical data on crime and corruption rates and other issues that the 
Ministry is authorized to circulate. The NGOs themselves provide 
information and expertise on various issues especially related to the 
improvement of standards for the Ministry’s anti-corruption capacities 
and assisting it with human resource development.  
• Ministry of Justice Information Bureau on Public Officials Property and 
Financial State–  
∼ The Bureau receives support from all institutions that are required to 
provide financial and property statements of their high-ranked 
officials; 
∼ The Bureau’s database provides information on the property and 
financial status of public officials to law-enforcement and controlling 
organizations.  
 
The National Bank of Georgia Financial Monitoring Service has a 
relationship with various government agencies combating corruption (Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and its departments; General Prosecutor’s Office; the Ministry of 
Finance and its departments) through information exchange and provision of expert 
assistance. The Service provides reliable assistance for the implementation of anti-
corruption policies regarding economic crime investigation. 
One particular issue raised regarding interagency cooperation and 
interaction is related to the relationships that state agencies have with the media, 
although attitudes vary among respondents. For the most part, respondents 
(especially those implementing anti-corruption policies through 
investigation/enforcement) indicated that interaction with the media is not based on 
mutual assistance. The problem is expressed in terms of the perceived bias of the 
media. This perception makes representatives of government agencies suspicious 
of media coverage of issues, and less open to public scrutiny while implementing 
policies that arouse the public interest.  
 
C.2.3.3  Controlling and /or Investigative Interactions 
 
Controlling/investigative interagency interaction is mainly fulfilled through 
cooperation among law-enforcement agencies. These interactions are described 
below: 
 
• Ministry of Internal Affairs interacts with– 
∼ Law-enforcement agencies (General Prosecutor’s Office, Financial 
Police) regarding the conduct of joint activities related to the 
implementation of anti-corruption policies; 
∼ Ministry of Justice National Forensic Bureau, regarding the provision 
of evidentiary assistance for investigative activities; 
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∼ Local government units, especially mayoral offices, with regard to 
information exchange and cooperation. 
• Ministry of Internal Affairs Special Operative Department interacts with– 
∼ Other internal units of the Ministry regarding information exchange 
and joint activities. This interaction also provides control over the 
activities of ministerial personnel in accordance with the legislative 
framework (on the basis of information received from the General 
Inspectorate) through investigations and law enforcement; 
∼ The General Prosecutor’s Office regarding information exchange; 
∼ Internal General Inspectorates of other ministries regarding 
information exchange in relation to criminal activities;  
∼ The Ministry of Finance Financial Police regarding information 
exchange and joint activities;  
∼ The Ministry of Finance Taxation and Customs Departments 
regarding information exchange on the circulation of illegal goods and 
incomes. This interaction also provides control over the performance 
of these institutions and assists in ensuring that the activities of their 
personnel are carried out in accordance with the law; 
∼ The state administrative institutions (especially at the local-level) 
regarding information exchange and control over the activities of 
public officials.  
• The Ministry of Finance Financial Police interacts with: 
∼ The General Prosecutor’s Office, regarding information exchange and 
role division (the first conducts investigation, and the latter’s role is 
law enforcement); 69 
∼ The Ministry of Finance Taxation and Customs Departments, 
regarding information exchange and the control over the activities of 
their personnel (conducts investigative activities); 
∼ The Ministry of Internal Affairs regarding information exchange, and 
the design of joint action plans and their implementation. 
• The Ministerial Internal General Inspectorates interact with– 
∼ The subordinate units of other ministries, providing control over 
institutional performance and ensuring that the activities of their 
personnel adhere to the legislative guidelines; 
∼ External controlling institutions, particularly those providing control 
over the correspondence of institutional performance with legislation 
and legal and regulatory acts (Audit Chamber, Ombudsman’s Office, 
General Prosecutor’s Office), and those conducting 
investigative/enforcement activities related to violations of the law 
(General Prosecutor’s Office, Ministry of Internal Affairs and its 
departments, Ministry of Finance Financial Police). The relationship 
focuses on information exchange and assistance during investigations. 
 
C.2.4  Assessment of Consequences 
 
C.2.4.1  The Efficiency of Institutional Functions 
  
The respondents assessed the capacity of institutions to cooperate and efficiently 
support anti-corruption functions as satisfactory. Another issue to consider is 
whether routine and strict procedures exist within the institutions. In this sense, an 
                                                
69
  Though the Financial Police itself is authorized and detains officials suspected of 
corruption. 
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absence of procedural restrictions (procedural frameworks are still being 
developed) creates an environment for reforms to be rapidly adopted, and followed 
by the implementation of decisive action-plans. This situation mainly relates to 
law-enforcement bodies implementing anti-corruption policies.  
Within this reform context, the strengthening of centralized control is 
symptomatic of the development process of Georgia’s state-administrative system. 
In comparison with the pre-revolutionary situation, the role of political leadership 
in the public service is crucial to the sustainability of anti-corruption initiatives. 
Ongoing reforms in the law-enforcement system are based on the political will of 
the new elite, and its commitment to combating corruption has become a guarantee 
for broader integrity provisions. Decision-making and control functions have 
shifted to, and are concentrated in, the upper-level institutions of the state-
administrative system. The locus of these functions appears to be damaging the 
principle of delegated authority. However, according to the assessments received 
from government and non-government respondents, as institutional efficiency 
improves so too will the integrity capacities of the system.  
There remains a possibility that some follow-on effects will occur. The 
concentration of decision-making and control in upper-level agencies of the state-
administrative system that is run by one political group with weakly designed 
institutional restrictions and procedural frameworks is likely to weaken the 
transparency of policies and implementation methods. This risk is especially high 
in relation to weaknesses of civil society ‘watchdog’ organizations and their 
vulnerability to the influence of political groups, thus causing mutual distrust 
between government and civil society organizations. This situation makes it 
difficult for civil society institutions to carry out effective monitoring of the 
implementation of government policies.  
The efficiency of institutional functions can be undermined by the 
weakness of control mechanisms for policy implementation at the local level. NGO 
sector respondents stressed that local government procedures remain a problematic 
area that still needs a more systematic approach to reform in order to improve local 
self-governance mechanisms. Currently, anti-corruption policies at the local level 
are mainly achieved through enforcement methods initiated by the Ministry of 
Finance Financial Police and the Ministry of Internal Affairs investigative/law 
enforcement divisions.  
It is assumed that external actors, especially international donor 
organizations, provide support to state-administrative institutions in their bid to 
achieve efficiency. Nevertheless, a number of government agencies believe that 
international organizations should be more supportive and less critical of 
government. Apart from this, cooperation between NGOs and state agencies is 
considered to assist the overall improvement and strengthening of the efficiency of 
institutions through sharing experiences and analytical capacity to improve, in the 
short term, the technical skills of staff in state agencies.   
 
C.2.4.2  Risks of Corruption  
 
Most of the rules governing institutional functioning are in the process of being 
drafted and those adopted have not yet been measured for efficiency. This raises 
questions regarding the vulnerability of public sector agencies to corruption and the 
performance of the state-administrative system in the context of the ongoing 
reform process. Therefore, the weakness of the procedural frameworks and the 
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absence of implementation mechanisms support an environment in which 
corruption risks remain prominent. Respondents involved in the study identified 
the weaknesses in the public sector system and regarded institutional imperfections 
as one of the major existing corruption risks. The absence of basic job descriptions, 
duty statements that detail roles, functions, responsibilities, authority delegations, 
and ties to appropriate and standardized levels of remuneration across the public 
sector makes the system chaotic and the execution of duties is dependent upon the 
discretion of individual public servants.  
Another risk of corruption identified during the study is the absence of 
general rules defining advancement procedures. This aspect hinders institutional 
development generally. It is difficult to monitor human resource management 
practices in public institutions to ascertain whether appointments and promotions 
of personnel are just and based on merit. In this sense, the most problematic issue 
is the absence of mechanisms to classify staff according to qualifications and skills 
and to promote qualified personnel according to merit and experience.  
Another associated issue relates to the general recruitment rules for 
selection of candidates. Mechanisms to monitor new staff recruitment are weak. 
Consequently, it is difficult to check whether new staff members are hired due to 
their qualifications and professional skills or through nepotism networks (including 
bribery). The lack of transparency in recruitment processes, resulting from the 
absence of defined and mandatory principles, policies, practices and standards for 
public service recruitment, create an opportunity for corrupt practices.  
One of the major identified risks of corruption is related to the low level of 
salaries in public service institutions. However, opinions regarding this issue did 
vary among the representatives of state institutions and external experts (NGO 
sector). A number of respondents stressed that low salaries cause corruption (in 
relation to bribery, state property misuse, illegal lobbying in state property 
privatisation processes, smuggling and tax evasion support, etc.), while other 
respondents stressed that in the most problematic areas, where corruption still 
remains, actual salaries had already increased, but it had produced little effect. It is 
important to note that this argument cannot be implied across the whole 
institutional environment as there are areas of the public service and state 
administration (especially at the local level) that have not yet undergone reforms or 
are currently undergoing reforms, for example the education system; healthcare 
and social welfare system; local government).  
According to some respondents, areas where the risk of corruption remains 
due to institutional weaknesses are the Ministry of Economic Development State 
Procurements Service, the Ministry of Finance Taxation and Customs departments. 
With regard to the issue of low salaries, it is worthwhile noting that salaries have 
been increased in these institutions; however, the absence of transparency 
provisions and adequate control mechanisms results in most of the respondents 
assessing these institutions as being susceptible to corruption. The Ministry of 
Finance Financial Police that deal with these agencies also reports that the lack of 
material/technical (IT infrastructure for example, shared electronic databases, 
cataloguing and accounting, and information exchange) and human resources 
(especially qualified personnel to implement tax and customs regulations and the 
monitor the activities of public servants), does not allow these institutions to 
perform their duties effectively, thus permitting abuses of authority at the lower 
tiers of the system. 
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One of the risks identified relates to the law-enforcement bodies 
themselves. Although the possibility of corruption (bribery) is not suggested, a 
number of experts from non-government organizations point out that due to ill-
defined procedural guidelines and a lack of parliamentary controls and oversight, a 
potential exists for abuses of authority and violations of the law to occur when 
punitive policies are being implemented by law enforcement agencies.  
 
C.2.4.3 Anti-corruption Capacities: Impediments and Assisting 
Factors 
 
None of the executive institutions involved in this study identified any 
impediments to the execution of their roles.70 However, the risks/difficulties that 
were identified relate to the functions of the internal general inspectorates of the 
ministries. Ministry units that are under inspection show less commitment to assist 
the inspectorates.  High-ranked ministry officials (including the Minister 
personally) often need to intervene to gain the cooperation of these units in relation 
to matters raised by the internal general inspectorates.  
Institutions exerting external control do not identify impediments of this 
nature. The degree of assistance provided by ministry units that are under 
inspection/investigation by the Financial Police, Ministry of Internal Affairs law-
enforcement Departments, or General Prosecutor’s Office is assessed as high. The 
reason for such a high level of assistance is explained by the desire of agencies not 
to attract the attention of other controlling or investigative institutions by being 
seen to impede the investigations conducted by such bodies.71  
The differences between the efficiency of internal and external controlling 
bodies require a deeper explanation than just a variance of commitment to assist 
one or another of the controlling institutions. The reason for impediments to 
internal control may be explained also by the institutional inability of the General 
Inspectorates to exert such control. This situation is exacerbated by a shortage of 
resources as well as a lack of autonomy, since inspections are usually initiated on 
Ministerial directives.  
Another issue deals with law-enforcement agencies (Ministry of Internal 
Affairs Special Operative Department, Ministry of Internal Affairs Department on 
Constitutional Order and Security, Ministry of Finance Financial Police) and their 
capacity to deal with the overlap and diversity of roles and functions caused by 
legislation, institutional by-laws and charters. For instance, all of these agencies 
deal with bribery issues in the state administrative system. It is difficult to ascertain 
whether actions undertaken by one or other institutions fit within their field of 
responsibility as defined by the legislative-administrative frameworks. The 
agencies seek to overcome these difficulties through coordinated action plans to 
efficiently implement anti-corruption policies.  
 
                                                
70
  It is also important to note that ‘impediment’ was interpreted by most of the 
respondents as interference by other institutions with their institutional role.  
71
  These bodies have a high level of government trust and authority in relation to the 
implementation of anti-corruption policies.  
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C.2.4.4  Impact on the Efficiency of Anti-corruption Policies 
 
The overall improvement to the anti-corruption environment can be traced to two 
dimensions: agencies that directly combat corruption and symptoms of abuses of 
authority; and agencies that overcome corruption through institutional reforms and 
the development of internal management mechanisms. First, efficiency in the 
implementation of anti-corruption policies is mostly dependent on law enforcement 
agencies such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs Constitutional Security and Order 
Department, Special Operative Department, the Ministry of Finance Financial 
Police, and General Prosecutor’s Office. These agencies cooperate through division 
of roles and by developing joint action plans. 72  Second, ongoing institutional 
reforms in the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Ministry of 
Economic Development allow the development of regulatory frameworks for 
subordinate units. Strong internal vertical accountability structures and regular 
external control have been institutionalized to minimize corruption in public 
service institutions that deal directly with citizens. 73  
Enforcement/prosecution practices are used more frequently than 
corruption preventions strategies. It is considered that the overall impact of anti-
corruption policies is dependent upon strong enforcement/prosecution practices. 
This approach suits the accelerated reform process and ‘revolutionary tactics’ used 
to modernize the state institutional system. The ‘revolutionary tactics’ of 
institutional reform strengthens the political leadership role in the adoption and 
implementation of anti-corruption policies. This approach is seen as desirable for 
the effective achievement of development goals. 74  
This approach does not mean that preventive practices are absent in the 
implementation of anti-corruption policies. The government strategies for 
institutional reform are directed towards the development of a preventive approach 
and relates to institutional efficiency. The implementation of preventive 
mechanisms is encouraged in the institutional environment through:  
 
• Development of a system of checks and balances;  
• Increased interagency cooperation;  
• Improvement of internal management;  
• Clarification of the monitoring and educational functions of civil society 
‘watchdog’ organizations; and  
• Public feedback mechanisms to allow for measurement of the efficiency 
and quality of public service delivery by institutions.  
 
While these mechanisms to prevent corruption are currently practiced, the 
overall anti-corruption effects through such methods will be achieved slowly. The 
focus on enforcement/prosecution over prevention is a result of the desire for rapid 
                                                
72
  Information analysis, certain case solving planning through investigation, the 
detainment of suspects and the presentation issues related to litigation processes are 
shared. 
73
  Such agencies included Police, Ministry of Justice Public Register National Agency 
and Civil Register Agency, The Ministry of Economic Development Agency for 
Free Trade and Competition, State Inspection of Technical Supervision, and others 
dealing with property privatisation issues. 
74
  The political willingness of the post-revolutionary leadership to combat corruption is 
considered a guarantee of overall success of the anti-corruption policies.  
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outcomes determined by general societal factors. The political preference favours a 
priority for prosecution/enforcement methods over preventive ones.  Tackling the 
environment which tolerates corruption across all level of society which tolerates 
corruption is seen as a high priority. Accordingly, the government has given 
priority to increasing the capacity of law-enforcement agencies to achieve change 
quickly rather than waiting for the results of long-term reform strategies targeted at 
the modernization of macro-economic and social systems required for preventive 
anti-corruption policies. 
 
C.2.4.5  Ethical Impact of Executive Institutions 
 
Ethical pursuits and goals, which are embedded in the functioning of executive 
institutions, are based on the general political will developed through parliamentary 
consensual politics. 75   However, there is a gap created by the inability of 
parliament to include all of the political groups representing the variety of the 
social spectrum in the political process designed to generate consensual political 
outcomes.76 Weaknesses in the Georgian political party system are caused by the 
deficient socio-economic structure of society in general because parties have weak 
socio-economic and ideological foundations. This weakness, in turn, affects 
political groups at the representational level (one party is politically dominant, 
while others have less proportional representation) and their ability to influence the 
policy-making process. Electoral outcomes in Georgia since 1990 show a general 
trend of public support accumulating around one party, which weakens the capacity 
for a multiparty political system. Consequently, the National Movement Party’s 
dominance in the political system is not a new political phenomenon and its 
declared mission to lead the country’s political development in a certain direction 
has been generally approved by mandate of the Georgian society. Other issues 
related to the institutional environment’s susceptibility to social/political pressures 
are:  
 
• The extent to which policy-making is influenced by the agendas of other 
political agents (such as political parties or interest groups); 
• How flexible the ruling post-revolutionary political leadership’s policies 
are regarding changes in public expectations and attitudes; 
• The extent to which the monopoly over political authority is secured 
through abuses of authority in relation to the division of political and 
administrative functions, and whether external (public/civil) control 
mechanisms on state functions are operating effectively to restrict this 
occurrence.  
 
The policies of the Georgian government are based on highly consolidated 
political group decisions that tend not to be open to involvement of other internal 
political actors. Formal institutionalised channels of input from social groups are 
not accommodated, which is why satisfaction or dissatisfaction with government 
policies are expressed through extremely informal means such as spontaneous 
                                                
75
  A detailed review of this is given in the section on Executive Institutions’ Role in 
Providing Integrity. These institutions have a partial role to play in the actual system 
of policy making and implementation.  
76
  National Movement Party dominates parliamentary politics. However, Georgian 
society expressed its preference to this party through fair and transparent elections 
held on 28 March 2004.  
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street protest actions) that have little influence. International organizations strongly 
influence the development of state institutional strategies and the drafting of reform 
action plans through the provision of expert advice, recommendations and 
technical assistance.  
The accumulation of scarce, highly qualified and skilled human resources 
supporting the ruling political leadership has resulted in a high level of self-
confidence and self-assurance in the decision-making process. This confidence 
explains the steadfastness of the government’s reform policies. Strong leadership 
and an uncompromising commitment to reform are also brought about by the 
specific situation in which state development occurs. For example: 
 
• State institutions are still in the process of being formed: the period from 
1990 until the present was not focused on state building but on the 
creation of corrupt networks that served the private interests of a handful 
of people representing the political elite of that time at the expense of the 
public interest;  
• Societal development does not correspond with the standards defined by 
the notion of the ‘modern nation’: the absence of a Georgian statehood 
experience has caused a low level of civil consciousness of the law and 
alienation from principles of the Rule of Law – citizens are accustomed to 
achieving personal goals through informal interpersonal networks; 
• Problems related to state sovereignty: unresolved territorial conflicts, 
ethno-politic issues, and difficulties regarding the process of integrating 
ethnic minorities results in the political leadership and government 
operating in a strained internal and external political environment. 
 
In this post-revolutionary context of uncompromising development 
strategies, the political leadership appears unwilling to respond to the changing 
public expectations, as it believes this would jeopardize the modernization reforms.  
The same reasons define the political team unity principle, which is 
reflected in the management processes of government institutions. Although most 
of the high-ranking decision-making public officials do not belong to political 
parties, their activities within the institutional framework and decision making 
processes are grounded in a general commitment to the ruling National Movement 
Party strategies of state development. As a result, the division between political and 
administrative functions at the higher levels of the state administrative system is 
not well defined. The ‘team principle’ itself is a political principle to raise the 
commitment of high-ranked public officials to the positions they hold, thus 
providing a coordinating and responsibility raising tool for policy outcomes that in 
turn improves the efficiency of the institution.  
The concentration of authority in certain ministries based on the unity of 
political leadership shows some tendency towards the abuse of authority. Some 
cases of violations by public servants of the procedural framework were identified 
in particular ministries which have special powers regarding anti-corruption 
policies. These violations occurred either in relation to abuses of human and civil 
rights, or in abuse of authority for private interest gains. Both types of misuse of 
authority are traced, investigated and prosecuted through interagency cooperation 
and mutual control, and through the oversight provided by the Ombudsman’s 
Office (in cases of rights violations), the Audit Chamber (in cases of public funds 
mistreatment) and civil society sector ‘watchdog’ organizations. (The media also 
plays a significant role based on their ability to raise public awareness.) Based on 
these relationships, more or less effective ‘checks’ and ‘balances’ exist and provide 
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an environment in which public servants are forced to adhere to legislatively 
defined rules. 
 
C.2.4.6 Specific Contributions of Core and Distributed Institutions 
 
Core institutions regulating institutional integrity are those that define reform 
strategies and draft anti-corruption policies: the Cabinet of Ministers as a collegial 
body, the Government of Georgia State Chancellery, the State Minister’s Office on 
Reforms Coordination Issues and the State Minister’s Office on Euro-Atlantic 
Integration Issues. These bodies are authorized to define policies and recommend 
implementation tools to individual ministries, initiate legislative changes or draft 
laws, as well as oversee the implementation of action plans approved by individual 
ministries/agencies.  
Core institutions which provide integrity support for enforcement policies 
to protect institutions from corruption are those responsible for carrying out 
investigative/punitive actions: the Ministry of Internal Affairs, its Special 
Operative Department and Department of Constitutional Order and Security, 
Ministry of Finance Financial Police and Ministerial Internal General Inspectorates. 
These institutions monitor the activities of individual public servants and their 
adherence to legislated functions. The operations of these institutions are regulated 
by the policies adopted by agencies representing the abovementioned group. 
However, oversight of the efficiency of their operations in accordance with the 
procedural framework does not render these agencies subordinate to the policies of 
regulatory institutions. Links between these two groups are based on monitoring 
and reporting on activities undertaken and outcomes achieved against defined plans.  
For the Georgian Government, efficiency is a priority regardless of 
procedural restrictions with emphasis placed on the achievement of final goals.  
The decision to either follow the rules or violate them to achieve quick and 
decisive results is left to the individual discretion of the public officials. In this 
sense, the provision of integrity is almost totally dependent upon the personality of 
the individual public official. 
 
C.2.4.7 Emerging Issues 
 
A number of issues have been identified that restrict executive institutions from 
operating efficiently as part of the integrity system. The most important of these 
are: 
 
• Transparency of decision-making and public involvement in policy 
decision-making is not satisfactory. The government operates in a rigid 
‘missionary’ mode and does not apply the principle of multi-actor 
politics. The degree of civil society’s involvement in policy formulation is 
quite low. Likewise, the analytical capacity of NGOs and civil-sector 
watchdog organizations is underutilized in monitoring the efficiency of 
implemented policies.  
• The Government is currently operating as ‘one system, one whole’. In 
other words, it seems that cooperation between government institutions 
has started to function. However, institutions with analytical and 
regulatory functions – most of the qualified and skilled human resources 
are accumulated in such organisations – operate at a policy-making level 
only and are not authorized to draft actual action plans and monitor their 
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implementation; nor are they allowed to perform control functions and 
engage in research.  
• There is a lack of long-term development strategies for the development 
of a structured and systematic institutional environment. Individual 
institutional roles have not been placed within the context of the entire 
integrity system.  
• Reforms under way in the country’s education system have not yet clearly 
defined how to deal with the need of retraining current civil servants or to 
train newly qualified personnel for the state-administrative system.  
• The technical infrastructure required to support institutional performance 
is not adequate in most of the institutions studied. Even where agencies 
are computerized and provided with modern equipment the absence of 
shared electronic databases that would provide quick information 
exchange creates impediments for efficient operations. and 
• There is a lack of exchange of expertise among agencies and a certain 
lack of internal research and analysis resources. 
 
C.2.4.8 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The general conclusion of the study of executive institutions is that corruption 
levels in this sector have significantly decreased since the Rose Revolution. At the 
same time, it is acknowledged that corruption remains a problem in various 
administrative sectors, especially those providing services to society in general 
(healthcare and social welfare system, taxation and customs system).  
According to respondents from governmental institutions corruption 
continues to exist in hierarchically lower-level public institutions that deal with the 
daily needs of society, while the persistent chain of corrupt dealings across the 
whole institutional structure appears to have been largely eradicated. Higher-level 
institutional structures are more viable due to strong controlling mechanisms that 
are in place and the political commitment to the fight against the corruption 
amongst the high-level decision-making leadership. 
Corruption in lower-level institutions occurs in local government bodies 
and regional and district units of public service institutions. It is obvious that 
individual central institutions exercise weak control and coordination of their local-
level agencies. Violations of the law at this level are dealt with only through 
external control agencies, for example, law enforcement agencies — given that 
anti-corruption efforts are confined to punitive rather than preventive measures.   
As regards the administration, a regional governor directly appointed by 
the president administers local government units and local units of public service 
agencies. The role of the regional governor is again defined by the ‘team principle’, 
which allows for weaknesses of the central institutions to be overcome by 
performing institutional activities at the local level.  
While the business sector was not included in this particular study, another 
issue outlined in the study deals with problems of interaction between the business 
sector and state institutions. There are two mutually contradicting assertions 
regarding this issue. One is that the government oppresses the business sector 
through the use of legislation and policies that limit business development. The 
other assertion is that the government implements reforms to improve the business 
environment. Such a contradiction in assessments of government policies is caused 
by the government’s strongly emphasized anti-corruption campaigns to sever the 
ties between the business sector and corrupt state institutions. Evidence supporting 
this assertion is the detention of a number of businessmen accused of tax evasion 
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and the confiscation of property gained through illegal activities and by forcing 
business entities to abide by the law. The Government’s anti-corruption policies for 
the business sector focus on the legalization and liberalization of the business 
environment. The Ministry of Economic Development and the State Minister’s 
Office on Reforms Coordination Issues have initiated a number of reforms in this 
area, such as simplifying licensing and taxation procedures to reduce factors that 
impede business development and reduce occurrences of bribery.   
In terms of the contribution of executive institutions and their role in and 
impacts upon the integrity system, it is recommended that the following issues be 
dealt with to increase the effectiveness of the anti-corruption policies in Georgia:  
 
• There is a need for a comprehensive reform of public sector HR 
management, which would include introducing a standardised system of 
HRM classifications across the sector; recruitment on merit; training and 
development based on merit and skill requirements; and advancement and 
mobility based on merit. 
• The provision of human, financial, material and technical resources to the 
state agencies need to be improved. In particular, there is a need to 
provide personnel training aimed at improving professional skills and 
knowledge of ethical codes; 
• Rules and regulations relating to institutional functions need to be clearly 
defined. For example, the mechanism of checks and balance should be 
developed in order to avoid any overlap of, or interference with, 
individual institution’s responsibilities by other institutions; 
• Oversight of the performance of law-enforcement agencies need be 
improved to ensure that their activities are conducted in accordance with 
laws protecting human and civil rights; 
• Mechanisms for public feedback on the operation of public sector 
institutions should be developed in order to create tools to measure the 
performance of these institutions and the adequacy of action plans against 
public expectations;  
• The role of international organizations and local NGOs in terms of 
sharing international experiences and the provision of information and 
analysis need to be increased. The government should seek to achieve a 
greater degree of openness towards initiatives by civil society and 
international organizations and involve these bodies in policy formulation 
processes, as well as allowing these organisations to participate in the 
monitoring of policies and reform activities (through provision of analysis 
and making recommendations);  
• The role of each institution needs to be defined as part of the entire 
integrity system and the strengths and weaknesses of individual 
institutions need to be analysed in order to create a viable institutional 
environment with reduced tendency towards corruption;  
• Communication between the agencies can be improved through creating a 
shared electronic database, which would provide quick information 
exchange between the agencies. This action will also allow for the 
exchange of individual agencies’ expertise and assist the achievement of 
best practices.  
 
 C.3.   Judiciary and Court Related Institutions 
 
C.3.1   Roles and Functions in Ensuring Integrity 
 
In considering the issue of integrity, the judicial system and court related 
institutions are defined by their special oversight powers. Their roles with regard to 
the integrity system include the following: 
 
• The provision of oversight for the protection of constitutional norms and 
rule of law principles.  This oversight role ensures protection of the 
general political will as expressed by the legislative branch of the 
Government and acknowledged as a tool to guide policy making and 
implementation. 
• The provision of equal access to the justice system for all social, 
economic and political actors participating in public life, thus improving 
political stability and acceptance by society of the legitimacy of the state. 
• The provision of immunity for public institutions from intervention 
initiated by private individual and group interests through research, 
investigation and prosecution (in the case of the General Prosecutor’s 
Office).   
 
The anticorruption capacity of the judiciary and court related institutions is 
determined by the goals imbedded in their defined role.  These goals include: 
 
• Oversight of state institutions to ensure that they operate in accordance 
with the laws adopted by parliament and to ensure that legislation and 
policies adopted do not contradict the principles of justice and liberty 
imbedded in the Constitution.   
• Monitoring and conducting investigations regarding the activities of state 
institutions and public officials to ensure that these activities correspond 
with the laws preventing abuses of authority, crime and corruption in the 
state system. 
• Designing effective judicial mechanisms in accordance with the 
legislative basis designed by parliament, thus providing a self-regulated 
judicial system based on the principle of an independent judiciary which 
is free from prejudice. 
• Designing internal accountability mechanisms to enhance the personal 
integrity of judicial and court-related officials. This action will improve 
the efficiency of the institutions and create, in effect, an ethical code of 
conduct supporting integrity inside this institutional grouping. 
• Providing support to other branches of government (executive and 
legislative institutions) regarding the provision of, and assurance of 
adherence to, the rule of law through activities that include–  
∼ Reports on the current situation in identified spheres of the state 
system;  
∼ Suggestions to improve the functioning of government institutions;  
∼ Recommendations for the improvement of the legislative basis, , or 
providing expert assistance during the drafting of action plans and 
policy; and 
∼ Participation in coordinated activities to combat corruption (especially 
by the General Prosecutor’s office). 
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The roles and functions of the Judiciary and court related institutions 
include the following: 
 
• Providing justice through the protection of constitutional norms and 
monitoring of the law (litigation and investigation); 
• Providing effective frameworks for law protection through the 
improvement of judicial institutional capacity (facilitating reforms); 
• Providing legal assistance to the ongoing general reform of state 
institutions (through the provision of expert advice and 
recommendations); and 
• Conducting anticorruption preventive and investigative activities. 
 
The efficiency of the judiciary and court related institutions is provided not 
only by directly related units but also by external actors that facilitate the 
achievement of the institutional objectives. International Organizations (Donor 
Organizations and NGOs), local NGOs and the media provide assistance for: 
 
• The provision of expertise and information databases;  
• Sharing successful experiences of analogous institutions from abroad; 
• Developing recommendations and suggestions to increase efficiency; 
• Technical assistance through financial aid, the improvement of 
material/technical equipment and human resource development programs; 
and 
• Publicizing the institutions to establish a public image.  
 
External actors also provide public feedback as to the efficiency of the 
judiciary and court related institutions in terms of their responsibilities under the 
Constitution. This feedback is provided through assessment, criticism and 
recommendations based on the analysis of public attitudes. Feedback is also 
received through individual citizens’ complaints and suggestions delivered directly 
to the judicial system and through monitoring the frequency of cases forwarded 
from lower level judiciary units to higher ones.  
 
C.3.1.1  Grouping of Judiciary and Court Related Institutions by 
Roles and Functions 
 
The Judiciary and court related institutions involved in the Georgian Integrity 
System can be divided into the following groups: 
 
• Those institutions that are responsible for constitutional norms and the 
protection of the law through litigation and input into legislative 
processes, such as– 
∼ High level courts that ascertain whether particular Acts (laws and 
decrees) correspond with the Georgian Constitution; 
∼ High level courts that determine the efficiency of laws and their 
correspondence with particular criteria (for example, Western 
standards adopted via international agreements and principles of 
justice) on the basis of information retrieved from litigation and 
recommendations for legislative improvement (new draft laws or law 
amendments) to the parliament; 
∼ high level courts that control judicial operations in general and 
determine mechanisms for its improvement (for example, imposing 
unified standards of litigation and legal interpretation); 
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∼ High/middle level courts that judge the competency of government 
executive branch units and the degree to which their authority 
corresponds with the Constitution and laws. 
• Courts that provide services to society in general (dealing with civil, 
social and criminal issues); 
• Court related institutions that supervise state institutions according to the 
law and therefore, protecting rule of law principles; and 
• Court related institutions mediating conflicts related to economic interests 
among economic actors, and between economic actors and state 
administrative bodies. 
 
C.3.1.2  Specific Functions of each Institution  
 
The Constitutional Court  The Constitutional Court is a judicial body that 
provides for and ensures the protection of constitutional supremacy.  Its main 
functions are: 
 
• To determine whether laws and other normative acts, issued by the 
Georgian government and parliament correspond with the Constitution; 
• To discuss issues relating to competency similarities and overlapping 
areas of responsibility among government institutions; 
• To determine whether international agreements correspond with the 
Constitution; 
• To adjudicate cases about violations of constitutional norms by the 
President, General Prosecutor’s Office, Supreme Court, Chamber of 
Control, National Bank and other government institutions; and 
• To determine whether decisions of the autonomous republics and other 
local government bodies correspond with the Constitution. 
 
These functions and constitutional controls are generally achieved by the 
following means: 
 
• General control: when subjects with special privileges, such as Parliament, 
the President or the Ombudsman’s office, appeal to the Court seeking 
determination of whether identified documents correspond with the 
Constitution;  
• Particular control: when citizens or groups of citizens appeal to defend 
their Constitutional rights where they claim that these have been violated 
by certain laws or documents. (Usually the cases determined by the 
Constitutional Court are related to particular areas of responsibility, 
including: social issues; property issues; labour rights; cases related to 
elections.) 
 
The Supreme Court  The Supreme Court is the highest court in Georgia.  It 
ensures that the lower level courts function according to the strict procedural norms 
(by approving decisions, or denying them or sending back decisions for review). 
Decisions made by the Supreme Court cannot be appealed against.  The court 
fulfills one of its main functions by establishing unified and standardized judicial 
practices. The Court, through oversight and feedback provides recommendations to 
the lower level courts on the correct interpretation of the law. Other functions of 
the Supreme Court are: 
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• To provide conclusions on impeachment issues (related to public 
officials) that are raised by Parliament; 
• To provide recommendations to the President on international 
agreements;  
• To oversee the judicial system through reporting and accountability 
required of its units; and 
• To oversee the discharge of penalty measures against judicial personnel 
accused of violating disciplinary norms. 
 
Violation of disciplinary rules includes: 
 
• The misuse of legal interpretation by judges when considering a case;  
• Participation in corrupt dealings; and 
• The violation of labour principles. 
 
The Supreme Court Chamber on Administrative Issues  The functions of the 
Supreme Court Chamber on Administrative Issues are:  
 
• To ensure that administrative acts are undertaken in accordance with 
Georgian legislation; 
• To discuss issues related to administrative agreements and their 
execution; and 
• To discuss issues related to the obligation of administrative bodies to 
issue and implement the payment of damages.  
 
The Appellate Court  The Appellate Court is an upper level court. Its main 
function is to preside over complaints on decisions made by lower level courts. Its 
role is to hear appeals on issues related to: 
 
• Civic, entrepreneurship and bankruptcy Acts – accordingly, there is a 
Chamber on Civic Issues at the Court that deals with these cases; 
• Cases related to the violation of the Criminal Code – accordingly there is 
a Chamber on Criminal Issues at the Court; and 
• Cases related to administrative and taxation issues, which are conducted 
by a Chamber on Administrative Issues. 
 
There is also an Investigative Board (Collegium) at the Court which 
monitors whether the decisions of lower courts correspond with the norms 
established by Georgian legislation. 
The Court also collects and analyzes information on court functions (data 
includes judicial practice, citizens’ comments and complaints) and drafts 
recommendations that are delivered to the High Council of Justice. 
 
Tbilisi Arbitration Chamber  The Tbilisi Arbitration Chamber is an 
independent and permanent institution that determines cases based on the law of 
Private Arbitration.77 Disputing parties may mutually agree to have the Arbitration 
Chamber hear their dispute. The main function of the Arbitration Chamber is to 
reach an agreement between the two disputing parties.  Negotiating with both sides 
                                                
77
  The law on Private Arbitration was adopted in 1997. Its application has been 
temporarily ceased until the adoption of a new law on Private Arbitration. 
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separately and then bringing the parties together to reach agreement achieves this 
end. 
 
General Prosecutor’s Office  The General Prosecutor’s Office is not strictly  
Judiciary-related institution. According to the amendments to the Constitution, it is 
not part of the judicial system anymore.  But actual capability of this institution to 
define (sometimes even intertwining) Judiciary functioning made us to identify it 
as the court related institution. The functions of the General Prosecutors Office are: 
 
• To prosecute criminal activities; 
• To provide procedural support for criminal prosecutions at the pre-
investigative level; 
• To conduct full investigations; 
• To oversee the activities of law enforcement agencies to ensure that these 
activities correspond with the law; 
• To participate in judicial processes as a public prosecutor; and 
• To coordinate activities on crime reduction. 
• These functions are fulfilled through the following activities– 
∼ Oversight of the internal units of the General Prosecutor’s Office; 
∼ Provision of statistical accountability of the Office units; 
∼ Analysis of the efficiency of the Office units’ processes and to 
standardize efficient practices; 
∼ Drafting of suggestions and recommendations for government to 
increase the efficiency of the Office; 
∼ Discussion of citizens’ (group of citizens) complaints and comments, 
thus receiving feedback from the public. 
 
C.3.1.3  Scope of Institutional Authority 
 
The judicial institutions are not authorized to commence investigative activities. 
Their functions focus on litigation and adjudication of cases at the various levels of 
the judicial hierarchy. The only activities that may be investigative relate to inquiry 
into the reliability of proofs and evidence provided by both the State prosecution 
and the defence.  
The control of judicial system personnel and the activities of judges are 
undertaken by external controlling agencies in various areas of judicial activity.  
The monitoring of economic and expenditure issues is provided by the Chamber of 
Control.  Judges’ activities and their correlation with the functions and procedures 
defined by law are investigated by the High Council of Justice (on the basis of 
complaints delivered by individual citizens, organizations and legal entities to the 
Council’s Disciplinary Department), which delivers its findings to the Conference 
of Judges’ Disciplinary Council, which is authorized to apply sanctions for 
violations of the law.  
Any other institution does not restrict investigative activities initiated by 
the Prosecutor General’s Office. The office does not need special permission from 
other institutions to commence investigations. The Prosecutor General’s Office 
conducts investigations on the basis of information received from other law-
enforcement institutions or operative information obtained independently. The only 
restricting factor is its dependence on the Courts, as the courts may or may not 
allow the General Prosecutor’s Office to commence an investigation. 
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C.3.1.4  Accountability and Reporting Arrangements 
 
The judicial system is not accountable to any of the government branches. The 
Supreme Court is accountable to the Parliament for the consequences of judicial 
functions. There are mechanisms to check the activities and functions of individual 
judges. As noted above, one of the controlling mechanisms is through the 
Conference of Judges’ Disciplinary Council framework and the High Council of 
Justice’s power to monitor the performance of judicial institutions. Another 
mechanism is the oversight role of the General Prosecutor’s Office, which permits 
the Office to monitor the activities of individual public officials (including judges) 
to ensure that public duties are conducted in accordance with the laws defining 
their functions and scope of authority. The General Prosecutor’s Office may 
conduct investigations based on information received from other law-enforcement 
institutions or operative information obtained independently. The General 
Prosecutor’s Office is accountable to the Parliament and the President and, in 
relation to institutional expenditure, to the Chamber of Control.  
The Constitutional Court is a unique judicial institution; formally, it is not 
accountable to any other institutions, though mechanisms applicable to its staff 
indicate that a certain kind of accountability, at least informally, to other branches 
of government exists. This informal accountability is through the proportional 
representation of candidates nominated by the President, and via Parliament and 
the Supreme Court.  
Internal control and accountability is particularly important for the judicial 
system.  As courts are collegial bodies, the heads of the courts do not possess any 
more authority than any other individual judge over the outcomes of individual 
cases; rather their functions are to undertake the organizational/administrative tasks 
of the courts.  Consequently, the Court heads and their deputies are obliged not 
only to preside over cases, but also to provide an environment for courts to 
function effectively. Internal accountability and reporting systems related to the 
activities of individual administrative personnel is arranged, managed and run by 
the heads of the courts.  
 
C.3.2.   Assessment of Capacity 
 
C.3.2.1  Adequacy of Institutional Resources 
 
The issue of human resources is particularly problematic. Human resources are 
inadequate in the courts and in the Prosecutor General’s Office in terms of both 
their numbers and their professional skills. According to the EU standards that 
define adequacy on an index between population to the number of judges, Georgia 
needs 500 judges while it currently has just 350.  Judicial reform is aimed at 
solving this problem. For example, the number of judges will be increased by 50 
this year. This problem causes inefficiency in the courts and slows the pace of 
litigation. From a qualitative point of view, the problem is a lack of personal 
integrity among the judges that negatively affects public trust in the judicial system. 
Some judges have been detained for taking bribes; some are suspected of 
malpractice or inappropriate behavior. The Supreme Court is attempting to solve 
these problems in the following ways: 
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• There is a ‘reserve’ of potential judges from unsuccessful applicants for 
previous judicial appointments, or former judges who were made 
redundant because courts were abolished.  These form the basis upon 
which to select candidates for vacant positions. 
• The Supreme Court tries to attract young professionals to the judicial 
system, especially those who have graduated from Western universities. 
The selection process is divided into several stages: first, an examination; 
second, an interview to assess the applicants’ personal characteristics and 
ethical views; and third, preparation and training through courses at the 
Justice School. 
 
An additional 200 staff will be recruited for Prosecutor General’s Office.   
As regards financial resources, institutions report that they are supported 
adequately, for example salaries have increased significantly. The financial means 
for developing technical infrastructure are being provided through national 
government programs and aid from international donor organizations.  These funds 
are being directed at the improvement of IT and the renovation and reconstruction 
of court buildings.  
The Tbilisi Arbitration Chamber is not supported by the state.  Its human, 
financial and technical resources are dependent upon the efficiency of its internal 
management and the profit received from litigation. The arbitrators receive very 
high fees (arbitrators’ fees consist of 50 per cent of the arbitration costs including 
all the taxes and charges). The arbitrators of the Chamber are respected 
professionals with excellent reputations and qualifications.  
 
C.3.3.   Assessment of Coherence 
 
Interagency cooperation of the Judiciary and court related institutions is defined by 
their roles in litigation processes. The roles include:  
 
• Prosecution and defence;  
• The provision of assistance in checking evidence; 
• Obtaining additional evidence, in relation to the General Prosecutor’s 
Office and the Ministry of Justice National Forensic Bureau’s cooperation 
with the courts); and  
• Case delivery to the various levels of the judiciary.   
 
Special attention should be paid to court-related institutions with regard to 
their interactions with other agencies. The General Prosecutor’s Office deals with 
all state-administrative institutions in relation to legal monitoring (including 
monitoring of the military service, transport infrastructure and the Ministry of 
Justice’s subordinate penitentiary system). The closest and most fruitful 
cooperation exists between the General Prosecutor’s Office and the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (the Minister also participates in the work of the General 
Prosecutor’s Office’s advisory board).  This cooperative relationship involves 
information and expertise exchange and the conduct of investigations in line with 
defined institutional roles.78 
                                                
78
  Some of the Prosecutor’s Office and the Ministry departments have the same 
functions and in order to avoid overlap they undertake cooperative activities. 
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The external cooperation between judicial and court related institutions and 
other government and non-government agencies (including international 
organizations) focus on the following areas: 
 
• Of the parliamentary institutions, the Committees on Legal Issues and 
Human Rights and Civil Integration Issues are named most frequently 
along with the Ombudsman’s Office for their monitoring work, especially 
as regards: information exchange on the protection of human and civil 
rights and violations committed by various law-enforcement agencies and 
the exchange of expertise regarding law-making and identified 
amendments needed to improve the procedural framework.   
• In respect of law-enforcement agencies, the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
Department for Constitutional Security and Order and the Ministry of 
Finance Financial Police were named as key institutions providing 
information exchange and the provision of evidence to the General 
Prosecutor’s Office and courts dealing with administrative issues 
(regarding procedural norms violations). 
• In respect of NGOs, the media and international organizations were 
recognized for their technical assistance for the development of human 
resources and material/technical infrastructure, and publicity to improve 
public relations.  However, the media and NGO cooperation raised some 
concerns about impartiality and bias.   
 
While the main complaint concerned impartiality and bias, significant 
improvements have been achieved as a result of NGO participation in programs to 
reform the judiciary – for example, programs designed to improve judicial 
appointment processes and the monitoring of case outcomes.  Participation from 
NGOs includes the provision of training and courses designed to improve the 
qualifications and professional skills of court personnel. The media is also paying 
more attention to the court system and several television stations broadcast 
programs to educate the public about the role of the judiciary in upholding the rule 
of law and the processes involved in litigation. Although problems remain in the 
judicial system, a number of respondents from the judiciary and NGOs have 
complained about the negative image of courts created in the media and have 
attributed this to the absence of journalistic ethics and professionalism.  With this 
in mind, it is difficult to determine whether improved media cooperation can 
improve the image of the judiciary in the public mind. 
 
C.3.4.   Assessment of Consequences 
 
C.3.4.1 The Efficiency of Institutional Functions 
 
Evaluations vary among the representatives of Government and non-government 
agencies. Government institutions point out that litigation processes have become 
more transparent and open to oversight by civil society organizations.  In addition 
to this, the procedural framework for litigation has become more structured and the 
pace at which cases are heard has improved. However, civil society representatives 
believe that there still remain problems with public oversight of the judiciary. They 
also contend that the reforms conducted in the judiciary have made this system 
even less independent than before. They point out that the judiciary is less effective 
for two reasons.  First, speeding up litigation cases often results in incompetent 
decisions and second, judges have to deal with many cases simultaneously and 
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cannot afford to spend the significant amount of time required to thoroughly 
understand each case. 
Such contrasting assessments by representatives of government and the 
non-government sector are actually a result of political debates between the two on 
the institutional design of the state in general. In this discourse, the government’s 
vision is that the current mode in which the judiciary operates is conducive to the 
government’s rapid reforms.  On the other hand, some civil society representatives, 
allegedly affiliated with certain opposition political parties, argue that the present 
judicial system is a clear illustration of the negative side effects of the reform 
process. Such arguments are said to be used to mould public opinion in favour of 
the government’s opponents.   
 
C.3.4.2  Risks of Corruption within Fields of Competence 
 
Risks of corruption are largely seen as being linked to the alleged deficient 
personal ethics of judges. Salary and working conditions are seen as not being 
sufficient incentives for judges to avoid corrupt activities, if they are not honest and 
people of strong principles. Personal integrity is a very important element to 
counter the effect of other factors such as weak social guarantees, low social status 
and institutional weaknesses, which can tempt members of the judiciary to 
undertake corrupt activities. One additional risk is the existing political context, 
whereby the judiciary does not have sufficient independence and executive 
agencies may influence judges to affect court decisions.   
 
C.3.4.3 Anticorruption Capacities: Impediments and Assisting Factors 
 
None of the judicial and court-related institutions reported any serious impediments 
to their performance created by other institutions. Impediments are mainly caused 
by internal weaknesses of the courts, such as the shortage of qualified personnel. 
Violations of the procedural framework occur when unqualified or dishonest 
judges make unjust decisions. Judges who have little personal integrity find 
opportunities to take bribes in a system that is currently under reform and that has 
weak control mechanisms. (The Ministry of Internal Affairs Special Operative 
Department has detained judges.) 
The anticorruption capacities of the General Prosecutor’s Office are 
stronger than any other institution. Reforms in this agency began much earlier than 
in others and, as a result, the institutional design has been tested, and is not as 
affected by the current reform processes.  This means that the reforms have not 
created ambiguities in the Office’s functions and opportunities for abuses of 
authority are low. The widely held view is that the strong vertical system of control 
and accountability implemented by the policies of a strong leadership do not allow 
lower-level officials to commit actions which violate regulations. 
 
C.3.4.4 Impact on the Efficiency of Anticorruption Policies 
 
Overall, the impact of the judicial and court-related institutions on anticorruption 
policies is positive. The General Prosecutor’s Office undertakes the most important 
role by cooperating with other law-enforcement agencies through investigation and 
support in applying punitive measures. The strengthening of the anticorruption 
capacities of the courts is still progressing.  In particular, the establishment and 
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improvement of internal control mechanisms will have further positive impacts 
upon the overall efficiency of anticorruption policies. The current reforms are 
designed to lead to two specific developments.  Firstly, judges of the upper-level 
courts will monitor the activities of the lower-level courts.  Secondly, the Supreme 
Court will establish uniformity in judicial practices. Judges will not be permitted to 
make decisions that contradict these standardized practices. In cases where judges 
do contradict the uniform requirements, they will be suspected of corruption or of 
holding inappropriate qualifications, which will result in the particular judge facing 
disciplinary measures.   
Additionally, corruption prevention policies exist within the judicial 
system. The High Council controls the activities of judges, and in cases of 
corruption becoming an issue the Conference of Judges Disciplinary Council 
discusses the problem. The Disciplinary Council has the right to make a 
recommendation, reprimand or warning and, in extreme cases, a judge’s position 
can be terminated.79 
 
C.3.4.5 Ethical Impact of Judiciary and Court Related Institutions  
 
An assessment of the ethical purposes of judicial and court-related institutions – to 
oversee the adherence to rule of law principles and their supremacy in public life, 
in the context of the executive and legislative branches of government – raises 
some reservations regarding the relevance of the actual processes occurring in this 
system and those essential value-based goals imbedded within it. Investigation and 
litigation, when conducted within this system are not considered to be generally 
and universally applied. Instead, some institutional activities are practiced 
selectively. In this sense, it is evident that the ‘team principle’, noted above in the 
sections on Parliamentary and Executive institutions, is also applicable to the 
judicial system. There are many violations of the law, abuses of authority and 
corrupt activities committed by public officials, which are subsequently uncovered 
and punished through judicial procedures.  At the same time, political opponents of 
the government, as well as elements of civil society and media representatives 
claim that there are similar violations and abuses that are not investigated and 
litigated, in which high-ranked public officials leading the implementation of 
anticorruption policies are suspected of involvement in inappropriate activities. 
Accusations of this kind are not treated by the judicial system in a way which 
either proves or shatters these assertions. Consequently, questions are raised 
regarding the judiciary’s ability to provide all segments of society with fair and 
equal access to justice.   
 
C.3.4.6  Specific Contributions of Core and Distributed Institutions 
 
Core institutions that define the level of integrity in the judiciary and court-related 
institutions are those that exert control over the activities of individual judges and 
those drafting codes of conduct and procedures through which individual officials’ 
                                                
79
  Statistics show these mechanisms to be very effective. For example, 15 judges were 
made redundant on the basis of abusing power or holding insufficient qualifications, 
and many judges also received reprimands in 2005.  During the 15 years period until 
2005, the number of judges stood down from their judicial positions was just 11.  
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actions are taking place. In this sense, the High Council of Justice, the Conference 
of Judges and the Supreme Court are key institutions contributing to integrity in the 
following ways: 
 
• The monitoring of litigation through the review of received complaints; 
• Discussions and hearings regarding the practices of individual judges (on 
the basis of the complaints received); 
• Oversight of the uniformity of litigation processes in the judiciary 
generally and oversight of the litigation procedures (in identified cases) to 
ensure that these are carried out in accordance with the set procedures; 
and 
• Delivering education/training/workshops for judges to expose them to 
innovations and changes in modern standards of litigation. 
 
Distributed institutions and practices are weak in the judicial system and 
the improvement of integrity and the application of relevant norms is dependent 
upon the discretion of individual judges or the fear of punishment for violations of 
the law. In this context, the tool which is being used most effectively for the 
improvement of integrity is the feedback received by the High Council of Justice 
from individual citizens, the government and non-government organizations 
regarding misconduct and corruption by certain judges. 
The General Prosecutor’s Office, its leadership and its board (which acts as 
its consultative body) discharges the strategic planning function to combat crime 
and corruption, as well as the internal control function that is expressed in the 
design of internal discipline and executive accountability mechanisms. These 
institutions are core agencies supporting integrity capacity.  
 
C.3.4.7  Emerging Issues  
 
Most of the respondents interviewed stressed several issues affecting the efficiency 
of judicial and court-related institutions in the integrity system. Among these 
identified issues the most important were: 
 
• The strong anticorruption commitment of the present government is a step 
forward in the state-building process and strengthening of the integrity 
system; 
• Recognition that personal anticorruption commitment and integrity is 
dependent upon the motivation of officials (i.e. existence of a proper 
working environment, transparent vertical mobility and promotion 
mechanisms, and a fair bonus system); 
• A strongly held awareness that the overall effect of integrity institutions is 
dependent upon mutually supportive actions;  
• Awareness that opportunities for corrupt behavior occurs not only as a 
result of institutional weakness, but also through low levels of public 
consciousness; and 
• A belief that the government is wary of private arbitration and has 
attempted to weaken the Arbitration Chambers because businesses can 
address the Arbitration Chambers and resolve disputes with the 
government, in their favor.  
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C.3.4.8 Main Findings and Recommendations 
 
The level of corruption in Georgia has decreased since the Rose Revolution, 
although some problems continue to exist in various institutional areas, including 
the judiciary. Most of the government and civil sector representatives expressed 
their concerns about corruption in the courts. It is important to note that the lack of 
integrity in the judicial system is not confined to bribery, though bribery in the 
courts is not excluded. Concerns were raised about the improvement of efficiency 
through reforms in the judiciary. In this context, the terms ‘corruption’ and 
‘inefficiency’ seem to merge and overlap. In this context, inefficiency is 
understood as judicial inability to gain public respect and establish an image of an 
independent institution.  
In order to increase the anticorruption capacity and efficiency of the 
judiciary, the following steps need to be taken:  
 
• More prominence needs to be given to preventive mechanisms that 
support anticorruption policies in order to develop a system of mutual 
controls to improve the institutional environment.  (At the same time, it is 
obvious that strong punitive policies are required to support the 
preventive policies.); 
• Actions need to be taken to ensure that the reformed education system 
will prepare qualified specialists in particular fields, and become a 
conduit of civic values in order to cultivate potential public officials with 
high personal integrity and civic awareness; 
• Better use needs to be made of best practices and experiences of 
‘Western’ democracies in the Georgian context; for example, the design 
and delivery of special training programs for judges and court personnel, 
and the provision of relevant academic literature; 
• The development of legislative mechanisms to allow public interest 
groups to influence policy formation and implementation, and to 
participate in the monitoring of the public sector, including the judiciary; 
and 
• Ensuring closer cooperation between the judiciary and court-related 
institutions on the one hand and NGOs and the media on the other, to 
publicize the reforms of the judiciary and court-related institutions.  This 
will raise general public awareness, promote civic values and obedience 
to the law, and improve the reputation of the judiciary in society. 
 C.4.   Special Institutions 
 
C4.1  Roles and functions in ensuring integrity 
 
The role of special institutions in ensuring integrity is defined by their unique 
functions of either exercising control over the institutional functions of other state 
institutions in accordance with the Constitution and the norms set by the 
Parliament; or, facilitating the functions of these institutions. Such institutions have 
been categorized as ‘special’ because of their institutional design, particularly their 
institutional independence (Audit Chamber, Ombudsman’s Office and Central 
Election Commission). These institutions do not belong to any of the government 
branches. Rather, they provide control over particular areas of institutional and 
legislative functions of other state institutions to ensure the protection of the basic 
goals of the state. The role of the special institutions in ensuring integrity is to: 
 
• Ensure that institutional mechanisms function efficiently to allow 
community groups organized around specific political, economic and 
social agendas to participate in the political life of the state.  (This 
includes access to and inclusion in the decision-making and legislative 
process within the parliamentary framework.) Such an arrangement 
facilitates a multi-actor democracy and strengthens consensus-based 
political will, which also increases the political stability of the state; 
• Protect the public interest by ensuring that state agencies obey the rules 
and procedures that have been adopted by the Parliament.  Such rules and 
procedures are designed to protect the public interest based on political 
consensus among the variety of political actors involved in the legislative 
process; and 
• Protect the rights and interests of individuals and groups in accordance 
with the rights enshrined in the Constitution.  This action ensures that the 
constitutional norms of justice and liberties are applied in institutional 
processes, which in turn contributes to the development of inclusive 
policies.  
 
Other institutions considered ‘special’ are those that are related to the 
Executive, but do not undertake executive functions. These institutions include the 
Supreme Council of Justice; the State Commission for Efficient Governance and 
Territorial Arrangement; the Civil Service Bureau; and the Development and 
Reform Fund. These bodies facilitate the functions of the executive, legislative and 
judicial branches of Government either through the provision of expertise and the 
drafting of institutional coordination policies, or in some cases by defining 
procedural mechanisms related to institutional roles and oversight of institutional 
functions (for example, the Supreme Council of Justice).  
The anticorruption capacity of special institutions is determined by the 
goals and mechanisms that determine their institutional roles, which include: 
 
• Provision of equal opportunities for political groups to participate in the 
decision-making and legislative system of the state. This contributes to 
the development of political space for debate and negotiation in which 
state development strategies are established; 
• Provision of regular control over the implementation of public interest 
policies and control over institutions implementing these policies. This 
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oversight mechanism ensures transparency and effective management of 
the state-administrative system; 
• Ensuring Constitutional human rights and liberties obligations are upheld 
by state agencies. This role guarantees that institutional functions are 
checked against the purposes they have been designed to serve, and the 
procedures and mechanisms defined by the legislation; 
• Facilitating the reform of the state-administrative system and increasing 
efficiency through the provision of an analytical and expert advice 
service; suggestions regarding material/technical improvement; and 
activities aimed at developing human resources; and 
• Coordinating interagency cooperation in identified areas, providing 
expertise and participating in the drafting of laws to improve the design of 
institutional procedural frameworks, and in some cases, to also conduct 
oversight of the implementation of disciplinary standards. 
  
The achievement of the roles of the special institutions involves external 
actors such as international organizations and local NGOs.  External actors assist 
special institutions through: 
 
• Technical assistance–  
∼ Financial aid, expertise and the design of information databases; 
∼ The improvement of equipment and human resource development 
programmes;  
∼ Sharing successful experiences of analogous institutions that function 
abroad; and 
∼ Developing recommendations and suggestions to increase institutional 
efficiency.  
 
Institutions in this category do not receive public feedback from external 
sources, as these institutions are responsible for providing public feedback to the 
state-administrative system in general. In this regard, the Audit Chamber is an 
exception. 
 
C.4.1.1  Grouping of Special Institutions by Roles and Functions 
 
Special Institutions do not represent executive, parliamentary, or judicial systems, 
but are related to these organizations through accountability and legitimacy 
mechanisms, or function directly under the President of Georgia. These institutions 
can be divided into the following groups: 
 
• Institutions that control the functioning of public institutions through– 
∼ Oversight of how state institutions deal with financial and economic 
issues and carry out their responsibilities in these areas; 
∼ Oversight of the inclusion of social and political group interests in the 
state system; 
∼ Monitoring of the protection of human rights and liberties and the 
respect afforded to these principles by state agencies. 
• Institutions that provide expertise and analytical support to the state 
agencies and contribute to the improvement of public institutional 
operations– 
∼ Oversight of the performance of the judicial institutions and the 
provision of expertise for the improvement of procedural and ethical 
norms; 
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∼ Conducting data analysis and providing expert assistance with regard 
to the efficiency of policy implementation at the local level together 
with the development of recommendations to improve local 
governance; 
∼ Provision of expert assistance to improve the efficiency of the public 
service, the transparency and adequacy of responses to social 
demands, and the development of suggested public service reforms; 
∼ Conducting activities to improve the human resource problems in the 
public service through the accumulation of extra-budgetary resources 
(subsidies) and to educate and train public sector employees. 
 
C.4.1.2  Specific Functions of Each Institution 
 
Audit Chamber  The Audit Chamber is the highest parliamentary-related auditing 
institution for economic and financial issues. The Chamber’s tasks are to oversee 
the use of state funds and valuable assets and to ensure their lawful, efficient and 
purposeful use. The functions of the Audit Chamber are: 
 
• To control the expenditures of the state, autonomous republics and local 
entities to ensure that respective expenditures are lawful; 
• To control issues of state debt and state and foreign loans in accordance 
with the law, the purpose of the loans and their efficiency; 
• To control the use of state property to ensure that the process is lawful 
and purposeful; 
• To study and analyze budgetary violations, including data falsification, 
and to recommend ways to overcome these problems; 
• To evaluate the validity of state budget revenues and expenditures; 
• To control the lawfulness of state financial mobility (timely transfers to 
banks and credit/commercial organizations); and 
• To analyze and evaluate draft laws, normative acts and projects that are 
related to state budget expenditures. 
 
These functions are achieved through the following activities:  
 
• Annual and quarterly inspections of the state institutions according to the 
preliminarily designed list; 80 
• Regular data collection and analysis of issues related to the state budget 
(revenues and expenditures); 
• Provision of expert advice to the Parliament during the drafting of the 
state budget and its adoption; 
• Reporting to the Parliament. 
 
The Central Election Commission  The Central Election Commission is an 
independent institution that oversees the preparation and conduct of elections, 
referendum, and plebiscites. Within the limits of its authority, the Commission 
monitors the uniform application of election legislation throughout Georgia. Its 
functions are: 
 
                                                
80
  There are two types of inspection: general inspection – a full inspection of a given 
state institution; issue-specific inspection – the study of certain issues in an 
individual institution. 
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• Oversight of the implementation of the Law on Elections throughout 
Georgia; 
• Control over the lawfulness of decisions made by district and precinct 
electoral commissions; 
• Consideration of complaints and comments regarding the activities of 
district electoral commissions;  81 
• Responsibility for the provision of technical and human resources for 
elections; and  
• Consultation regarding legal issues associated with elections and other 
relevant activities. 
 
The Ombudsman’s Office  The Ombudsman’s Office is an independent 
institution that oversees the protection of human rights and freedoms, exposes 
rights violations and carries out activities for their restitution. The Office’s 
functions are: 
 
• To exert independent control over the protection of human rights, based 
on complaints and comments received from citizens and through 
investigations initiated by the office; 
• To ensure that human rights and freedoms are maintained in the state 
penitentiary system; 
• To gather information on human rights violations, analyze the legal basis 
designed to uphold human rights and recommend to Parliament ways to 
improve the existing legal basis; 
• To develop recommendations for institutions that violate particular rights 
to encourage the restitution of those rights; 
• To provide law enforcement agencies with information when a human 
rights violation is considered a crime under the Criminal Code; and 
• To conduct civic education programs to raise civic awareness. 
   
Supreme Council of Justice  The Supreme Council of Justice is an advisory 
board related to the President.82 Its main task is to support ongoing reforms in the 
judicial system and to coordinate the functions of the judicial units. The Council’s 
functions are: 
 
• To develop recommendations designed to increase the efficiency of the 
judicial system; 
• To select and recommend candidates for positions in judicial institutions, 
and to recommend the dismissal of judges; 
• To train judges and develop other mechanisms to improve their 
professional qualifications; 
• To define the specialization of District Court judges; 
• To define the staff structure and number of personnel for general courts 
(except the Supreme Court); 
• To define the procedures for general courts; and 
• To initiate disciplinary sanctions against individual judges upon receipt of 
a complaint about a violation of the law or procedural norm, such as– 
∼ Violation of the law during litigation; 
                                                
81
  The Commission decides the final results of the elections and can either confirm or 
disallow the results. 
82
  The amendment to the law on Supreme Council of Justice made this institution an                                                                                
independent body and increased its functions. 
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∼ Corrupt dealings or abuse of authority; 
∼ Activities that are incompatible with the judge’s duties and 
responsibilities (conflict of interest); 
∼ Activities damaging the reputation of the court; 
∼ Breach of professional/official secrecy. 
 
The State Commission on Efficient Governance and Territorial Arrangement  
The Commission is established as a presidential working group in accordance with 
a presidential decree. Consequently, the President heads the Commission. As the 
country’s territorial arrangement is not regulated by the Constitution (because of 
the unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia), the Commission’s task is 
to develop recommendations regarding the laws regulating administrative and 
territorial governance. The Commission’s activities are focused on data collection 
and analysis and do not include the control of local governments. The 
Commission’s activities focus on: 
 
• Issues related to self-governance; 
• Decentralization of the state governance system – defining what functions 
should be delegated to local governments and what functions should 
remain under the control of the central government; and 
• Defining procedures for funding self-governing units. 
 
The Civil Service Bureau  The Bureau is subordinate to the Civil Service 
Council, a high-level policy advisory body chaired by the President. The Civil 
Service Council consists of 12 members: three of them represent the Parliament; 
three represent the executive; three are from the judiciary; and three are from local 
government bodies. The Bureau is a technical entity responsible for the 
development of the state civil service reform policy to be approved by the Council, 
and for ensuring its implementation. Under the law, the Council and the Bureau are 
obliged:  
 
• To undertake research and analysis and prepare draft decisions and 
recommendations for public service reforms;  
• To coordinate the planning and implementation of reforms in the public 
service.  
 
These activities are designed to achieve: 
 
• Uniform standards and approaches to improve the performance of the 
public service; 
• To improve human resource management in the public service; and 
• To assist local government bodies with the development and 
implementation of standards for efficient management. 
 
The Bureau has to be informed about the changes planned and undertaken 
in the public service system, developments in relation to the selection and 
management of public service personnel, and adherence to the legal requirements 
in the system.  
 
Development and Reform Fund   The fund was established by a presidential 
decree and its purpose is to promote governance reform in Georgia. Initially, its 
main task was to combat corruption. The President announced this at the Davos 
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World Economic Forum in January 2004, stressing the need to increase salaries of 
Georgian public officials as this problem was creating an environment conducive 
to corruption. A special fund was created into which donations from the 
international community would be accumulated and spent on human resource 
development as part of the reform process and the strengthening of anticorruption 
capacity. These goals are achieved by the Fund through the following policies and 
activities: 
 
• Accumulating financial resources from international donor organizations 
and individual businesses (both Georgian and foreign); 
• Financing increased salaries and salary supplements to high-level public 
officials; 
• Financing programs to improve the qualifications of public officials; and 
• Donating grants and fellowships in various fields to assist students 
(especially law students) travelling abroad for educational purposes.83 
 
C.4.1.3  Scope of Institutional Authority 
 
The authority of special institutions to initiate investigations is limited to 
observation and oversight functions. These organizations are responsible for 
monitoring and reporting within their area of expertise to Parliament or the 
President in accordance with their institutional arrangements. External control over 
the performance of these institutions (with regard to possible corrupt activities and 
criminal violations of the law) is provided by law enforcement agencies based on 
operative information received through issue-specific inspections. Internal 
monitoring of the institutional activities is also undertaken. High-level public 
officials are responsible for ensuring that their subordinates follow disciplinary 
rules. Thus, they oversee the activities of individual staff members and ensure that 
the activities correspond with the duties of the personnel.  
There are two categories of controlling agencies:  
 
• Those institutions that carry out monitoring and are authorized to 
organize research into the implementation of particular public policies 
and deliver the research findings to other branches of government that are 
obliged to consider the reports received from these institutions. This 
process facilitates policy reformulation and amendments to the policies. 
Institutions representing this category are: the Audit Chamber, the 
Supreme Council of Justice, the Ombudsman’s Office, and the Central 
Election Commission. 
• Those institutions that conduct research and particular state-agency 
functions, provide advisory functions to the President, and design 
programs to be submitted to the President. Institutions representing this 
category are: the State Commission on Efficient Governance and 
Territorial Arrangement, the Civil Service Bureau, and the Development 
and Reform Fund. 
 
                                                
83
  The aim is to involve these people in the government system after graduation from 
university. 
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C.4.1.4  Accountability and Reporting Arrangements 
 
The institutional arrangement of special agencies is determined by their affiliation 
either to the Parliament, or to the President. Accordingly, these institutions are 
either accountable to the Parliament or the President. Institutions reporting to the 
Parliament are: the Audit Chamber; the Central Election Commission; and the 
Ombudsman’s Office. The institutions accountable to the President are his advisory 
and technical assistance agencies: the Supreme Council of Justice, the State 
Commission on Efficient Governance and Territorial Arrangement, the Civil 
Service Bureau, and the Development and Reform Fund.   
 
C.4.2   Assessment of Capacity 
 
C.4.2.1.  Adequacy of Institutional Resources 
 
Most of the institutions report that human, material and financial resources are 
sufficient. The key institutions such as the Ombudsman’s Office currently do not 
experience resource problems. Financial resources are mainly provided through the 
state budget and direct aid from international donor organizations. In relation to 
human resources, the Office has created a network of civil society institutions 
(outside its own staff), which provides it with information and analysis in areas 
relevant to the Office’s field of work.  
The Audit Chamber is an exception in this regard due to the imbalance 
between the Chamber’s significant workload and the resources apportioned to it by 
the state. Financial inspection is a difficult task in terms of human resources – an 
inspector must have an understanding of many different areas. The Chamber 
addresses this problem by operating a training centre, which was established with 
support from international donor organizations. The Chamber has also invited 
foreign experts, and is currently applying international experience in its practice. IT 
technologies and technical infrastructure are also being upgraded. Inspectors are 
provided with personal computers. Inspectors will soon have their own laptops, 
which will enable them to send data from inspected institutions to the Chamber in a 
timely manner. The Chamber will have a unified information database and all of its 
information will be transparent.  
The Central Election Commission (CEC) has sufficient financial resources 
and material and technical utilities. In relation to human resources, there are more 
people in the institution than are required for it to function efficiently. Shortly, the 
CEC will carry out a certification process of commission members, as required by 
law.  Once completed, the Commission will be able to reduce the number of 
employed staff on the basis of the certification results. Only those people who pass 
the certification exams and obtain respective certificates will maintain their 
positions in this system. Certification exams are mandatory for all district and 
precinct election commission members and the CEC apparatus.  
The Supreme Council of Justice, for the most part, does not have resource 
problems. The Council has sufficient financial and human resources and 
experiences no problems with office infrastructure with the exception of the 
disciplinary department where more staff are required. This department reviews 
written requests and complaints and performs preliminary checks of the 
information provided. The Council receives a large number of requests and 
complaints and it is difficult for the disciplinary department, comprising ten 
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persons, to deal effectively with the high number of judges and possible complaints 
against them. The Council employees were selected through a special procedure 
and they continuously undergo courses to improve their qualifications. 
 
C.4.3  Assessment of Coherence  
 
Given their unique positions, special institutions interact with all public 
institutions, although there is a difference in the levels and intensiveness of the 
interaction. For example, the Supreme Council of Justice is an exception as it deals 
with only the judicial system. The nature of the cooperation between the special 
institutions and other institutions differ also. The Audit Chamber is obliged to deal 
with all public institutions due to its function as inspector of activities related to the 
state budget, while the Ombudsman’s Office interacts with public institutions with 
regard to issues related to violations of human rights and constitutional rights in the 
various areas of public life. At the same time, a number of institutions cooperate 
with these agencies in line with their organizational and institutional needs (e.g. 
parliamentary institutions, the judiciary and the General Prosecutor’s Office).  
The Central Election Commission cooperates with the Parliament (the 
Committee on Legal Issues and Budgetary and Financial Committee). The 
Committee on Legal Issues considers legislative changes and amendments 
prepared by the Commission while the Financial Committee considers the Central 
Election Commission’s budget. The Commission also works with the Prime 
Minister’s office to draft the budget before submitting it to the Parliament. The 
Prime Minister and the Government then review the Commission’s budget. The 
Commission occasionally communicates with the President’s Office in order to 
consider election dates and agree on related organizational issues. The Commission 
has a close relationship with the Supreme Council of Justice as it is involved in 
training judges on election issues. The Commission’s lawyers train the judges in 
election-related issues and share experiences with them.  
Other institutions representing special agencies interact and cooperate with 
all public institutions within the framework of research/programs/projects that they 
organize. The extent and range of institutional interactions are defined through 
need and the goals imbedded in operational action plans. Systematic and regular 
interaction and cooperation is conducted with the President’s Office through their 
legal and institutional framework. (The institutions are the President’s advisory 
boards.) 
Interaction and cooperation with civil society organizations and 
international donor organizations is also very close. In this context, the importance 
is defined not only in relation to material and technical assistance but also in 
relation to the development of human resources. 
 
C.4.4   Assessment of Consequences 
 
C.4.4.1  The Efficiency of Institutional Functions 
 
The special institutions function efficiently within the legislative framework set for 
them. Of significance, are the restricted functions of special institutions such as the 
Audit Chamber, the Ombudsman’s Office and the Supreme Council of Justice to 
merely oversight and monitor. These institutions fulfil their functions and report on 
their findings to appropriate institutions, but they have no authority to control how 
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their conclusions and recommendations will be received and acted upon by the 
agencies. Thus, the impact of these institutions on state building and reforms 
designed to improve transparency and combat corruption is dependant upon the 
discretion of other institutions and the commitment of the latter to follow the 
recommendations received from these institutions.    
The efficiency of other institutions such as those that act as the President’s 
Advisory Boards is not easily measured, as it is difficult to ascertain the extent to 
which the President and the Government as a whole accept or follow the 
suggestions and expert advice received from the Boards.  
 
C.4.4.2  Risks of Corruption within Fields of the Competence 
 
It should be noted that as special agencies monitor other institutions, the corruption 
risk is high, especially in such institutions as the Audit Chamber. Risks are high as 
Chamber inspectors have direct contact with representatives of those institutions 
that are under inspection. Corruption risks at the Supreme Council of Justice are 
lower as its personnel do not have ‘face to face’ contact with complainants or the 
judges that they are required to inspect. Consequently, it is very important to 
understand what mechanisms are in place to reduce the temptation for public 
officials to engage in corrupt activities. Factors determining why officials may be 
‘tempted’ include: low salaries of the personnel of lower level institutions; general 
public mentality (protectionism, tribalism and informal relations interfere with 
performance); institutional weaknesses expressed through lack of transparency and 
the inability to verify information obtained through monitoring. Consequently, the 
only guarantee that public servants will not be involved in corrupt dealings is 
related to their personal integrity. 
Other institutions, which either represent advisory boards or do not 
monitor the economic activities of other institutions, are less likely to be faced with 
the problem of corruption. Questions on the potential for corrupt activities may 
arise in relation to the Development and Reform Fund, since this institution is 
responsible for carrying out activities that require particular financial support. In 
addition, salaries and supplements of high-ranked officials are accumulated within 
this institution. However, as the fund is fully dependant on financing from 
international donors (not public funds), there is multilateral control provided by 
donors that minimizes the risk of corruption in this institution. 
 
C.4.4.3  Impact on the Efficiency of Anticorruption Policies 
 
The impact of the Audit Chamber on the overall anticorruption situation has been 
significant, as the institution following the Rose Revolution has not been used to 
advance the interests of particular political groups. In the pre-revolutionary period, 
the Chamber was used by the government to gather and consolidate information on 
violations of the law committed by public officials.  The information was collected 
for use against the officials if they went against the will of the ruling political elite, 
or if the Government wanted to dismiss particular officials. The Chamber would 
produce large volumes of documentation about the breaches and crimes committed 
by state officials, but these documents would not be publicized until the ‘right 
time’. Instead, the information would be stored in the archives of the Chamber. 
Many of the prosecutions of high-level state officials that were carried out 
immediately after the November 2003 elections used the documentation produced 
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and maintained by the Chamber in the previous years. Legal violations and 
economic crimes uncovered by the Chamber in various public institutions were 
publicized and submitted to the Parliament, and law-enforcement agencies 
conducted investigations into the violations and detained wrongdoers. However, 
the practice of collecting information for blackmailing purposes has not been 
observed since then.  
It is difficult to measure the impact of other special institutions in relation 
to anti-corruption policies. The Ombudsman’s Office regularly publicizes reports 
on abuses of authority regarding human and civil rights violations and frequently 
receives responses from law-enforcement agencies. The Central Election 
Commission and the Supreme Council of Justice detect violations of procedural 
standards and submit their findings to the appropriate institutions. In both cases, the 
institutions have an indirect effect on anticorruption policies. As for the advisory 
boards, such as the State Commission on Efficient Governance and Territorial 
Arrangement, and the Civil Service Bureau, their impact is not felt at the policy 
implementation and operational level, rather their role is to influence policy 
formulation and planning processes. Consequently, preliminary assessment 
regarding the reduction of corruption concludes that these institutions also have an 
impact on the implemented anticorruption policies.     
 
C.4.4.4   Ethical Impact of Special Institutions 
 
As most special institutions have advisory (the State Commission on Effective 
Governance and Territorial Arrangement, the Supreme Council of Justice and the 
Civil Service Bureau) or technical assistance roles (Development and Reform 
Fund), their functions do not run counter to their ethical purposes.84 The situation is 
different with regard to the Audit Chamber and the Ombudsman’s Office. Their 
functions are aimed at recognizing progress or uncovering problems as a part of the 
transparent state building and democratic consolidation processes.  Consequently, 
it is vital that these institutions are able to perform their institutional activities in 
accordance with their imbedded ethical purposes. The Audit Chamber is more 
vulnerable to interference and manipulation from external actors than the 
Ombudsman Office as the Chamber deals with public funds and the management 
of valuable assets through control and oversight. The profile of the Ombudsman’s 
Office has increased recently, when it began to publicize legal violations and 
abuses of authority committed by high-ranking public officials, and led reform 
policies in law-enforcement agencies. The Ombudsman’s Office also assesses the 
performance of the judicial system. Whether the Central Election Commission 
functions in accordance with its institutional ethical purposes is also under 
question, especially regarding the Commission’s mandate to provide fair political 
opportunities for all political groups to participate in the state’s decision-making 
and legislative system. This issue is not caused by institutional weakness and the 
inability to organize and manage election process – in this sense, the Commission 
fulfils its duties. Rather, the problem is caused by the electoral legislation, which 
binds the Commission with the ruling political party (National Movement Party). 
The selection procedures to appoint Commission members and the quotas set for 
political parties do not ensure the Commission’s ability to fairly monitor electoral 
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  They do not deal with policy implementation and have little authority to conduct 
oversight. 
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processes. Also, the 7 per cent threshold set for the parties to acquire seats in 
Parliament in addition to the Commission’s inability to ensure control over 
campaigning expenditures85 create problems for the development of a multiparty 
democratic political system.  
 
C.4.4.5  Specific contributions of Core and Distributed Institutions 
 
As all special institutions either facilitate the functioning of other institutions 
through expertise and technical assistance to affect policy formulation, or monitor 
implemented policies, the special institutions are core institutions. They either 
define political development strategies (advisory boards), formulate ethical codes 
for the public service or monitor technical and operational aspects (the Chamber of 
Control, the Supreme Council of Justice, and the Ombudsman Office) or ethical 
aspects (the Public Service Bureau, the Supreme Council of Justice, and the 
Ombudsman Office) of the performance of the public service system. Distributed 
institutions provide integrity improvement inside these institutions through control 
over activities and the provision of disciplinary processes for personnel. 
 
C.4.4.6  Emerging Issues 
 
Most of the interviewed respondents identified several issues affecting the 
efficiency of public institutions as an integrity system. Among the issues identified, 
the most important are: 
 
• Lack of long-term vision or strategy with regard to what a Georgian 
integrity system should be;  
• Lack of transparency and citizen involvement in the decision-making 
processes;  
• Alienation of political parties and NGOs;  
• Low level of trust in public institutions; 
• Lack of human resources; 
• Low professionalism of public sector employees; and 
• Unsound balance between preventive and punitive measures to combat 
corruption — as a result the environment remains susceptible to 
corruption. 
 
C.4.4.7  Evaluation of the Current Situation and Recommendations 
Identified 
 
The general decrease in corruption in the state administrative system is also 
reflected in special institutions. The Ombudsman’s Office, the State Commission 
on Efficient Governance and Territorial Arrangement, and the Civil Service Bureau 
have never been problematic agencies; however, the Audit Chamber and the 
Central Election Commission remain problematic areas.  
In the case of the Audit Chamber, the lack of human and financial 
resources and institutional weaknesses (inability to provide scrupulous control over 
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including public funds, and also nonmaterial means called ‘administrative resources’ 
– local governance units are involved in campaigning through use of force on voters, 
fraud of voters lists, etc. 
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personnel activities and verify information obtained through inspections) create an 
environment conducive to corrupt activities. For example, inspectors check public 
procurements carried out by individual ministries. Annual procurements in certain 
cases amount to between 140 and 200 million Georgian Laris, which means that a 
five-member group of Chamber inspectors who have low salaries deal with tasks 
involving 140-200 million Laris. If, for example, a Ministry has a 20 million Laris 
discrepancy in its financial records the inspectors may negotiate a deal with 
Ministry officials, receive a payment and draft an inspection report in which they 
will show the discrepancy to be 2 to 3 million Laris or less. The Chamber’s 
leadership does not have the mechanisms to verify the information. At times, the 
Chamber will be suspicious and conduct a repeat inspection, but this is very rare.  
The Chamber does not have any effective levers to control inspectors. 
Problems regarding corruption and abuse of office in the Central Election 
Commission are not of the same economic nature as found in the Audit Chamber. 
Rather, they are largely related to procedural violations and abuses of authority 
during the elections. There are two major problems here:   
 
• Election officials take bribes and manipulate votes in favour of a party 
that pays; 
• Election officials receive instructions from a particular political party (for 
example, the ruling party) and influence voters accordingly at district 
levels. 
 
Other problems that occur in the Central Election Commission are related 
to the complexity of the electoral legislation. Vote counting is a complex procedure 
and leaves room for making errors and manipulating votes. An additional problem 
is related to the electoral rolls, which are inaccurate. Apart from these issues, the 
Central Election Commission has limited authority to oversee pre-election 
campaign expenditures.  The Commission is only responsible for ensuring that 
financial statements on expenditures are submitted in a timely manner and in a 
format corresponding with legal requirements, but it cannot check the reliability of 
the data provided by the parties.  
Recommendations identified to increase anticorruption capacity include: 
 
• To increase the powers of special institutions (especially the 
Ombudsman’s Office, the Chamber of Control, and the Central Election 
Commission) from a mere oversight function to the ability to monitor the 
implementation of recommendations and conclusions;  
• To improve the legislative basis for the operations of these institutions; 
(e.g. in order to avoid future manipulation, it is necessary to simplify 
election procedures; to establish and implement internal control 
standards; to design a procedural framework for regulating interaction 
with external institutions to avoid overlap and interference; to optimize 
intra-structural cooperation, as well as inter-institutional relations with the 
Parliament, State Chancellery, and other state institutions; 86 
• To implement policies to develop the resources of these institutions 
(especially human resources) through increased funding; to involve 
international organizations and NGOs in developing training programs; to 
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between the Commission and the Justice Ministry’s Civil Registry Bureau. 
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develop the IT infrastructure and raise the professionalism of IT 
personnel; 87.  
• To develop long-term strategies for improving the integrity system; an in-
depth analysis should be undertaken to examine particular institutional 
roles to identify the strengths and weaknesses of particular institutions, to 
define their goals and to place them within the integrity system; 
• To capitalize on the capacity of civil society, plan appropriate public 
relations policies for public institutions to encourage improve 
communication channels. Political parties should also be permitted to 
monitor the state-administrative system through improved transparency 
and the dissemination of information through the policy formulation 
process; and 
• To introduce preventive mechanisms to combat corruption; although 
punitive policies are important at this stage of the state-building process, 
preventive mechanisms must be introduced to prevent anticorruption 
policies from transforming into repressive tools.  
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 C.5.   Non Government Organizations 
 
C.5.1   Roles and Functions in Ensuring Integrity 
 
The roles and functions of non-government organizations (NGO) in providing 
integrity are through this sector’s analytical, lobbying and advocacy mission. Types 
of NGO activities include: 
 
• Provision of assistance for civil integration and political participation; 
• Raising public awareness; 
• Assistance to strengthen the rule of law;  
• Assistance for the development of public accountability mechanisms; 
• Assistance to improve the professional skills of public officials; 
• Facilitate reform of state administrative institutions;  
• Assistance to strengthen the capacity of civil society to oversight public 
institutions; 
• Development assistance for state budget monitoring systems; 
• Development assistance for the reform of the social welfare system; and 
• Assistance to formulate state policy against organized crime and 
corruption through the use of intellectual resources. 
 
Various NGOs working on these issues can be divided into two groups: 
those conducting research and analysis (think tanks) and those lobbying and 
advocating for various social and political agendas. However research and 
advocacy are frequently merged in the activities of most Georgian NGOs.  
Those NGOs involved in researching social and political life in Georgia 
provide government, non-government and international organizations with valuable 
background information against which specific policies and programmes are 
implemented.  
NGOs involved with advocacy or in lobbying for specific social-political 
agendas contribute to the effective functioning of the national integrity system by 
ensuring that the interests of social groups are represented in policy development 
processes.  Such NGOs also assist the Georgian government with modern policy 
implementation instruments/methods based on the experience of Western states 
and which reflect liberal democratic principles of citizen involvement in the State.  
 
C.5.2  Assessment of Capacity 
 
The capacity of Georgian NGOs to support an integrity regime is variable. Firstly, 
the political context following the Rose revolution has changed and the role of 
NGOs is being revised. Secondly, though NGO staff have professional skills and 
are Western educated, it is difficult for them to retain this expertise in the changing 
environment in Georgia. State organizations and private business organizations 
attract western educated people. Thirdly, the financial capacity of NGOs is 
dependant on international and donor organizations continuing to operate in 
Georgia and consequently on any financial aid. Issues affecting the capacity of 
NGOs to promote integrity are described below. 
Following the Rose Revolution on 23 November 2003 a crisis began in the 
Georgian civil sector, which impacted on further development of the political 
system and the national integrity system in Georgia. The crisis was manifested in 
the following way: 
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• During the Revolution parts of the civil sector were involved in the 
revolutionary processes while others refused to take part, which 
politicized the various organizations. The political events that took place 
later intensified the politicization and polarization of those organizations 
according to their political beliefs. This polarization even took place 
among the organizations that were supporting the Revolution.  
• The ‘leakage’ of staff became a serious challenge for the non-government 
organizations. The civil sector became the main source for providing the 
new political elite with staff as NGOs employed Western-educated young 
people with some experience in governance.  
• The priorities of international donor organizations changed. Prior to the 
Rose Revolution the international donor organizations mainly focused on 
NGOs that specialized in human rights and the protection of liberal values.  
Currently, more attention is paid to the development of state institutions 
and the activities of those NGOs that can provide analytical and 
consulting services in that field. Therefore, many organizations now have 
to redefine their roles and find a new niche. 
 
C.5.3  Assessment of Coherence 
 
In relation to institutions that are not part of the state structure, it may be asked: 
what role do these institutions play in the operation of the Georgian national 
integrity system? Are they part of national integrity system? Do they participate in 
that system? 
NGOs support the national integrity system by providing government 
institutions with the following technical assistance:  
 
• Consultancy services (provision of analysis and expert advice); 
• Financial and technical support for staff development and infrastructure 
provision; and 
• Facilitate cooperation with international organizations through the 
exchange of information and the provision of expert-consultancy services. 
 
Based on such activities, these organizations play a significant role in the 
Georgian national integrity system; however, it is difficult to determine whether 
NGOs are an inherent part of the system. NGOs can assist the Georgian 
government with advice and with the creation of an environment necessary for this 
process to occur.  
The non-government sector is not an active player in the policy making 
process. Given the sector’s resources and specific charters, NGOs generally limit 
their work to the provision of specific expert consultations and monitoring of 
government activities. The capacity of the non-government sector to influence 
policies and other government activities is further hampered by a weak civil society. 
The majority of NGOs focus on the protection of human rights and the 
development of general liberal values. A smaller proportion direct their attention to 
democratic governance mechanisms and local self-government issues, with public 
policy planning and analysis a lesser priority for these organizations. This 
weakness of civil society is a result of the narrow focus of donor organizations. 
The focus of financial assistance from donor organization influenced the 
composition of the NGO sector. Another weakness of the NGO sector in Georgia is 
its weak connection with citizens, which impacts on the sector’s ability to influence 
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public opinion and conduct public discussions. This weakness increases the 
likelihood of the authorities overlooking the potential of the sector and 
disregarding their advice.  
 
C.5.4   Assessment of Consequences 
 
The crisis in the NGO sector impacted on the effectiveness of the Georgian 
national integrity system in the following ways: 
 
• The NGOs that played an active role in the Revolution garnered the trust 
of the post-revolutionary political elite and as a result the authorities are 
more willing to cooperate with these organizations than with the NGOs 
that opposed the Rose Revolution. At the same time, increased 
politicization brought about by the Revolution further divided the NGO 
sector according to their affiliations with political parties. 88  Such 
allegiances also hindered the cooperation between leading NGOs and the 
authorities as they failed to find a common language with the new 
political elite. Currently, only a very small portion of the civil sector can 
cooperate with the government in public policy making; 
• The aforementioned issues undoubtedly have a negative impact on the 
ability of the civil sector to generate discussions and mobilize public 
opinion. The politicization of NGOs also means that the public regards 
them as either ‘government’ or ‘antigovernment’ organizations and 
therefore public trust towards such NGOs has decreased; 
• The exodus of specialists from the civil sector to the government offices 
also reduces the level of expertise in NGOs. Consequently, the authorities 
have acquired more confidence in decision-making and require less 
external assistance. Even in situations where cooperation between the 
NGOs and government exists, it is always necessary for the government 
to completely trust the NGO.  As a result, only a select number of NGOs 
are able to take part in the public policy making process; and 
• Given that international donor organizations pay significant attention to 
the development of state institutions and regularly employ NGOs to 
facilitate this process, only NGOs that have this expertise are involved in 
the process. Due to the shift in priorities of international donor 
organizations, the civil sector, generally, has to reconsider its priorities 
and change its profile. This process may further exacerbate the 
politicization of NGOs, and convince the authorities that cooperation with 
NGOs that they can trust is an effective collaborative tool. 
 
NGO perceptions as to the effectiveness of the Georgian national integrity 
system as a way to evaluate the anti-corruption activities of the Georgian 
government vary considerably and are often contradictory. The majority of civil 
sector respondents consider the functions of the integrity institutions to be 
satisfactory; however, survey responses indicate that some NGOs do not agree with 
this assessment.  
                                                
38 Despite the fact that the Ethic Code for Non-government Organizations that was 
drawn up by Caucasian Institute of War and Peace, Democracy and Development, 
Young Economists’ Association and Civitas Georgica was hoped to be an 
instrument that would promote unity among non-government organizations and stop 
their farther politicization, it turned out that this document was not acceptable to all. 
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According to the respondents, the institutions representing law 
enforcement agencies, especially those related to the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and the Prosecutor’s Office are the most successful institutions. The most 
problematic in the eyes of the respondents are the Customs and Tax Departments89 
under the control of the Ministry of Finance. Most respondents also indicate that 
the operation of the judicial system is problematic. The reasons given by 
respondents for the ineffectiveness of the judicial system vary.  A number of 
respondents believe that the problems relate to a lack of human resources, while 
other respondents consider that the problems are linked to legislation, which 
prevents the judicial system from becoming truly independent. Other problematic 
areas include social security, public health and agriculture systems, where 
corruption and ineffective administration are still considered to be significant 
problems. Almost all respondents believe the lack of human resources to be the 
main cause of ineffective administration. 
The identification of corruption as one of the main problems in particular 
areas does not indicate that corruption is not evident elsewhere. According to the 
respondents, despite decreases in corruption in areas where the government and 
public most frequently interact (for example, police and public and civil registers), 
there are a wide variety of reasons that cause the types and levels of corruption to 
vary. Some respondents believe that reduced corruption is a result of the anti-
corruption drive led by the ruling political elite and the series of punitive measures 
adopted, which intimidated public officials and made them refrain from 
participating in illegal activities. As a result, there is an apparent sharp reduction of 
corrupt behavior at the lower and medium levels of state administration.   
According to some respondents, the situation is vastly different in the highest 
decision making circles where ‘elite corruption’ exists. However, not all 
representatives of the civil sector agree with the assessment that ‘elite corruption’ 
exists. Some respondents believe that the concentration of power at the higher 
levels of the state system caused frustration and doubts about the government anti-
corruption activities among those skeptical of government motives, and that these 
problems were further exacerbated by ineffective public relations between various 
government offices. 
The above response regarding ineffective public relations is one of the 
most interesting issues raise in the context of evaluating state integrity institutions 
and their cooperation with the NGO sector. Despite the fact that the exchange of 
information between some government offices is quite effective, public relations 
activities with the broad range of NGOs are quite weak. There are public relations 
services and press centers in government offices. However, these units do not 
function effectively. As a rule, Information flow is restricted and these units are 
bypassed with information flowing directly from high-ranking officials 
representing various ministries or departments. The ineffectiveness of public 
relations divisions may be linked to the absence of such services in those agencies 
prior to the Revolution and that the people employed in these services are not 
                                                
89
  One of the recent initiatives directed at solving the problems in that sphere that was 
voiced by the authorities in summer of 2006 is to unite the various divisions 
currently subordinated to the Ministry of Finance (financial police – one more 
agency that is considered to be a result of successful reforms, tax and customs 
departments) and make this newly formed body a separate agency that will not be 
subordinated to the Ministry of Finance. That initiative is being discussed and no 
further decisions have been made so far.  
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qualified. Some respondents also think that the agencies have centralized control 
over the way the information is disseminated.  
The reasons for the existence of corruption identified by the respondents 
are listed below: 
 
• The lack of appropriate human resources remains a problem despite the 
implemented structural changes. There is a clear imbalance between 
skilled/ethical staff and material/technical resources that these agencies 
now have. According to the respondents, the government has essentially 
managed to provide the administrative system with the material and 
economic means to function effectively, but the problem of human 
resources remains overlooked. Overcoming the lack of suitable human 
resources will require a long term commitment as a new generation of 
specialists needs to be educated and trained. Reliance on Western-
educated young people is problematic, because they are offered better 
opportunities for professional development abroad. As a result, more 
attention should be given to training young people locally. Educational 
reform is a positive step in that direction. The crux of the problem is– 
∼ Despite adequate salaries and the creation of a supportive work 
environment for public officials, there remains no guarantee that 
officials will not participate in corrupt transactions. The respondents 
believe that the cause of that problem is that most officials working in 
the lower and medium levels of the administrative system were raised 
during the Soviet period or during Shevardnadze’s presidency, and as 
a result these officials have been exposed to corrupt practices. The 
potential for corrupt public officials to be punished for corrupt 
transactions is the most effective preventive strategies. 
• Public attitudes substantially define the ethical component of human 
resources. The success and effectiveness of reforms carried out by 
government authorities essentially depend upon the social environment in 
which the reforms are carried out. Most respondents believe that one of 
the factors hindering the success of anti-corruption policies is that civil 
awareness is quite low and that citizens often see informal means as the 
only way to solve problems and conduct transactions. The major risk is 
that a significant portion of public officials working in state agencies 
share such attitudes with the general public; 
• An unstable socio-economic environment that encourages public officials 
working in lower administrative levels to participate in corrupt 
transactions. Some respondents termed these practices ‘induced 
corruption’: they believe that the eradication of this kind of corruption 
through the pursuit of general state policies is impossible until the general 
socio-economic environment is improved. Therefore, the only effective 
tool to reduce corruption among public officials is through punitive 
measures. 
 
The respondents also highlight the following reasons for ineffective 
integrity institutions in Georgia. 
 
• Sufficient staff lacking professional qualifications and ethical values 
makes it necessary to concentrate power and control in the hands of the 
ruling political elite to achieve the desired outcomes from the 
implemented reforms. The centralization of power often results in hasty 
decisions because of the need for prompt actions in some circumstances. 
Appropriate decision-making depend on formal institutional mechanisms 
as well as effective management. This shortcoming raises the issue of 
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how to protect institutional functions from the arbitrary behavior of public 
officials.  
• The recruitment mechanisms used to appoint public officials (especially 
high-ranking public officials) is a very important issue. Currently, leaders 
make recruitment decisions.  To ensure institutional integrity the main 
task of state personnel policy should be the selection of suitable staff by 
principled leaders. Some respondents, however, believe that personnel 
recruitment policy in being undertaken in an acceptable way.  These 
respondents believe that despite staff selection being primarily based on 
personal trust, which renders the recruiting process less transparent, such 
an approach is justified as past experience of working with the recruit is 
the only way to efficiently achieve the required level of teamwork. At the 
same time, transparent and formal mechanisms of recruitment must be 
gradually introduced at every level of government, which, in the long run, 
will institutionalize the desired recruitment processes. The existing 
recruitment mechanisms, however, encourage nepotism – despite being 
justified by some respondents – and really damage the quality of integrity 
institutions and undermine appropriate public values.  
• One additional factor noted by the respondents is the absence of 
comprehensive anti-corruption policies and measures. Leadership-based 
governance is characterized by hasty and spontaneous action without the 
underpinning of an anti-corruption strategic plan. The respondents fear 
that the absence of common processes causes the fragmentation of 
specific, field oriented anti-corruption strategies. Strong coordination by 
the government, based on the general anti-corruption drive, does not 
alleviate fears that the anti-corruption campaign may fail in the future.  
 
The respondents consider the following measures as suitable tools for 
solving the above-mentioned problems: 
 
• It is necessary to continue implementing punitive measures given the 
existing public attitude and socio-economic conditions that create a 
favorable environment for corruption; 
• Given public attitudes to corruption, education must be introduced into 
the education system in order to change attitudes/practices and raise 
public awareness of the problems. This function could be undertaken by 
the civil sector; 
• To overcome the human resource problems, it is necessary to introduce 
training programs in national universities to teach the young generation 
administrative and public service skills as Western-educated young 
people rarely return to Georgia; 
• As a result of the lack of human resources and experience in anti-
corruption policymaking and implementation, the sharing of experiences 
from foreign countries (especially in corruption-prevention strategies and 
practices) is necessary. NGOs could play a valuable role in this respect; 
• To create a balance between punishment and prevention strategies, ethical 
codes must be developed for public officials.  This approach will educate 
state officials and strengthen the ethical basis for decision making. The 
role of NGOs is very important in this process;90 
 
                                                
90
  It should be noted that a Code of Ethics has been developed and established in the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. The code was prepared in cooperation with an NGO 
(Liberty Institute).  
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C.5.4.1  Recommendations 
 
In order to ensure the rule of law, to improve the level of institutionalization and 
consequently promote integrity, it is necessary to: 
 
• Adopt common approaches to reform the state governance system based 
on cooperation between the government and non-government sectors; 
• Refine bureaucratic internal and external (public/civil) control 
mechanisms to ensure that these measures  correspond with the goals of 
institutional effectiveness; 
• Enhance the monitoring role of civil society watch-dog organizations; and 
• Build trust between the government and civil society organizations to 
encourage future cooperation and support. 
 
 C.6.   Donor and International Organizations 
 
C.6.1  Roles and Functions in Ensuring Integrity 
 
The four largest donors to Georgia are: the World Bank, the United States, The 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the European 
Union (EU). Since 1993, U.S. assistance has totaled approximately $441 million. 
The World Bank has provided approximately $509 million to Georgia. World Bank 
assistance includes structural adjustment credits, agricultural development loans, 
assistance to the health and power sectors, and technical assistance to strengthen 
the private sector. USAID works closely with the World Bank and supports its 
economic reform policies. EBRD provides direct funding for the power and 
transport sectors and supports private sector development. The EU’s technical 
assistance program has focused on the rehabilitation of transport infrastructure, 
strengthening the private sector, agriculture and security. Since 1992, Georgia has 
borrowed about $280 million through annual structural adjustment loans from the 
IMF. USAID provides technical assistance to the Ministry of Finance and works 
closely with the IMF to address fiscal policy issues.  
Other international and donor organizations working in Georgia and 
supporting the national integrity system include:  
 
• The UK Department for International Development (DFID) works in 
partnership with the Georgian government. DFID is committed to 
international targets, and seeks to work with business, civil society and 
the research community to encourage the progress required to improve 
sustainable development; 
• The Eurasia Foundation funds programs aimed at building democratic and 
free market institutions in the new independent states of the former Soviet 
Union. The main directions of its work include: private sector 
development assistance; facilitating the reform of public administration 
and policy making process; and improving the capacity of Civil Society 
institutions; 
• The German Development Cooperation (GTZ) assistance encompasses 
both financial and technical cooperation with the Georgian government. 
As part of this two-fold cooperation, the German Development 
Cooperation focuses on three priority areas: Sustainable Economic 
Development; Democracy; Civil Society; Public Administration; and 
Energy. 
• The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) identified several 
areas of targeted assistance for Georgia.  Its activities are aimed at 
capacity building for– 
∼ Democratic governance in the legislative, executive and judiciary 
branches of the government;  
∼ Poverty reduction through policy advice and promotion of 
employment opportunities, crisis prevention and recovery;  
∼ Environmental and natural resource management; and 
∼ Human rights protection and improvement.  
 
Successful capacity building projects undertaken by civil society 
organizations are mainstreamed into UNDP projects. 
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) 
Mission to Georgia was established (in 1992) in response to armed conflicts in the 
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country.  However, it assists the Government of Georgia not only in the field of 
conflict resolution, but also in improving the democratization process, human 
rights protection and strengthening the rule of law. 
An integral part of all program strategies of the international organizations’ 
missions in Georgia is their contribution to improving the efficiency of the national 
integrity system in the following ways: 
 
• Institutional and policy reform at the national level with local and 
grassroots capacity building;  
• Economic and energy sector restructuring support;  
• Strengthening the private sector;  
• Strengthening civil society;  
• Developing democratic local governance;  
• Promoting the rule of law; and 
• Fighting corruption. 
 
C.6.2  Assessment of Capacity 
 
There are three main clusters that are impact on the work of international and donor 
organizations. They are: government institutions; civil society sector; and various 
other social groups (for example, ethnic minorities, private enterprises and the 
poor). At the same time, there are international organizations which deliver 
services and coordinate activities under the auspices of various international aid 
programs and projects.  Consequently, the capacity of international and donor 
organizations to improve the Georgian national integrity system is based not only 
on their own organizational resources, but also on human and material-technical 
resources of the organizations that are involved in joint projects and programs 
implemented in Georgia. 
Key areas targeted by international and donor organizations include:  
 
• Promoting the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights 
and democratic institutions, including the strengthening of civil society 
actors;  
• Reducing poverty, targeting assistance to the state’s policy formulation as 
regards the most vulnerable groups issues;  
• Supporting reform initiatives in individual sectors; and 
• Enhancing stability and security through capacity building of relevant 
state institutions which creates a complex infrastructure involving state 
agencies, NGOs and society in general, through mutual and regular 
cooperation.  As a result of the projects implemented so far, vast networks 
of organizations have emerged with diversified material-technical 
infrastructures and skilled human resources. In this regard, the role of 
international and donor organizations has been to mobilize these 
resources for the achievement of specific goals and to improve their 
capacity through technical and/or financial aid.  
 
C.6.3  Assessment of Coherence 
 
The opinions expressed by representatives of international and donor organizations 
about Georgia’s national integrity system are largely similar to the conclusions 
offered by the representatives of non-government organizations. The processes that 
are now taking place in the state governance system since the Rose Revolution are 
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considered by international and donor organizations to be satisfactory and they 
note a clear progress in that sphere. However, a small number of representatives of 
international and donor organizations interviewed believe that the reforms carried 
out by the government are superficial, being directed at gaining international 
support, and consequently not yielding substantial changes.  They take the view 
that it is, therefore, hard to speak about the existence of a national integrity system.  
However, these views did not predominate and were largely based on some 
mistrust towards the government on the part of those organizations, and a lack of 
acceptance by some of the strict measures taken by the government during its 
implementation of anti-corruption measures.  Some international and donor 
organizations hold the view makes the government only pursues anti-corruption 
policies in order to gain support from, and be able to be integrated into western 
international organizations, especially NATO and the European Union. In order to 
achieve that goal, a country has to adopt certain standards for corruption prevention 
and reduce its level of corruption. Nevertheless, the representatives of international 
and donor organizations working in Georgia do offer the Georgian government 
cooperation and support in strengthening the national system, in the following 
ways: 
 
• Expert assistance during the public policy making process and exchange 
of information – especially sharing the experiences of other countries; 
• Provision of technical assistance to improve the state governance system, 
manifested by building technical infrastructure and repairing 
administrative buildings so that the officials have comfortable working 
conditions; 
• Devising and developing training-retraining programs for specialists and 
offering these programs to the government; and 
• Assisting non-government organizations where their priorities and human 
resources capacities correspond with public policy planning, analysis and 
monitoring requirements.  (This assistance is apart from supporting civil 
education programs both for public officials and society at large.) 
 
The issues or field of influence that were named by representatives of 
international and donor organizations as successful and problematic in terms of 
anti-corruption activities were largely the same as those identified by non-
government organizations.  Those institutions that have everyday contact with the 
public, such as the Ministry of Education, Prosecutor General Office, Ministry of 
Defense, Financial Police of the Ministry of Finance and the law enforcement 
agencies, are considered to be successful examples of anti-corruption policy and 
structural reforms. The judiciary system was seen as the most problematic area, 
followed by social welfare, the public health system, the agriculture system, and 
the Tax and Customs Departments of the Ministry of Finance.  However, the 
reason why international and donor organizations see the above-mentioned areas as 
problematic is that, after the Rose Revolution, the level of corruption sharply 
decreased in all state agencies, but at the same time some agencies have been more 
successful in addressing corruption problems than others. 
 
C.6.4   Assessment of Consequences 
 
Respondents representing international and donor organizations indicate that 
corruption is not seen by them as the main indicator of a problem. Rather, 
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respondents see the main problem as ineffective administrative systems.  Because 
of imperfect internal control mechanisms and lack of coordination, transgression, 
negligence or abuse of power (even when it does not involve personal interests) are 
still possible. The courts are seen as especially problematic, where minor 
corruption has sharply decreased, but where both non-government and international 
organizations unanimously identified this sector as problematic in terms of 
conscientiousness. Most respondents explained that their evaluation was formed by 
the lack of independence of the judicial system.  They believe that high-ranked 
office holders and politicians pressure and influence the courts. 
The overwhelming majority of the respondents interviewed considered that 
problems relating to integrity are caused by the lack of suitable human resources. 
Representatives of international and donor organizations predominantly agree with 
these opinions expressed by representatives of civil society. The primary difference 
was that non-government organizations believed that the essential condition for 
ensuring the sustainability of anti-corruption measures within government 
institutions is that individuals working in them should be conscientious and possess 
high moral and ethical values; whereas, according to the representatives of 
international and donor organizations, the main requirement is to ensure that the 
individuals working in the state agencies adhere to high standards of professional 
behaviour. Therefore, successful institutions, in the opinion of international and 
donor organizations, achieved success in fighting corruption because of highly-
professional and well-qualified personnel in those agencies.  Conversely, 
problematic institutions did not have professional and well-qualified personnel and 
failed to achieve the same success despite, in some cases, better material and 
financial resources. 
Representatives of international and donor organizations believe that 
public attitude is one of the most serious factors hindering institutional reforms and 
anti-corruption policies being pursued by the Georgian government. The effect of 
the prevailing public attitude is an adverse socio-cultural environment in which 
those state agencies which have already been reformed, or are currently undergoing 
reform must function.  This cultural environment is an unsatisfactory environment 
from which the state has to recruit its personnel. The modernized institutions 
cannot function to high ethical standards when operating within a society that 
accept nepotism and public corruption.  This attitude becomes more problematic 
when people employed in public institutions share the prevailing attitudes of the 
public at large who regard illegal transactions and actions as acceptable.  
Most representatives of international and donor organizations believe that 
under the existing socio-cultural conditions the only guarantee of ensuring integrity 
is having leadership that pursues a strong anti-corruption agenda.  However, this is 
problematic in a system where nepotism underwrites a principle that strong 
leadership is best based on the selection of personal acquaintances as leaders.  In 
these circumstances, controlling the system of recruitment is especially difficult at 
lower and medium levels of the administrative system. According to the 
respondents, the vast majority of public officials that were ostensibly recruited on 
the basis of transparent competition actually obtained their present positions 
through personal connections and other corrupt mechanisms. Respondents argued 
that these practices could only be changed through the development of 
comprehensive control mechanisms for recruitment.  
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C.6.4.1  Recommendations 
 
The representatives of international and donor organizations believe that the 
following measures have to be taken to achieve the necessary reforms of Georgia’s 
administrative system and to ensure integrity within public institutions in Georgia:  
 
• To strengthen the national system in Georgia and ensure the success of 
the anti-corruption policies, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive 
approach that involves all public sector institutions in the reform process. 
This approach should reform the state governance system through 
adopting cooperative policies and systems within and between agencies 
targeted at prevention of corruption;   
• Adherence to the ‘rule of law’ principle through reforms to the judiciary 
to strengthen its independence and to guarantee preservation of stability 
between judicial institutions; 
• Creation of mechanisms for the distribution of material-technical and 
financial resources that will ensure that the budget resources are 
distributed among the state agencies according to the needs of those 
agencies.  Additionally, salary increases should not be limited only to 
higher level officials.  Officials working at the middle and lower levels of 
the administrative system must also receive appropriate conditions and 
higher salaries where justified; 
• Implement a public cultural change program involving the state 
educational system, media and non-government sector so that these 
organizations contribute to and support a whole-of-society reform 
process;  
• Achievement of a deeper level of cooperation between the government 
and non-government sectors is also necessary for the development and 
improvement of external control mechanisms for monitoring public 
service delivery; 
• Improving the qualifications and skills of public officials and the 
introduction of professional training-retraining programs for public 
servants through the cooperation of international and donor organizations. 
 
 C.7.   The Media  
 
C.7.1   Roles and Functions in Ensuring Integrity  
 
The role of the media in building the Georgian national integrity system is through 
its ability to analyze the depth of democratization in Georgia and promote 
transparency and good governance. In this regard, access to information is crucial 
for at least two reasons:  
 
• It ensures that citizens make responsible, informed choices rather than 
acting out of ignorance or misinformation.  
• Information serves a ‘checking function’ by ensuring that elected 
representatives uphold their oaths of office and carry out the wishes of 
those who elected them.  
 
The relationship between the media and government can be characterized 
as antagonistic, but even this kind of interaction is a vital and healthy oversight 
mechanism to appraise government activities.  This antagonism is characteristic of 
the transitional society in Georgia and is defined by the role the media plays in 
broadly disseminating information and mediating between the state and all parts of 
civil society.  
While the media is considered to be a part of civil society, it also overlaps 
with other areas of democracy and good governance: 
 
• The media may yield results in governance activities, particularly those 
related to decentralization, anti-corruption, and citizen participation in the 
policy development process;  
• The rule of law may be further institutionalized by an independent media 
that keeps a check on the judiciary, reports on the courts and judicial 
decisions, and promotes a legal environment that supports freedom of the 
press; and  
• Free and fair elections conducted through transparent processes require a 
media sector which gives candidates equal access, and reports relevant 
issues in a timely, objective manner. 
 
Within the context of support for democratic transition, state building and 
the strengthening of the national integrity system in Georgia, the goal of media is 
to serve the public interest. The media’s role in developing the Georgian national 
integrity system is to develop a range of diverse mediums and voices that are 
credible, and to create and strengthen a sector that promotes such outlets. Credible 
outlets enable citizens to have access to information that they need to make 
informed decisions and to participate in the social and political life of the country. 
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C.7.2  Assessment of Capacity 
 
C.7.2.1  Economic Basis of the Media 
 
With regard to economic support, there is a sharp difference between media 
organizations operating in the capital city and those operating in the regions. Tbilisi 
based media organizations have relatively stable financial incomes due to the level 
of economic development in the city; however, economic stability is the main 
problem faced by regional media outlets. The advertising market that would ensure 
the financial welfare of regional media organizations is underdeveloped. In larger 
towns and administrative centres, though the economic infrastructure is 
inadequately developed, the private or state sector supplies some orders to local 
newspapers, television and radio stations.  Media organisations operating in smaller 
regional centres lack even these limited orders. It appears that independent media 
organisations can only survive if they are involved in alliances that will bring 
financial benefit. For example, participation in coalition or media development 
projects and programmes run by international organisations, or cooperation with 
the local government or local political and economic groups may increase financial 
support. In some cases, a newspaper generates its own income from additional 
business activities, for example, printing facilities or other services.  
 
C.7.2.2   Technical Equipment and infrastructure 
 
Economic support impacts on the level and quality of technical equipment and 
infrastructure of Georgian media organizations. Those media organizations located 
in Tbilisi are able to purchase modern technical equipment and upgrade that 
equipment if necessary, while the situation in the regions is quite different. 
The financial and economic prosperity of regional media organisations 
determines the quality of their technical equipment. Economic prosperity is 
determined by many factors: geographic location or the involvement of the given 
organisation in networks of groups with economic interests or in civil society and 
international organisations. In fact, the latter aspect plays a significant role in 
solving problems related to the media’s technical equipment. An analysis of the 
situation shows that from a technical viewpoint, organisations which receive 
assistance from international donor organisations have noticeably better conditions. 
A wide range of factors hinder the media in performing its functions: 
 
• There are limited publishing houses for print media in the regions, 
resulting in the majority printing their newspapers in Tbilisi. This 
occurrence negatively impacts on the regularity of published newspapers. 
While there are publishing houses in Kutaisi, Batumi and Poti (although, 
even Poti newspapers do not use this publishing house), the media in 
neighbouring towns prefer Tbilisi publishing houses, based on print 
quality and prices; 
• The print media also finds it difficult to deliver its products to the 
population. The former Sakpress (Georgia Press) network and the Postal 
Service no longer function.  This results in newspaper editorial boards 
finding their own means for distribution, though this hinders the 
distribution of newspapers in many districts, especially mountainous ones, 
where transport and road infrastructure have collapsed; 
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• The operation of electronic media organisations is facilitated by the 
infrastructure of masts and transmitters owned by the state-founded 
company Tele-Radio Centre of Georgia. Television and radio companies 
send out their signals in accordance with agreements with this 
organisation. Although the amount that the Tele-Radio Centre of Georgia 
charges for its services is defined by how much its partner organisations 
can afford, many regional media organisations owe money to this 
organisation. However, the Tele-Radio Centre of Georgia has never 
terminated broadcasting for this reason alone. Some television or radio 
companies use their own masts and transmitters for broadcasting. 
 
C.7.2.3   Problem of qualified personnel 
 
Qualified personnel represent the most important factor for the development of the 
Georgian media. The issues associated with qualified personnel in media 
organisations vary considerably in different regions, in different towns within the 
regions, and also vary according to the form of ownership of each organization. 
Tbilisi based media organizations are less affected by this problem as there are 
more opportunities for individuals to gain journalism qualifications than in regional 
areas.  
The outflow of journalists with appropriate qualifications is felt 
particularly in Samtskhe-Javakheti, Kvemo Kartli, Mtskheta-Mtianeti and Racha-
Lechkhumi.  Media organisations in these regions experience difficulty in 
appointing skilled individuals as a result of local economic and social conditions. 
Young people with educated in journalism prefer to seek employment in the 
Georgian capital, or alternatively remain in the region but work in various non-
government and international organisations.  
There is a significant link between qualified personnel and the size of 
regional municipalities, their infrastructure and the economic stability of the local 
media. More qualified personnel are employed by media organisations in regional 
administrative centres and in large industrial towns. In small agricultural district 
centres, the local media is staffed by people who worked for the old Soviet media 
organisations.  
In the state-owned media, the majority of the journalists are middle-aged 
and do not adopt modern journalistic standards and new working styles. In the 
private sector, editorial boards pay much attention to improving the level of 
professionalism of both their journalists and their technical and administrative 
personnel. The owners of media organisations emphasise that it is very difficult for 
them to attract qualified personnel; it is also difficult to retain staff or improve the 
current standards. The regional media is greatly assisted by representatives of 
international and local civil society, who hold joint activities and training with 
representatives of independent media organizations. In comparison to the private 
media, one of the characteristic of the state-owned media is that the state media 
employs more administrative and technical personnel than journalists. According to 
our observations, in private media organisations, which employ staff in a similar 
manner to the state-owned organizations, there are increased problems related to 
content and the development of their marketing strategies. In media organisations, 
where the situation is opposite (journalists prevail over administrative and technical 
staff) their production is more relevant for the audience, thus sales are higher.  
Local markets and regional economic problems restrict the ability of media 
organisations to develop internal structures within each organisation such as 
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marketing, advertising and distribution. Very few regional media organisations 
could manage to introduce innovations in this respect and thus ensure their 
organisational sustainability.  
 
C.7.2.4   Journalists Unions 
 
Regional media organisations and journalists often enter into partnerships with one 
another. Such cooperation and the establishment of partnership networks mainly 
takes place within the framework of coalition projects and training provided by 
Western donor organisations. For example, the Radio Network of Georgia union 
was established under the aegis of Radio Tavisupleba (Radio Liberty), which 
consists of five radio stations in Western and Eastern Georgia. Under the aegis of 
the Tbilisi-based television company Rustavi 2, the Georgia Association of 
Independent Broadcasting was established; this example illustrates how 
cooperation within the framework of the union enables weaker television 
companies to fill their airtime with broadcasts from a stronger organisation, and 
also enables the stronger one to broadcast throughout the whole country without 
additional expenses.  
The Georgian print media has almost no formal networks or unions, if one 
does not take into account common national unions such as the Journalists 
Federation of Georgia, which consists of many representatives of the regional print 
media. Such unions aim to share experiences and create a common space for 
information. Common programs of the local TV companies are joined within the 
framework of the project Parallel of the Samtskhe-Javakheti Association for Media 
Development and these programs are broadcasted by all the organisations involved 
in the network. 
The small number of journalistic unions and the limited number of joint 
activities within them represents one of the biggest problems for regional media 
development. If international organisations were involved in establishing and 
operating such unions, this would greatly contribute to solving this problem.  
 
C.7.3   Assessment of Coherence 
 
C.7.3.1  The Media and the Authorities 
 
Relations between the media and the authorities are generally constructive. 
Nevertheless, there have been instances when this balance has been shattered and 
the authorities have exerted pressure on the media. However, this scenario actually 
works in favour of the independent media.  Regularly, media organisations readily 
agree to make deals with local authorities in order to secure improved economic 
stability. This type of relationship is possible in larger municipalities and in most 
regional district centres the media is mostly controlled by the state, even if 
nominally it is independent. Most of the print media in Georgian regional areas is 
owned by the state, whereas the electronic media is either private or is established 
by non-government organisations and accordingly, it is the electronic media which 
comes under most pressure from government authorities. Both the Government and 
individual political or business groups try to use television and radio companies as 
an efficient tool to influence public opinion, either by putting pressure on them or 
by agreeing to ‘profitable’ cooperation with them. 
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C.7.3.2  The Media and Society 
 
The negative attitudes in society caused by the opaque and corrupt management 
style of both the local and central governments over the years have laid a solid 
foundation for the creation of an independent media space. Georgian society has 
become increasingly politically active in recent years, and its involvement and role 
in the Rose Revolution in November 2003 is an expression of this active stand. For 
the reasons discussed above, however, this political activity has not yet proved 
sufficient to establish a coherent independent media space. Rather, the public 
focuses its interest on particular media organisations. 
The degree of attention the media pays to social problems varies based on 
the extent to which a given media organisation works to satisfy public demand. 
Media organisations that are owned by local governments generally disseminate 
official information, report news in an essay-like fashion, and do not try to depict 
actual problems within society. The independent media tries to cover the whole 
spectrum of current social and political problems. The independent media focuses 
on political and economic issues and related to this, corruption and criminal 
business activities, social crimes, welfare and health care problems. The 
independent media works in close cooperation with civil society. The independent 
media is in an advantageous position in terms of access to information and 
resistance to pressure.  
 
C.7.4   Assessment of Consequences 
 
Similar to the non-government sector, since the Rose Revolution there has been a 
tendency within the media towards politicization. This politicization is more 
prominent in major influential television companies. The level of criticism levelled 
against the government in the various newspapers also differs; some editions are 
exceedingly and sometimes unconstructively critical, whereas some express too 
much support for the government. This situation is not a result of systematic 
government pressure on the media, although it is difficult to determine whether 
there is any substantial government pressure on electronic and print media. It is 
more appropriate to discuss the policies pursued by media outlets and the 
approaches of the media and media owners in cooperating with the authorities. In 
most cases, the degree of criticism by media outlets is determined by the extent to 
which business and political circles influence the television stations and 
newspapers.  As a general rule, this influence on the Georgian media is exerted 
through ownership of media outlets. 
Media outlets owned by individuals who have close relationships with 
government are more loyal towards the policies pursued by the government and are 
more ‘benevolent’ during the coverage of current events than those media outlets 
without such relationships with the authorities. The attitudes of the authorities and 
the degree of cooperation offered by them to media outlets are proportional to the 
attitudes put forth by the various media outlets towards them.  Information about 
especially problematic and serious issues is more readily available to some media 
outlets than to others. This is particularly relevant with television media coverage 
rather than print media as the government tends to focus on relationships with 
television organizations given their broad public appeal.  
Similar to the civil sector, evaluations of the effectiveness of integrity 
institutions made by representatives of the various media organizations vary 
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considerably.  Some representatives state that the anti-corruption activities 
conducted by the government have already yielded some results and that the 
general level of corruption has sharply decreased.  Other representatives assert that 
corruption has been curtailed only at lower levels of the administrative system and 
that this has been achieved through the fear of punishment rather than by 
increasing the salaries of public officials (the salaries of the employees working in 
lower levels of the administrative system remain low). These respondents believe 
that changes currently occurring are superficial and that corruption is still rife in 
higher levels of the administrative system. 
Media representatives, such as the respondents from the civil sector, (but 
unlike the representatives of international and donor organizations) believe that the 
main cause of corruption is not so much a lack of qualifications and 
professionalism in the public service, but rather, the moral and ethical 
characteristics of the people working in public office. This does not mean that the 
media representatives fail to realize that crimes and transgressions are committed 
due to lack of professionalism and qualification. However, the representatives 
consider the main driving force compelling a public official to commit a crime and 
conduct illegal transactions is a rational decision based on economic calculations. 
One additional interesting factor that the media representatives noted was the way 
in which institutional imperfections allow unscrupulous high-ranking officials to 
easily find ways to conduct illegal activities. One of the indications of institutional 
imperfection that allows this to occur is the lack of transparency in the operations 
of various state agencies.  The most problematic issues related to the lack of 
transparency are personnel recruitment mechanisms and the absence of defined 
principles on which public officials receive promotions. According to the 
respondents, it is difficult to monitor how fairly and transparently public officials 
are recruited and promoted.  
 
C.7.4.1 Recommendations 
 
Main recommendations identified through the study are as follows: 
 
• Separation of media editorial policy from the economic and political 
interests of business groups through the adoption of a common code of 
ethics designed to ensure the independent work of journalists;  
• Closer cooperation between the non-government sector and the media to 
establish effective public control over state governance functions through 
increased transparency in relation to policy making and its 
implementation; 
• Increase horizontal ties among media professionals; 
• Expand educational and practical programs in electronic information 
gathering and dissemination; 
• Expand educational and practical programs in business, management, and 
technical skills; 
• Increase professional contacts, personnel exchange and collaboration 
between domestic and foreign media companies and institutions; and 
• Cooperation between the media and the Church for strengthening public 
civic values. 
 C.8.   Local Government 
 
C.8.1   Roles and Functions in Ensuring Integrity  
 
The roles and functions of local government, which ensure integrity, are imbedded 
in its combination of civil society and state elements. Local government institutions 
allow for interaction between local communities and state institutions to take place. 
As all civic rights, social activities and other various aspects of public life occur 
and are realized within local communities, local government institutions play an 
important role in linking civil society and the state. Thus the task of local 
governance institutions is to ensure the fit of state institutional actions with the 
interests of individuals and society in general.  
Local government has both a political and social character. On one hand 
local government is an integral part of the state administrative system.  It is 
structured in accordance with the law and administrative procedures and is 
responsible for budget implementation and fiscal issues. On the other hand, local 
government provides an avenue for civil society self-organization and the 
achievement of local interests. It is important to note that those who should be 
governed are themselves governors. This process occurs through the involvement 
of local communities in the decision making process – the very principle of local 
government.  
To improve democracy, good governance and integrity, the roles of local 
government are: 
 
• To ensure democratization of the state system through decentralization; 
• To reflect the varied interests of local communities in the formulation and 
implementation of government policies;  
• To ensure that state interests exist in accordance with individual rights 
and interests. 
 
Decision-making practices of local government institutions in Georgia as 
they currently exist do not correspond with the above mentioned goals. A new law 
on local governance that will improve local government practices was adopted by 
the Georgian parliament in 2006. At the same time, a new draft law on public 
service designed to institutionalise the administrative process in local government 
was also submitted to parliament.  
The strengthening of self government at the municipality level is a step 
toward Georgia achieving the above mentioned goals as local financial, material 
and human resources will be increasingly administered by individual municipalities. 
A new law on local government redefines the roles of elected councils and mayoral 
offices. This law increased the responsibilities of elected councils while certain 
privileges of the ‘executive component’ of local government have been reduced. 
Changes to the ‘representative component’ of the local authorities include: 
 
• The leader of the local council is declared leader of the municipality; 
• Council is permitted to approve statutes of all subordinate bodies 
(procedural regulations and role division); 
• Statutory acts may only be adopted by the council; 
• Local council bureau that is responsible for facilitating council functions 
and monitoring the ‘executive component’ of local government was 
established; and 
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• The frequency of council meetings was increased to once a month. 
 
With regard to the ‘executive component’ the following changes have 
occurred: 
 
• Mayoral office as a collegial body was abolished; 
• The only task of this office is to implement decisions made by the council. 
 
C.8.2  Assessment of Capacity 
 
Significant problems that hinder the ability of local authorities to function 
effectively include a lack of qualified human resources and a lack of material and 
technical resources. At the same time, institutional flaws exist that are having a 
greater impact on the functioning of local government bodies than those issues of a 
financial or material/technical nature. One of the major problems is the absence of 
regulations defining the selection criteria for public service candidates. Problems 
also exist in relation to instructions given by office holders and ranking regulations. 
Draft laws aims to eradicate these problems. Problems regarding the selection of 
candidates are: 
 
• Every citizen over 18 is permitted to hold the highest positions in local 
government bodies including the position of a mayor. This causes a 
downgrading of the rank of public office; 
• There are no clearly defined instructions for specific public offices; 
• There are no special requirements for a person to have qualifications that 
correspond to the specific position; 
• There are no clear criteria set out and procedures adopted for candidate 
selection; 
• There are no state programs designed to improve the qualifications and 
skills of local government public officials; and 
• There are no clear retirement procedures for public officials. According to 
the law, public officials can be dismissed due to either the closure of an 
office or its reorganization. The law is unclear as to what the latter means. 
The absence of appropriate procedures gives grounds for unauthorized 
dismissals from office. 
 
There are institutional resources created after the Rose revolution that can 
be mobilized to solve these problems. Institutions were established to solve public 
service problems including local government deficiencies. The main goal of these 
institutions is to create a system of reformed public service structures, and 
improved education and qualifications of public officials. These institutions are: 
 
• The Public Service Council, established as an advisory board under the 
President and responsible for– 
∼ Formulation and implementation of general strategy and principles 
defining public service reforms; 
∼ Development of the local government structures and their 
coordination with central authorities; 
∼ Facilitation of the development of education programs that are 
designed to improve the human resources of the public service. 
• The Public Service Bureau, established as an advisory board under the 
President and responsible for– 
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∼ Drafting legal Acts to develop the public service and submission of 
the Acts to the Public Service Council; 
∼ Technical and expert assistance to the Public Service Council and its 
members; 
∼ Facilitating education and qualification improvement programs for 
public officials through coordination and support. 
• The State Commission on Effective Governance and Territorial 
Arrangement is the consulting body under the President. Its task is to 
determine recommendations for the President regarding personnel policy 
and improvements to the qualification system in local governance 
structures; and 
• The Zurab Zhvania School for Public Administration is established under 
the Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia. Its task is to develop 
special educational programs for public servants.  
 
C.8.3   Assessment of Coherence  
 
According to the respondents interviewed, the relationships between the local self-
government and central government, in most cases, does not correspond with the 
reform objectives for the administration system. The local self-government does 
not exhibit independence and transparency in decision making. The processes 
within the administrative offices at the regional level are governed by the local elite, 
and familial relationships are strong in such conditions.  
The structures of local government are not defined in the regions. 
Consequently, the functions of local government bodies are not well distributed. 
This results in centralized management and control being necessary to ensure that 
the institutions function effectively. The function of management and control in the 
regions is performed by the President’s representative, although this ‘oversight’ 
function is not stipulated by law. Thus management processes at the regional level 
extend beyond legislative frameworks and are justified by claims that they are a 
temporary event and represent the only way to avoid failure of administrative 
processes prior to reforming the system of local self-governance. At the same time, 
centralized management of the administrative structure at the regional level enables 
the central government and the ruling political elite to exercise effective control 
throughout the country. Correspondingly, the President’s representative in the 
region exercises personal political responsibility at the regional level.  
Legislative imperfections of local self-governance result in the President’s 
representative in the region being the person responsible for ongoing processes – 
the same can be applied to other appointed officials. The majority of decisions 
made by him/her may be unlawful as they may be made independently and be 
based on personal considerations. The latter does not necessarily imply that a 
violation of the law will occur as a result of private interests. In many cases, private 
interests play a part in decisions when the local government acts in accordance 
with directives received from the central government. Many of the relationships 
between the central and local governments are characterized by low levels of 
formal associations and are, in fact, a network of personal relationships. 
The degree of personal relationships between the central and local 
governments results in informal relationships existing within the administrative 
system in the regions. This is especially evident in the mechanisms used to recruit 
employees in local government. Human resource policies are mainly determined by 
the President’s representatives in the regions and, as a rule, the issues of staffing 
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are not solved without agreement from the President’s representatives. This 
approach to recruitment relates not only to appointments of Gamgebelis (heads of 
the local government), but also to recruitment of officers at the lower levels of the 
central government (for example, the head of the district division of the road 
department or the head of the tax inspection department, etc.).   
 
C.8.4   Assessment of Consequences 
 
Due to the informal relationship structures, the situation in the regions with regard 
to corruption is more severe than in the central government. Corruption in local 
government has decreased at the lower administration levels similar to the central 
government, but the intensity of elite corruption has increased. Three factors are 
considered to have decreased corruption within the lower administrative levels.  
 
• Public officers fearing punishment, which results in them avoiding 
involvement in corrupt activity;  
• Newly appointed employees who are inexperienced in corrupt dealings 
are cautious about jeopardizing their positions.  Such employees also lack 
experience of how the corruption networks function; and 
• Effective barriers also exist for newly appointed public officers that 
encourage them to avoid being involved in corrupt activities: loyalty to 
the government and the party is the main principle for new personnel 
appointments in public service (based on party membership), and the 
possibility of career development prospects, as a private motivating factor. 
 
Finally, the reduction of corruption at the lower administration levels does 
not have institutional grounds and there is a possibility that the success so far 
achieved may be temporary. This possibility is amplified by factors such as public 
attitudes towards corruption and the harsh socio-economic backgrounds in the 
regions.  The degree of tolerance towards corruption is much higher in the regional 
areas than in the capital of Georgia. Correspondingly, if strong personalized control 
is weakened, corruption will become more widely spread at the regional and local 
levels.  
 
C.8.4.1  Recommendations 
 
Recommendations identified through the study include: 
 
• There should be established minimum standards (qualification 
requirements) for office holders of local government bodies which specify 
the qualification requirements of the individual positions; 
• Special instructions for each position in the public service should be 
elaborated; 
• Rules and procedures for candidate selection should be clearly defined; 
• Rules relating to recruitment procedures must be defined and should be 
mandatory for all local government bodies to avoid misinterpretation of 
existing rules and procedures in favour of the personal interests of 
powerful individuals; and  
• Legislation must clearly define the meaning of office closure and 
reorganization and must also formulate appropriate procedures and rules. 
 
 D. Main Findings of the Study 
 
D.1  The Nature of the Interactions between Integrity Institutions  
 
This GNISA research clearly shows that the main nucleus of Georgia’s national 
integrity system is represented by the executive power of the government. The 
functions of the other branches of government are arranged so that, at best, they 
provide support for the reforms implemented by those in authority who are the 
recipients of government decisions, or at least, do not normally hinder these 
reforms. This situation supports arguments about the independence of the 
legislature and judiciary as well as their positions as independent and passive 
observers. However, this assertion may be disputed. Another argument is that, in 
the active reform process, the legislature is forming a foundation to facilitate the 
very process of reform. It could be said that the legislature has occupied a rightful 
niche in an accelerated process of modernization and that overall cooperation 
between the legislative and executive branches is productive, and the one-party 
system enabled a stable political background for exercise of executive power and 
rapid implementation of the reforms by Parliament. 
As for the non-government institutions such as the media and public sector 
organizations, it is difficult to determine precisely the immediate impact on the 
reform process. In some ways, these institutions do help in establishing an 
environment in which reforms are implemented, but they are less active in 
monitoring progress across the system. Donors and other international 
organizations, given their capacities and resources, are more influential than the 
non-government sector in developing public policy and providing technical 
assistance for implementation. However, it is difficult to judge international 
organizations’ contributions to improving integrity. Local civil society is in a better 
position to monitor the process of reform. Nevertheless, cooperation between 
international organizations and local NGOs strengthen the overall anticorruption 
environment. 
Many experts and public officials working within executive institutions 
indicate that decision making authority is concentrated in the political elite 
governing the country, and that the major directions of the anti-corruption policy 
are decided by the leaders of this group. Strong leadership somewhat damages the 
principle of decentralization, but at the same time, it minimizes the negative impact 
caused by the scarcity of human resources. Arriving at decisions by group decision 
making processes improves the degree of coordination among agencies. 
Respondents from the NGO sector do not agree and argue that there is a lack of 
systemic foundations upon which to base reforms. However, the resolution of 
recent crisis situations (for example, the restoration of constitutional order in 
Kodori Gorge and processes for establishing stability in the region) tend to indicate 
effective coordination between the upper echelons of the political elite and senior 
government officials. NGO respondents observed cases of overlapping functions, 
negligence and weak control systems at the medium and lower levels of 
government; although, these were seen by those surveyed as temporary problems 
that will be solved as reforms progress. 
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D.2  How Systematic is the System? 
 
The structural reforms directed at combating corruption have been assessed 
differently by those surveyed during the research from government organizations, 
and those from international, donor and non-government organizations.  
Anti-corruption strategies and their results were positively perceived by the 
public servants surveyed. Indicators show that the level of corruption has 
significantly decreased compared to the pre-revolutionary period. Their opinion is 
that success is related to the approach of the Georgian government towards these 
reforms. The public servants commented that the government of Georgia does not 
blindly follow the recommendations and requirements of the international 
organizations, but rather plans and implements reforms while considering local 
requirements. The state’s approach towards reforms is different from that which 
existed before the revolution. The process of reform implies the synthesis of two 
purposes: increasing the effective and efficient functioning of institutions and 
reducing corruption. The following steps have been taken in this direction: 
 
1. Refinement of the legislative basis and in many cases the rapid approval 
of a whole range of legal packages for creating the necessary legislative 
frameworks with the purpose of maintaining the current speed of reform. 
This approach encounters some difficulties, because it is hard to measure 
the effects of the changes in legislation as they occur very quickly;  
2. Adopting strong preventative action against corruption, the effect of 
which is not so much to identify and punish all corrupted public officers 
but to create an strong system of deterrence so that anyone employed in 
the state administrative system will not violate the law and become 
engaged in corrupt dealings; 
3. Mobilization of financial resources to provide social benefits and 
significantly higher salaries for public sector employees. On one hand, 
from a purely economic viewpoint, this action has decreased the necessity 
for high-ranking officials to seek illicit payments and, on the other hand, 
it has increased the personal motivation of public officials to fulfill their 
public duty obligations; and 
4. Based on the mobilization of financial and technical resources, the 
technical infrastructure has been re-established in many public institutions. 
For example, buildings were refurbished and a better working atmosphere 
created necessary for revitalizing the personal motivation of upper, 
medium and lower-level public officers and for improving work 
satisfaction. This action has led to increased employee self-awareness of 
their status and role, which improves motivation and good faith towards 
the organization. 
 
There are differing assessments of reform implementation and 
effectiveness by respondents representing international and non-governmental 
organizations, although their assessments point to an evident decrease in corruption. 
Moreover, they argue that, with regard to increasing effectiveness and the building 
of an anti-corruption environment, there are some actions in which the government 
can be proud of the success it has achieved (for example, the reforms within the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Education, Prosecutor’s Office, National 
Bank, Financial Police of the Ministry of Finances, and the Ministry of Energy). 
However, many respondents consider that the reforms and fight against corruption 
is often unsystematic and fragmented, and in many cases resembles a ‘Fire 
Brigade’ approach. Their opinion is that the government of Georgia has not created 
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a unified reform strategy. A comparison of the successful structures from the 
viewpoint of reforms (for example, the ministries and agencies listed above) with 
those fields still ‘untouched’ (such as agriculture, social welfare, healthcare, 
customs and taxation systems) is evidence of the lack of a unified reform strategy. 
Success was only achieved where strong leaders with relevant managerial 
qualifications, experience and motivation existed. This approach also indicates that 
the government has trusted leaders to operationalize reform and anti-corruption 
activities individually within agencies. Some of the respondents in the donor and 
international agency community state that the problem is not the unsystematic 
nature of reforms, but their incoherence and the lack of a unified action plan.  
Respondents denote that the lack of transparency in the processes is the 
logical continuation and accompanying event of all of the issues discussed. The 
attitude within society is considered the main reason for this, as well as the fact that 
the government is rather inaccessible. Not only society at large, but also non-
government organizations are not active enough; consequently, adequate 
monitoring of the processes and operations of government bodies is hindered by a 
lack of skills and weakness of ‘watch-dog’ organizations, rather than dissuasion by 
the government. However, this lack of transparency is also accompanied by some 
apprehensions within the government towards some civil society organizations 
because of their affiliation with some political parties and their close political 
involvement. 
Despite various viewpoints expressed about the success and effectiveness 
of the reforms, the almost unanimous assessment of the representatives of 
government and non-government institutions shows that the main stimulation for 
the implementation of reform and the improvement of the anti-corruption 
environment was the anti-corruption disposition of the post-revolutionary political 
elite, and their desire for integration into Western, and especially, in the first place, 
into Euro-Atlantic organizations. The advances steps made in this direction 
necessarily imply the consent of the government of Georgia to undertake the 
recommendations and requirements of these international and regional 
organizations. Reform of government institutions through increasing their 
effectiveness, reducing corruption and, consequently, developing and strengthening 
the integrity system, will be the necessary pathway for Georgia to join the Western 
political community.  
 
D.3  Balance between Prosecution and Prevention 
 
The appropriate balance between these two components in ensuring integrity in the 
public sector is well illustrated in the government’s anti-corruption policies and the 
reforms underway in the country. In the opinion of most of the respondents, these 
two components are intimately connected with one another. Government officials 
generally defended the strategic course of the ongoing reforms, which also includes 
anti-corruption policies. On the other hand, the respondents, while noting some 
positive developments, point to deficiencies in this process and were, on the whole, 
critical of the government’s actions.  
Nevertheless, according to the study, the institutional-structural reforms 
under way, in all areas of the country, are progressing successfully. A reduction in 
the amount of corruption is a natural consequence of these reforms. One of the 
keys to success has been that the Georgian authorities have taken a new approach 
towards reforms. There are several key aspects of this new approach, including the 
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fact that the government did not ‘blindly imitate international experience’ (as noted 
above) and set out to implement reforms in various systems and agencies which fit 
the present needs within Georgia.  
The fight against corruption has a long history; there was even an attempt 
under the Shevardnadze administration, when an anti-corruption group 
‘Shvidkatsa’ (‘Seven-man team’) was created. However, all attempts made at that 
time were outdated and failed to yield results: there was no coordinated fight 
against corruption because corruption was not viewed in the context of systemic 
reforms. In this sense, one of the aspects of the approach was that the state 
regulated many areas that did not require government oversight. Part of the new 
approach is deregulation. The premise is that the removal of excessive regulations 
will reduce possibilities for corruption. This approach has been the case so far in 
several areas. For example, the procedures of licensing entrepreneurial activities 
have been simplified; a requirement for technical inspection of transport has been 
removed, etc. 
The anti-corruption strategy within the framework of the new approach 
involves four occurrences to overcome corruption. These are:  
 
1. An effective legislative base, by which the state does not regulate areas 
that do not need to be regulated;  
2. An efficient enforcement and punitive apparatus reacting quickly and 
firmly in every case of legal violation; 
3. Steps to increase the motivation of public sector employees, for example, 
paying higher salaries more appropriate to their specific roles and 
responsibilities;  
4. Focus on psychological factors by encouraging public sector employees 
to understand that they are undertaking an important public duty for their 
country; 
5. Simplification of administrative procedures in order to minimize 
bureaucracy and promote efficiency of public service delivery by 
government agencies; and 
6. Deregulation – reducing government’s involvement in different sectors in 
order to minimize opportunities for public officials to engage in corrupt 
activities. 
 
It was taking into account these factors, such as raising salaries for public 
sector employees and instilling in them a ‘sense of mission’, that laid the 
groundwork for the reduction in corruption. This is precisely the reason that 
corruption has reduced among the higher-ranking officials. In addition, factors such 
as improved uniforms (in the case of the police), appropriately equipped and 
refurbished work rooms and better computer access are important and significant in 
terms of reducing corruption at the lower levels of the bureaucracy. In such 
conditions, a person feels that he or she is a ‘dignified person with a certain 
responsibility’, as one respondent stated. Another important element is the trust 
factor. A government must trust its employees; for when the system declares trust 
in its employees, they are far more likely to identify themselves as a part of the 
system and behave with a greater degree of integrity as a result of that recognition.  
Despite the fact that both officials and analysts acknowledge that the 
process of establishing an anti-corruption policy has a long history, neither 
category of respondents possessed complete information about anti-corruption 
institutions or their preventative and enforcement approaches. Assessments of how 
these institutions function vary not only between the representatives of government 
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and non-government institutions, but within these groups as well. In other words, 
respondents hold varying attitudes and possess varying amounts of information 
about this issue. It is very important to underline the range of institutions 
responsible for the implementation of anti-corruption policies in order to 
understand what means are available to these institutions (prevention/prosecution) 
and which are used more frequently and effectively for the achievement of their 
goals.  
Key institutions responsible for the implementation of anticorruption 
policies through preventive means are: 
 
• The Audit Chamber  This agency is charged with the role of 
ensuring that all necessary conditions are created so that corruption is 
minimized. The Chamber’s main task is to protect public sector property; 
study the legality of budgetary funds spent; and, prevents corruption. 
During 2005–2006, the Audit Chamber exposed some 2,000 corrupt deals. 
The Audit Chamber is the highest government oversight body and it 
coordinates all state agencies in the financial-economic sector: the 
Prosecutor’s Office, the Interior Ministry, the Financial Police, the Tax 
and Customs Departments, the Financial Monitoring Service and other 
oversight bodies. The Chamber regulates how and when oversight bodies 
can enter state agencies.  
• The Office of the State Minister for Coordinating Reforms is responsible 
for coordinating the operations of institutions which have an anti-
corruption policy implementation role and ensuring that their activities 
correspond to the overall aims of the reforms, particularly the country’s 
anticorruption strategy. It is, therefore, not considered necessary to create 
a separate agency to implement an anti-corruption policy, because a 
reduction in corruption is a natural consequence of the reform process. It 
is logical then, that efforts to reduce corruption be coordinated by the 
same agency that plans and coordinates reforms.  
 
The key institutions responsible for the implementation of anticorruption 
policies through prosecution are: 
 
• The Ministry of Interior Department of Constitutional Security and Order; 
• The Ministry of Interior Special Operative Department; 
• The Ministry of Finance Financial Police; and 
• Prosecutor General’s Office. 
 
These institutions conduct investigative and enforcement activities against 
crime in the economic sector and abuses of the law relating to expenditure of 
public funds. Their role is much greater than those mentioned earlier. Consequently, 
prosecution is seen as a much more important component in policies supporting 
integrity, rather than prevention. While this imbalance has some positive effects on 
the outcomes of anti-corruption policies (because the fear of being punished 
diminishes the likelihood of public officials being involved in corrupt dealings), it 
also may create some impediments for the overall integrity system. For instance, 
there are problems with lack of initiative and acceptance of responsibility among 
mid and lower levels public sector employees.  
This fear of being punished (when a public official’s initiative might be 
interpreted as abuses of law or authority) can make them passive and overly 
dependent on the directions of higher ranking officials. So, the strengthening of 
repressive measures only, can have the effect of paralyzing the operations of the 
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bureaucracy. Another possible negative outcome of the strengthening of repressive 
mechanisms is a situation in which public sector employees in Georgia work 
according to strict rules of subordination. The supervisor takes the decision and the 
lower level employee merely executes it — even when his position authorizes him 
to take his own decision on the issue. In this situation, there is a danger that higher-
ranking employees may use their posts to issue illegal directives to promote their 
own interests. Some analysts consider this tendency itself a form of corruption, 
while others think it is, at least, a lack of integrity or behaviour which is 
questionable in legal terms. 
There are only weak mechanisms in place to avoid such risks and to 
monitor how institutions and agencies undertake their functions and whether or not 
public sector employees carry out their duties in a proper fashion. For instance, the 
Public Defender’s Office is able to provide some oversight over public sector 
employees and that is an additional means for the state to ensure integrity. This 
oversight would not normally be a reaction to concrete violations; rather, it would 
serve to identify legislative problems and to determine which laws or procedures 
need to be changed.  
Both government officials and experts pointed out that it is very important 
to create a solid legislative base that will create proper balance between prevention 
and prosecution in order to reduce the possibility of corruption. However, no less 
important is ensuring that public sector employees understand the essence of the 
reformed laws. This understanding is important because the law is executed 
primarily at their level. Education and retraining programmes are also a mechanism 
for strengthening the balance between prevention and prosecution. If, currently, 
government employees lack qualifications and are not well-versed in the operations 
of an efficient and effective bureaucratic culture then, they are not fully aware of 
their rights and responsibilities. Consequently, it is considered that the only way to 
ensure that these employees follow the rules is through repression. Education will 
hopefully reverse this unsatisfactory situation. Reforms in education systems and 
universities, in particular, as well as the establishment of the High School of Justice 
will be designed to serve these primary goals. 
 E.  Significant Issues Reported by 
 Respondents 
 
Respondents from government, international and non-government organizations all 
mentioned the outcomes of the institutional-structural reforms being implemented 
in Georgia after the Rose Revolution. They also provided qualitative assessments 
of their successes and failures to date. 
The government is trying to create a corruption-free zone and to some 
extent it has achieved this in some sectors. Many respondents said that the degree 
of corruption has significantly decreased, but that this has mainly been at the lower 
levels and has been achieved through building fear of punishment. However, it was 
also felt that there is a whole range of institutions where poor management of 
corruption problems is still present. 
Some respondents think that corruption has not been reduced, but rather 
has become more hidden. Their opinion is that corruption has been considerably 
reduced at the operational levels, but the phenomenon of spending money without 
proper authority, or purpose, or wastefully in large amounts, is still a significant 
issue, which is directly related to the decision making elite. Corruption has shifted 
into the inappropriate use of public money though improper financial actions. This 
shift means that the higher-ranked echelons of the administration system, who are 
in charge of handling the expenditures of budgetary funds, are widely seen as still 
involved in corruption. Public sector respondents supported this opinion to some 
extent, expressing the view that this problem can be solved through the 
introduction of proper budgeting and fully accountable financial measures, based 
on the true values of goods and services provided. However, even when the 
funding of a particular agency can be planned according to pre-planned and 
properly scheduled activities, it is still possible for a public sector employee, acting 
in bad faith, to insert lines in the budget for activities that are not in any plans and 
which are unnecessary. Concomitant with this, there can be cases when budgetary 
funds have been spent for satisfying the private interests of particular public 
officials.  
The research identified the following issues as factors which are hindering 
the strengthening of Georgia’s national integrity system: 
 
a. Public attitude, where the forms of nepotism and too close patron-client 
relationships are still at work and widely adopted. This background does 
not lend itself to a transparent system; 
b. Weaknesses in human resources reflected by the low qualifications and 
lack of professionalism of most people employed in the public sector. 
This deficiency is revealed especially through the lack of managerial and 
organizational skills necessary to bring about proper implementation of 
the reform process;  
c. An imperfect legislative base that is being established faster than 
institutions can adapt to it, such that violations of the rule of law may take 
place not because the officer concerned intended it to occur, but because 
of the general ineffectiveness of the law or their having no real awareness 
of it; 
d. Lagging behind the international standards in financial accounting. None 
of the agencies interviewed seem to work according to sound 
international standards of financial accounting, even though, theoretically, 
Georgia has already adopted such standards. The requirements stipulated 
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by these standards cannot be performed because the programmes for 
developing and training people who are supposed to perform these 
functions have not yet been introduced, and the public sector itself does 
not have the human resources needed for this purpose; 
e. Lack of unified wage standards, which is reflected by a great 
discrepancies among agencies, or even within an agency, where senior 
staff salaries may be disproportionately high compared to lower level 
salaries. This discrepancy adversely affects the personal motivation of the 
employees in a system that is perceived to be unfair; and  
f. A feeling of concern among public sector employees about the stability 
and security of their jobs. Currently, public sector employees do not have 
any real guarantees that would provide them with a feeling of confidence 
in the stability of their workplace. This uncertainty reinforces conditions 
for corruption. 
 
Apart from the factors mentioned already, some other worrying tendencies 
have been identified during the recent processes of developing the public sector, 
which have the potential to reduce the effective functioning of the national integrity 
system. Group decision making principles mentioned earlier, despite their positive 
effects, also can bring about certain threats. However, it would seem that with a 
strictly disciplined leaders group, high-ranking officials, including ministers and 
their deputies, get a rare chance of making decisions independently. It should be 
noted that the degree of independence during decision making depends on the 
nature and significance of an issue. Obviously, there is a whole set of issues of 
lower importance that high-ranking officials can make decisions on independently. 
It is clear that the existence of a strong, vertical decision making hierarchy provides 
some restrictions for public sector employees in the process of decision making 
even when within their area of expertise. This situation adversely restricts decision 
making independent of a higher authority. Such situations are not caused so much 
by any fixed government policy but rather by the lack of a proper decision making 
structure and culture within the public sector. In many cases, even high-ranking 
public officials want to avoid administrative responsibilities during the reform 
implementation process by delegating decisions upwards to the political team that 
has been the initiator of the reforms.  
A small group of the political elite determines the recruitment mechanisms 
across the public administration system, including lower level recruitment. This 
action causes significant problems for integrity. Applicants affiliated with the 
ruling political party can be seen as being from a loyal background, and are 
sometimes recruited on the basis of nepotism or protectionism for public offices. 
For this reason, it appears that public officers are often selected based upon which 
party they support, with selection of candidates based on discriminatory and 
sometimes corrupt decisions. This issue is especially problematic in the regions, 
where ‘belonging’ to a party is one of the guarantees of finding a job at the local 
level and in many cases the links within a party and between relatives are identical. 
This means that, in the regions, if there is an influential person in the political party 
then, s/he is also surrounded by relatives or close acquaintances willing to gain 
some benefits from supporting their candidacy for a position. This approach is 
usually justified on the basis of a scarcity of human resources and that personal 
trust is one of the priority factors for the decision-makers in selecting candidates to 
be employed in the public service. 
The problems and issues given emphasis in the study by the respondents 
were: 
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1. Significant issues outlined by representatives of the executive 
branch of the government: 
 
a. The government operates in a rigid ‘missionary’ mode and does not apply 
the principle of multi-actor politics. The degree of civil society’s 
involvement in policy formulation is quite low. Likewise, the analytical 
capacity of NGOs and civil-sector watchdog organizations is not used 
sufficiently by government to monitor the efficiency of implemented 
policies;  
b. The government is currently operating as ‘one system, one whole’. In 
other words, it seems that cooperation between government institutions 
has started to function, moving towards a ‘whole-of-government’ mode. 
However, institutions with analytical and regulatory functions, in which 
most of the qualified and skilled people are concentrated, operate at a 
policy-making level only and are not authorized to draft actual action 
plans and monitor their implementation. These institutions are not 
allowed to implement control measures or engage in research;  
c. There is no long-term strategic vision for the development of a structured 
and systematic institutional environment. Therefore, the roles of 
individual institutions have not been placed in the context of the entire 
integrity system;  
d. Reforms underway in the country’s education system have not yet clearly 
defined how to deal with the need to retrain current civil servants or to 
train new qualified personnel for the public sector; 
e. The technical infrastructure needed to support the performance and roles 
of the various integrity institutions is not adequate in most of the 
institutions studied. Even where agencies are computerized and provided 
with modern equipment, the absence of shared electronic databases that 
would provide quick information exchange creates impediments for 
efficient operations; and  
f. There is a lack of exchange of expertise between institutions and a 
shortage of internal research and analysis resources. 
 
2. Significant issues outlined by representatives of the legislative 
branch of the government: 
 
a. There is an absence of databases allowing information sharing and use of 
information technology to monitor and control the operations of 
government agencies for the execution of parliamentary decisions; 
b. There are no satisfactory mechanisms for mutual control between 
parliamentary and executive institutions of either state or municipal 
budget expenditures; 
c. There is a need to create an entity such as a parliamentary ‘shadow 
cabinet’ to scrutinize decisions taken by ministers and their staff; 
d. The activities of NGOs and their involvement in supporting the 
operations of parliamentary institutions remains weak; 
e. The activities of Parliament to gain public support is weak and 
ineffective; 
f. Drawn from above, another issue is the involvement of ethnic minorities 
in public life. A nationally endorsed ‘state language’ would engender a 
proper knowledge of Georgian among Armenian and Azerbaijan ethnic 
groups living in the Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli regions of 
Georgia and promote involvement in public life . The lack of involvement 
of these groups creates a fertile environment for corruption at the local 
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administrative level where public oversight is weak. Policy 
implementation agencies are able to abuse the authority delegated by the 
central government. Parliament has the responsibility for solving this 
problem and is meant to oversight the design and implementation of 
education programmes, as well as provide political support for the 
protection of the rights of minorities through legitimate policies; and 
g. The Parliamentary institutions’ ties with local government units are very 
weak. 
 
3. Significant issues outlined by representatives of the judicial 
system: 
 
a. There is a strong anti-corruption commitment in the present government, 
which is a step forward in the state-building process and strengthening of 
the integrity system; 
b. Policies that would motivate officials to commit to anti-corruption 
practices and increase personal integrity (the existence of a proper 
working environment, transparent vertical mobility and promotion 
mechanisms, a fair bonus system etc.) are not systemic and do not involve 
all employees working in judicial institutions, rather these policies affect 
only high-ranked officials;  
c. There is a strong awareness that the overall effect of integrity institutions 
is dependent upon mutually supportive activities;  
d. Opportunities for corrupt behaviour occur not only as a result of 
institutional weakness, but also through low levels of public awareness; 
and  
e. The government is wary of private arbitration and has attempted to 
weaken the Arbitration Chambers because businesses can influence the 
Chambers and resolve disputes with the government in their favour.  
 
4. Significant issues outlined by representatives of the government 
institutions that have special functions and responsibilities: 
 
a. There is a lack of any long-term vision or strategy as to what an integrity 
system for Georgia should look like;  
b. There is lack of transparency and citizen involvement in decision-making 
processes, an alienation of political parties and NGOs and a low level of 
trust in public institutions; 
c. There is a lack of skilled human resources, especially evident from the 
low level of professionalism of public sector employees; and  
d. There is an inappropriate balance between preventive and punitive 
measures to combat corruption resulting in an environment susceptible to 
corruption. 
 
5. Significant issues outlined by representatives of local government: 
 
a. The corruption problem is significant in institutions that obtain substantial 
funding from the state budget; 
b. Patterns and scope of corruption have been changing and corruption is 
now more narrowly based and centralized. Corruption now exists 
primarily in a very thin layer among the top echelons of high ranked 
public officials and decision makers; 
c. The political elite are willing to combat corruption and this factor is very 
important for the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies. However, 
government policies and their impact on corruption are very dependent on 
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scarce intellectual and human resources engaged in the decision making 
and implementation processes. These resources are insufficient to support 
more effective anti-corruption campaigns;  
d. Corruption is encouraged by the low level of civic awareness and 
inadequate salaries paid to public sector employees; and  
e. The main requirements for strengthening anti-corruption strategies are 
more decentralization of the budget expenditure processes, ongoing 
reforms in local government, programmes for efficient management 
development and improving the qualifications of people working in the 
public institutions, and a clearer specification of the roles of controlling 
institutions. 
 
6. Significant issues outlined by representatives of International and 
Donor organizations: 
 
a. Corruption has definitely reduced over the past two years. It has been 
significantly reduced in the electoral and education systems. The 
education sector is still corrupt, but it is improving. A significant amount 
of work remains to be done to reduce corruption in the judiciary and to 
address the current problem of smuggling; 
b. Currently, the government mostly uses fear to fight against corruption. In 
the areas where there is less corruption, it is the case because people are 
afraid of prosecution. Such negative reinforcement is understandable 
when this government is still new; negative reinforcement only works in 
the short-term, but positive reinforcement is crucial for long-term results. 
Both preventative and punitive measures are necessary to effectively fight 
corruption. Punitive measures are important for quick impact, but 
preventive efforts are absolutely necessary to yield more sustainable 
results; 
c. While the public mindset is one of the biggest impediments to reducing 
corruption in Georgia, the poor economy is an even greater problem; 
d. The authorities are attempting too much reform too quickly, but have 
neither the capacity nor the experience to handle major reform issues 
properly. The government lacks policy development and implementation 
skills. As a consequence, there are very few sectors (if any) that have 
clearly defined reform policies and are following them; 
e. Business does not play an active role in anti-corruption and integrity 
building and are silent and inactive. Similarly, NGOs are not involved 
actively either. There is little understanding that concerted actions are 
needed; and  
f. The government has become more aware of human rights issues since it 
received criticism about its punitive anti-corruption policies, and has 
moderated its previous harsh methods. (This change is also partly 
influenced by the actions of the Ombudsman’s Office and the Committee 
of Human Rights in the Parliament.) 
 
7. Significant issues outlined by representatives of the NGOs: 
 
a. There are people who, by reputation, are corrupt and who still hold top 
positions in Georgia. Georgian society is disappointed that such people 
are not in jail but hold positions in Parliament or are employed in 
government; 
b. The solution to the corruption problem could be a combination of punitive 
and preventive policies. Punishment is really necessary in some cases, but 
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sometimes even punishment would not be effective in eliminating 
corruption; 
c. The overall success of anti-corruption policies can best be achieved by 
increasing the importance of support and coordination between all social 
and political stake-holders: government, NGOs, media, church, etc.; 
d. Corruption is greatly encouraged by the absence of strict procedures and 
functional separation, as well as weaknesses in external and internal 
controls; 
e. There is less corruption in the lower levels of the public sector due to the 
punitive actions that have been taken. However, at the higher levels, new 
clans have replaced the old ones and nepotism is as common as it was 
previously; 
f. The main weakness of the post revolutionary government’s institutional 
reforms strategy is the absence of a social and economic development 
program; 
g. One advantage to the anti-corruption objectives is the governing elite’s 
strong political willingness to fight against corruption and the public 
support to fight against corruption; and 
h. The factors that encourage corruption are frequent violations of the rule of 
law principles (the personification of authority), the nepotistic mentality 
in society, and social and economic problems. 
 
8. Significant issues outlined by representatives of the media: 
 
a. Corruption has been reduced significantly in the public sector due to 
recent prosecutions of corrupt public sector employees as well as 
increased public sector salaries;  
b. The government is using both preventive and punitive measures to 
strengthen the integrity system and to combat corruption, but appears to 
be relying more on the latter. Both of these mechanisms are very 
important, but if the government really wants to reduce corruption and 
maintain a corruption-free environment, then more preventive measures 
are necessary; and 
c. The main impediments to reducing corruption in Georgia are the lack of 
transparency of public sector institutions, favoritism towards the ‘heroes 
of the revolution’, the frame of mind of the populous and a habit of 
corruption, economic problems, and a lack of knowledge of specific 
measures to fight corruption effectively. 
 
 F.   Recommendations 
 
Recommendations listed below are based on conclusions and main findings 
retrieved through the study of Georgia’s National Integrity System institutions. 
They are grouped in accordance with the institutional sets targeted during the 
research. The recommendations are aimed at setting out clearly possibilities how 
the Georgian National Integrity System and its institutions can be functionally 
improved. The recommendations reflect conclusions applicable to the integrity 
needs in Georgia and show priorities and principles for the development of an 
efficient institutional environment, achievement of which would be desirable for 
increasing integrity and the country’s anti-corruption capacities. 
 
F.1.  Recommendations from the respondents of parliamentary 
 institutions  
 
a. Improvements are required in information technologies and the creation 
of shared electronic databases that would allow speedy information 
exchange between institutions; 
b. Greater attention is needed to learning from successful anticorruption 
experience in foreign countries with the aim of introducing ‘best practice’ 
into the operations of Georgia’s Parliament. This would include: 
i. involving international organizations and local NGOs who have 
expertise in drafting laws that represent ‘world best practice’ to 
strengthen Georgia’s anti-corruption legislation and strategies; and 
ii. receiving assistance to improve the mechanisms of parliamentary 
oversight. 
c. Improvements are needed in the provision of resources — a priority is to 
acquire sufficient numbers of professional personnel to support 
Parliament; 
d. The cooperation with international organizations needs to be extended 
(especially those organizations which focus on human rights protection) 
to assist the development of ethical practices in law-enforcement agencies, 
thus reducing the likelihood of adverse side effects emanating from 
coercive anti-corruption policies and practices; 
e. The parliamentary public relations strategic planning processes and 
implementation mechanisms should be improved; 
f. There is a need to create a parliamentary ‘shadow cabinet’ to scrutinize 
decisions made by the executive; 
g. Parliament’s ties with local governments should be strengthened; 
h. Parliamentary support of local NGO efforts to participate in local level 
policy implementation processes would prove mutually beneficial. NGOs 
could carry out watch-dog roles and provide Parliament with much-
needed feedback and other information, thus minimizing the deficiencies 
caused by the shortage of qualified analyst personnel; 
i. The use of investigative-coercive methods may be an effective way to 
combat corruption as a short-term solution; and 
j. In the long-term, public education and the preventative anti-corruption 
strategies are very important tools for combating corruption.  
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F.2.  Recommendations from the respondents of executive 
 institutions 
 
a. The provision of human, financial, material and technical resources to the 
state agencies need to be improved. In particular, there is a need to 
provide personnel training to develop the professional skills of public 
sector employees as well as knowledge of ethical codes; 
b. The policies, standards and procedures for institutional functions need to 
be clearly defined and communicated. For example, a proper mechanism 
of checks and balances should be developed to avoid overlaps or 
interference with the responsibilities of an institution by other institutions; 
c. The oversight of the performance of law-enforcement agencies needs to 
be improved to ensure that their activities are conducted in accordance 
with laws protecting human and civil rights; 
d. Mechanisms should be developed to receive public feedback on the 
operation of public sector institutions in order to create tools to measure 
the adequacy of action plans and the performance of these institutions 
against public expectations; 
e. The roles of international organizations and local NGOs in sharing 
international experiences and the provision of information and analysis 
need to be increased. The government should show more openness 
towards initiatives by civil society and international organizations. These 
organizations could be involved in policy formulation, participate in 
monitoring policies and reform activities, and provide feedback to 
Government in the form of analysis and recommendations; 
f. Just and transparent vertical mobility policies and processes for public 
sector employees should be established based on merit (i.e. qualifications, 
professional skills, performance and personal integrity and against 
uniform, open and job-specific selection criteria); 
g. The role of each institution needs to be defined as part of the entire 
integrity system and the strengths and weaknesses of individual 
institutions need to be analysed to create a viable institutional 
environment with reduced tendency towards corruption; and 
h. Communication between the agencies can be improved through creating a 
shared electronic database, which would provide quick information 
exchange between the agencies. This technology will also allow for the 
exchange of expertise between individual agencies and the promotion of 
‘best practice’.  
 
F.3. Recommendations from the respondents of the judiciary 
and court related institutions 
 
a. More prominence needs to be given to preventive mechanisms that 
support anti-corruption policies, to develop a system of mutual controls to 
improve the institutional environment — at the same time, it is obvious 
that strong punitive policies are required to support preventative policies; 
b. Steps must be taken to ensure that the reformed education system will 
prepare qualified specialists in particular fields, and become a conduit of 
civic values to cultivate high personal integrity and civic awareness in 
potential public officials; 
c. Use should be made of best practices and experiences of ‘Western’ 
democracies as these apply to the Georgian context;  
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d. Special training programmes need to be designed for judges and court 
personnel, as well as the provision of relevant professional and academic 
literature;  
e. Legislative mechanisms should be developed to allow public interest 
groups to influence policy formation and implementation, and participate 
in monitoring all levels of the government and public sector system, 
including the Judiciary; and 
f. Tighter cooperation is needed between the judiciary and court-related 
institutions on the one hand, and NGOs and the media on the other, to 
publicize through an accurately defined public relations strategies, the 
reforms being carried out by the judiciary and court-related institutions 
involving personnel training, the development of professional skills and 
improvements to institutional functions. This approach will raise general 
public awareness, promote civic values and obedience to the law, and 
improve the reputation of the judiciary within society. 
 
F.4.  Recommendations from the respondents of ‘Special 
 Institutions’ charged with very specific responsibilities 
 
a. Increase the powers of these special institutions (especially the 
Ombudsman’s Office, the Chamber of Control, and the Central Election 
Commission) from simply oversight functions to the ability to monitor the 
implementation of their recommendations by the government; 
b. Improve the legislative basis for the operations of these institutions by the 
following actions:  
i. Simplify election procedures to avoid future manipulation.   
ii. Establish and implement internal control standards; 
iii. Design a procedural framework to regulate interaction with 
external institutions and avoid overlaps and interference; 
iv. Optimize intra-structural cooperation, as well as inter-institutional 
relations with the Parliament, State Chancellery, and other state 
institutions (e.g. the problem of voter lists can be solved through 
establishing tight cooperation between the Commission and the 
Justice Ministry’s Civil Registry Bureau). 
c. Carry out policies aimed at developing the resources of these institutions, 
especially human resources, through an increase in funding to:  
i. involve international organizations and NGOs in developing 
training programmes;  
ii. develop the IT infrastructure and raise the professionalism of IT 
personnel; and 
iii. increase the role of universities through the introduction of new 
educational programmes and projects. 
d. Develop long-term strategies for improving the integrity system, part of 
which should be an in-depth analysis of particular institutional roles to 
show the strengths and weaknesses of the various institutions, define their 
goals, and place these institutions correctly within the overall integrity 
system; 
e. Capitalize on the capacity of civil society to plan appropriate public 
relations policies for public institutions, which will allow for the 
establishment of the channels of social influence — political parties also 
should be allowed to monitor the public sector through improvements to 
transparency and the provision of information on the policy formulation 
process.); and 
f. Introduce preventive mechanisms for combating corruption since, 
although punitive policies are important at this stage of state-building, 
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preventive mechanisms must be introduced to prevent anti-corruption 
policies from transforming into repressive tools.  
 
F.5.   Recommendations from the respondents of NGOs 
 
a. Common approaches need to be adopted towards reforming the state 
governance system, based on cooperation between government and the 
non-government sector; 
b. Enhancements are needed in the internal and external (public/civil) 
control mechanisms over the public sector to ensure that these accord 
with the goals of institutional effectiveness; 
c. A proper distribution of roles and functions within agencies is necessary, 
which should improve institutional functioning and the achievement of 
uniform procedures and operations; 
d. The roles of civil society watch-dog organizations in monitoring 
processes needs to be enhanced; and  
e. The level of trust between the government and civil society organizations 
needs to be strengthened to create opportunities for greater cooperation. 
 
F.6.  Recommendations from the respondents of international 
 and donor organizations 
 
a. To strengthen the national integrity system in Georgia and to ensure the 
success of the anti-corruption policies, it is necessary to adopt a 
comprehensive strategy. This strategy involves the reform of the state 
governance system to increase institutional effectiveness of the system 
and addresses corruption prevention;  
b. The rule of law principle must be observed through reforming the 
judiciary system and strengthening judicial independence; 
c. A mechanism must be implemented for the proper distribution of 
material-technical and financial resourcing that will ensure that financial 
resources are distributed to public sector institutions according to their 
actual needs. Increases in salaries should not be limited to high ranking 
officials, but extended to officials working at the middle and lower levels 
of the public sector, who also need guarantees of tenure; 
d. As part of this comprehensive approach, respondents highlighted the 
necessity of changing the publics attitude — with the state educational 
system, the media and the non-government sector playing an essential 
role in that process; 
e. A deeper cooperation with the non-government sector is also necessary to 
ensure the creation and refinement of external control mechanisms for the 
public service; and 
f. Improvements are required in the qualifications of public sector 
employees through the introduction of professional training and retraining 
programmes with cooperation from international and donor organizations 
and the media. 
 
F. 7.  Recommendations from the respondents of media 
 organizations 
 
a. There needs to be a proper separation of the editorial policy of media 
outlets from the economic and political interests of business groups 
through the adoption of a commonly agreed and understood code of ethics 
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to ensure the independence of journalists and to avoid influence by media 
owners; 
b. An effective mechanism of public control needs to be established for the 
functioning of state governance system through close cooperation 
between the non-government sector and the media to increase the 
transparency of policymaking and its implementation; 
c. Stronger horizontal ties among media professionals are needed as is the 
development of their professional organizations; 
d. A need for an expansion of educational and practical programmes in 
electronic information gathering and dissemination; 
e. Enhanced educational and practical training programmes are needed for 
media managers to enhance their business, management, and technical 
skills; 
f. Increased professional contacts, personnel exchange programmes, and 
collaboration between domestic and foreign media companies and 
institutions are all necessary to improve effectiveness; and 
g. Greater cooperation between the media and the Church is required to 
strengthen civic values in the public’s mind. 
 
F.8.  Recommendations from the respondents of local 
 government institutions 
 
a. Minimum standards should be established (e.g. qualification 
requirements) for office holders in local government bodies, adequate for 
them to meet the specific demands of their particular roles); 
b. Special instructions should be developed, such as job specifications and 
selection and performance criteria, for each position in the entire public 
service with clear rules and selection processes involving competitive 
merit-based arrangements for the filling of all government positions — 
this approach will avoid misinterpretation of rules and procedures which 
support the personal interests of particular powerful individuals; and 
c. Legislation must clearly define the permissible situations for office 
closures and reorganizations, and formulate proper procedures and rules 
for these activities. 
 
F.9.  Process for handling recommendations 
 
This is a formidable list of recommendations. Thankfully, the recommendations are 
generally consistent rather than conflicting.  There are a number of possible 
responses to such a long list: 
 
a. The list is too long – where to start. 
b. We need to prioritize it. 
c. We need to create a reform supremo who can put the whole thing in order.  
 
The nature of integrity systems suggests other alternatives.  National Integrity 
Systems work because several institutions operate to deter and detect corruption 
and raise integrity.  Institutions can independently improve their internal operations 
and can work with other organizations whose cooperation and common action can 
achieve the above goals.   
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F. 9.1 Action by each organization that is a part of the integrity 
system 
 
Accordingly, a report such as this should be read by all organizations involved in 
the Georgian integrity system and each should: 
 
• Consider their individual response in terms of the content of the report 
and the action they will take to respond 
• List those organizations with whom they need cooperate and coordinate 
and publish this list 
• Designate officials to discuss improved cooperation and coordination and 
publish  
• Monitor the changes they put in place unilaterally and in concert with 
organizations with which they cooperate and publish these results.    
 
International and donor organizations can consider which recommendations that 
they are in a position to further through financial and or technical assistance. 
The national government can provide moral support for the process as a 
whole as well as addressing issues identified in the report. 
 
F. 9.2  Governance Reform Commission 
 
However, there is also a need for a body that can provide system-wide oversight, 
continue and update mapping of the integrity system, and assist institutions to 
cooperate with each other to raise integrity.  In particular, this body can provide the 
system wide overview required by recommendations F.1 b, F.2 b, F.2 g; F.3 a, F.4 
d above.  Ideally, it should take the form of a Governance Reform Commission 
modelled on the extraordinarily successful Electoral and Administrative Review 
Commission (EARC) established in Queensland in 1989 that provided the research, 
public consultation and the recommendations for the reform of various integrity 
institutions and integrity mechanisms that were presented to the Queensland 
Parliament.  Such a body would need to be seen to be above partisan politics and 
be designed so as to make manipulation of its recommendations extremely difficult.  
There are a number of ways to achieve this end. A useful model, however, is one 
where the government and the leading opposition party each nominate a 
commissioner with credibility as a supporter of integrity. (It would be politically 
dangerous to do otherwise.) These two commissioners choose an independent 
chairperson. Decisions would then be taken by a majority.  As in the Queensland 
model, the Commission would have an agenda – either that one set out above, or 
one modified by the Commission after public input.   
The Governance Reform Commission (GRC) would be served by a 
secretariat that would follow a process similar to that which EARC pursued in 
Queensland.  For each agenda issue finalized by the commission, the secretariat 
researched the issue and the means used in other jurisdictions to deal with it.  This 
course of action led to an issues paper, a free two day public conference, public 
submissions and a report to a bi-partisan Parliamentary Committee which 
recommended reforms to the Parliament.  This process involved some extremely 
productive exchanges between what ‘engaged academics’ and ‘reflective 
practitioners’ – academics who wanted to ‘road test’ their theories in the complex 
problems of modern governance, and practitioners with considerable knowledge of 
the details of the problems and wanted to stand back and reflect.   
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There are three variations that the Institute for Ethics Governance and Law 
(IEGL) suggest to the EARC model that we would recommend to Georgia.   
 
• The GRC should be permanent. It may be initially a larger body to cope 
with a backlog of necessary reforms or to deal with a major corruption 
problem. During its later, mature stage, it would receive new 
commissions from the government and have the responsibility of 
reviewing all areas of reforms already introduced. Ideally, it should have 
an independent board which could provide other briefs. 
• It should not see itself as necessarily, or even primarily, a law reform 
body. Even if it reports on all its findings to parliament, it should be 
expected to make proposals about the way that existing institutions 
operate.  
• It should look to the overall coherence of the system and the way that the 
different reforms interact with each other. 
 
In five short years, Queensland moved from Australia’s governance basket 
case to become leaders and models of governance reform.  We would like to think 
that progressive members of any country would adopt a similar ambition. In 
contemplating and pursuing reforms of public institutions, progressive leaders 
would come forth and set new standards for their region.  In some countries, this 
goal may seem as far away as it seemed to Queenslanders twenty years ago.   
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INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR GEORGIA:   
For those working in Government Integrity Institutions  
 
 
 
A:  OPENING QUESTION 
 
A1.  Before we start, do you have any questions at all about this project? 
 
B:  ABOUT YOUR OWN INSTITUTION 
 
B1.  What are the key documentary references for your role (the "paperwork" that 
supports your role, e.g.: legislation, regulation etc.)?   
 
B2.  What are the main ways in which your own institution carries out its role? 
 
B3.  Is your institution able to commence investigation without seeking authority 
from other officials? 
 
B4.  To whom does your institution report? 
 
B5.  Who appoints your institution's senior staff and who can remove them from 
their jobs? 
 
B6.  If there were to be a change in your Minister, would the new Minister have the 
right to replace you and/or your senior people? 
 
B7.  What do you see as the three greatest risks of corruption within your sphere of 
influence? 
 
B8.  Is your institution resourced sufficiently well, in terms of its financial and 
human resources, to carry out its role effectively? 
 
B9.  What non-governmental inputs does your institution currently receive from 
NGOs, the media, the public at large etc., and how does this occur? 
 
C:  COOPERATION BETWEEN INTEGRITY INSTITUTIONS 
 
A list of some of the integrity institutions currently operating in Georgia. 
 
C1.  Which of these institutions specifically assist you in fulfilling your role and in 
what ways? 
 
C2.  Which of these institutions could assist you more in fulfilling your role and in 
what ways? 
 
C3.  Why do you think that they may have not yet been able to provide this level of 
assistance yet? 
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C4.  Of the extra assistance that other institutions might provide for you, which 
would be the most valuable in assisting you to fulfil your own role more 
effectively? 
 
C5.  (a) Do any of these institutions make it more difficult for you to fulfil your 
own role? and (b) If so, which ones and in what ways? 
 
C6.  Which of these institutions do you assist directly in effectively fulfilling its 
role and in what ways? 
 
C7.  (a) Are there any of these institutions which your institution could be assisting 
more than at present?  (b) If so, in what ways and (c) Why do you think your 
institution has not yet been able to provide this level of support? 
 
C8.  (a) Do any of the other institutions in the system provide a check in the event 
of your own institution failing to fulfil its role? and (b) In what ways could that 
checking occur? 
 
C9.  Would greater cooperation between the country's integrity institutions be 
useful in strengthening their overall impact in their fight against corruption? 
 
C10.  Are there other untapped resources that could also be effectively harnessed to 
promote integrity and support (be part of) the integrity system? 
 
D:  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
D1.  What would you like to see this project recommending as far as your own 
institution is concerned? 
 
D2.  Do you have any final suggestions as to how Georgia might better address its 
integrity needs? 
 
D3.  Are there any other matters relevant to this project, which you would like to 
share or express, in order to assist us in our work? 
 
E: THE CURRENT SITUATION (OPTIONAL – IF TIME PERMITS) 
 
E1.  How serious a corruption problem still exists at present in Georgia?  How 
widespread is it and what areas would you suggest are the most serious? 
 
E2.  Do you feel that, over the past 2 years, corruption has been reducing, 
increasing or staying about the same? 
 
E3.  Of the corruption that now still exists, has the type and level of corruption 
been changing? If so, in what ways? 
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E4:  In what ways is the government currently dealing with integrity issues and the 
fight against corruption?  
 
E5.  What in your view are the impediments / barriers to reducing corruption and 
achieving integrity in Georgia? 
 
E6.  (a) Do you think it is realistic for Georgia to meet EEU standards in this area ? 
and (b) If , how long do you think this might take? 
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INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR GEORGIA:   
For those External to Government 
 
 
 
A:  OPENING QUESTIONS 
 
A1.  Do you have any questions at all about this project? 
 
B:  EXISTING INTEGRITY INSTITUTIONS 
 
B1.  Of the integrity institutions of which you are aware in Georgia, which would 
you say are the most important in reducing the level of corruption? 
 
B2.  Of the integrity institutions of which you are aware in Georgia, which ones 
would you say are operating well and are making, or may be able to make, a 
significant contribution to reducing corruption in Georgia?   In what ways? 
 
B3.  Conversely, which integrity institutions here would you see as not operating 
well yet and therefore may be unlikely to make such a contribution in their present 
situation?  Why not? 
 
B4.  From your knowledge of how the system operates in practice, do you feel that 
the commitment to anti-corruption at the top of these integrity institutions is 
matched by a similar commitment and ethical behaviour at the operational levels of 
these institutions? 
 
B5.  To what extent are these integrity institutions currently adequately resourced, 
in terms of human and financial resources, in order to be effective in their roles?  
 
B6.  Would extra resources be useful?   If so how should extra resources be used? 
 
B7.  To what extent do these integrity institutions have the necessary support from 
the Government, within the public service and from society in general, in order for 
them to be effective? 
 
C:  COHERENCE OF THE INTEGRITY SYSTEM  
 
C1.  Do you feel that the integrity institutions of which you are aware in Georgia, 
are working cooperatively together, that is acting in mutually supportive ways as 
part of an integrity "system" or is this not the case? 
 
C2.  Who is supporting whom and in what ways? 
 
C3.  Which institutions need the support of others and are not currently receiving 
it ?  Why do you think this is not happening? 
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C6.  Do you think that the currently emerging set of integrity institutions will be 
able to work as a "system" in order to promote higher levels of integrity and lower 
levels of corruption in Georgia? 
 
C7.  Can you think of ways in which some new or existing institutions could help 
other institutions to perform their tasks better? 
 
C8.  Are there other untapped resources that could also be effectively harnessed to 
promote integrity and support (be part of) the integrity system? 
 
D:  CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
D1.  Are you optimistic or pessimistic that satisfactory progress can be made? 
 
D2.  If you are optimistic, how long do you perceive it will take for Georgia to 
meet EU standards in this area? 
 
D3.  Do you have any final suggestions as to how Georgia might better address its 
integrity needs? 
 
D4.  Are there any other matters relevant to this project, which you would like to 
share or express, in order to assist us in our work? 
 
E: THE CURRENT SITUATION (OPTIONAL–IF TIME PERMITS) 
 
E1.  How serious a problem do you think corruption is at present in Georgia? 
 
E2:  If you believe that there is corruption, how widespread is it and what areas 
would you suggest are the most serious? 
 
E3.  Do you feel that, over the past 2 years, corruption has been reducing, 
increasing or staying about the same? 
 
E4.  Of the corruption that now still exists, has the type and level of corruption 
been changing?   If so, how? 
 
E5.  In what ways is the government currently dealing with integrity issues and the 
fight against corruption?  Is this approach likely to be effective?  If not, why not? 
 
E6.  In your view from where (i.e.: what levels, people) within the system is 
leadership emanating in the fight against corruption and lack of integrity? 
 
E7.  What in your view are the impediments / barriers to reducing corruption and 
achieving integrity in Georgia? 
 
E8:  Should the focus of anti-corruption strategies be more on the punitive side 
(investigation, coercion, enforcement, creating a fear of prosecution etc.) or on the 
preventative (using awareness, persuasion, education, training etc.)? 
 
Appendices 166 
E9.  In what other ways might a stronger more effective integrity system be 
achieved in Georgia? 
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List of Agencies Surveyed 
 
 
Parliamentary 
 
1. Budget and Finance Committee 
2. Human Rights and Civil Integration Committee 
3. Defence and Security Committee 
4. Regional Policy, Self Government and Mountainous Regions Committee 
5. Legal Issues Committee 
6. Procedural Issues and Rules Committee 
7. European Integration Committee  
8. Parliament Staff Office 
9. Parliament Legal Department 
10. Parliament Budget Office 
 
 
Executives 
 
1. The Government of Georgia Chancellery 
2. Office of State Minister for Reform Coordination 
3. Office of State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration 
4. Ministry of Internal Affairs 
 Ministry of Internal Affairs Analysis Department 
 Ministry of Internal Affairs Special Operative Department 
 
5. Ministry of Finance 
 Ministry of Finance Financial Police 
 Ministry of Finance Customs Department 
 Ministry of Finance Taxation Department 
 The Ministry of Finance General Inspectorate 
 
6. Ministry of Justice 
 Ministry of Justice Information Bureau on Public Officials Property and 
Financial State 
 The Ministry of Justice Public Register National Agency 
 The Ministry of Justice Civil Register Agency 
 The Ministry of Justice Legal Aid Commission 
 The Ministry of Justice National Forensic Bureau 
 The Ministry of Justice General Inspectorate 
 
7. The National Bank of Georgia  
 The National Bank of Georgia Financial Monitoring Service 
 
8. The Ministry of Defense 
 8.1 The Ministry of Defence Legal Department 
 
9. The Ministry of Economic Development 
 9.1 The Ministry of Economic Development State Procurement Agency 
 9.2 The Ministry of Economic Development General Inspectorate 
Appendices 168 
10. The Ministry of Labour and Healthcare  
 10.1 The Ministry of Labour and Healthcare General Inspectorate 
 
11. The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources  
 11.1 The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources General 
Inspectorate 
 
12. The Ministry of Education and Science 
 12.1 The Ministry of Education and Science General Inspectorate 
 
13. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 13.1 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs General Inspectorate 
 
14. The Tbilisi City Mayor’s Office 
 14.1 The Tbilisi Internal General Inspectorate for Law Protection 
 
 
Judiciary and Court Related Institutions 
 
1. The Constitutional Court 
2. The Supreme Court 
 The Supreme Court Chamber on Administrative Issues 
 
3. The Appellate Court 
 The Appellate Court Chamber on Administrative Issues  
 The Appellate Court Chamber on Civil issues 
 The Appellate Court Chamber on Criminal Issues 
 
4. Tbilisi Arbitration Chamber 
5. Prosecutor General’s Office 
 
 
Special/Others 
 
1. The Audit Chamber 
2. The Central Election Commission 
3. The Ombudsman’s Office 
4. The Supreme Council of Justice 
5. The State Commission on Efficient Governance and Territorial 
Arrangement 
6. The Civil Service Bureau 
7. The Development and Reform Fund 
 
 
International and Donor  
 
1. The World Bank  
2. The United Nations Development Program (The UNDP) 
3. The European Commission 
4. The UK Department for International Development (The DFID) 
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5. The United States Agency for International Development (The USAID) 
6. The Eurasia Foundation 
7. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (The OSCE) 
8. The National Democratic Institute (The NDI) 
9. The International Republican Institute (The IRI) 
10. URBAN INSTITUTE 
 
 
Nongovernmental Organizations 
 
1. Association of Public and Legal Advice (ALPE) 
2. Civil Society Institute 
3. Liberty Institute 
4. Trans National Crime and Corruption Center 
5. Georgian Young Lawyers Association 
6. United Nations Association 
7. Economic Policies Research Centre 
8. National Association of Local Authorities of Georgia (NALAG) 
9. Caucasus Research Resource Centre 
10. Open Society – Georgia Foundation 
11. The Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development  
12. The Transparency International Georgia 
13. Georgian Young Economists Association 
 
 
Media 
 
1. Georgian Public Broadcasting  
2. Imedi TV Company 
3. Newspaper 24 Saati 
4. Newspaper Rezonansi 
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Sources Used for the Desk-research 
 
1. Fairbanks Ch. The Feudal Analogy // Journal of Democracy. №3, July, 2000 
2. State-Society Synergy: Government and Social Capital in Development / Ed. 
P. Evans. Berkley: University of California 
3. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World. / Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988 
4. Georgia’s Statistical Year-Book, Tbilisi, 2000 
5. Judicial Reform in Georgia: A Study of Public Opinion. Final Report. 
GORBI, Tbilisi, 2000 
6. Public Education Project, Exit Survey Results // GORBI, Tbilisi, Oct. 2001 
7. Corruption, Exit Survey Results // GORBI, June, 2002 
8. Evaluation Report on Georgia // Group of States against Corruption. 
December 2006 
9. Monthly Reports on State Expenditure Monitoring Project // Transparency 
International Georgia, January-May 2006 
10.  Report on Election Administration Reform in Georgia // Transparency 
International Georgia, January 2006 
11. Report on Reform of Law Enforcement Bodies in Georgia // Transparency 
International Georgia, December 2005 
12. Report on Government Reform in Georgia Since the Rose Revolution // 
Transparency International Georgia, November 2005 
13. Alternative Corruption Status Report for Georgia // Anti-Corruption NGO 
Coalition. December 2003 
14. Analysis of the Legislation, Parliamentary Proposals and Discussions on 
Litigation Procedures // Report by the Georgian Young Lawyers Association, 
2006 
15. Monitoring of the Funds of the President’s Representatives in Regions: 
Anticorruption Report //  Georgian Young Lawyers Association, 2006 
16. A Society Free of Corruption: which Way to Choose? // European Initiative 
for Democracy and Human Rights, Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy 
and Development, the Center for Change and Conflict Management 
“Partners Georgia”.  
17. Financial and Institutional Sustainability of the Civil Society Organizations 
// Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development. 2004 
18. Civil Society after the Rose Revolution // Caucasus Institute for Peace, 
Democracy and Development, 2005 
19. Civil Society Development in Georgia: Achievements and Challenges // 
Ghia Nodia, Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development. 
2005 
20. Constitutional-Political Reform Process in Georgia: Elite and Voices of 
People // International IDEA, Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and 
Development. 2005 
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Laws and Bylaws 
 
1. Georgia’s Constitution  
2. Organic Law on Constitutional Court 
3. Organic Law on Ombudsman Office 
4. Organic Law on Common Courts 
5. Organic Law on Prosecutor General’s Office 
6. Organic Law on Supreme Court 
7. Organic Law on Electoral Code 
8. Organic Law on Local Self Governance 
9. Organic Law on National Bank of Georgia 
10. Georgia’s Civic Code 
11. Georgia’s Civic Procedural Code 
12. Georgia’s General Administrative Code 
13. Georgia’s Administrative Procedural Code 
14. Georgia’s Administrative Delinquency Code 
15. Georgia’s Labor Code 
16. Georgia’s Tax Code 
17. Georgia’s Customs Code 
18. Law on Referendum 
19. Law on Georgia’s Budget System 
20. Law on Parliamentary Faction 
21. Law on Status of Member of Parliament  
22. Law on Lobbyism 
23. Law on Parliamentary Rules of Procedures 
24. Law on Diplomatic Acts 
25. Law on Police 
26. Law on Operative and Investigative Activities  
27. Law on Constitutional Litigation 
28. Law on Private Arbitration 
29. Law on Rules of Allotment of Cases and Delegation of Authority to Other 
Judges  
30. Law on Disciplinary Responsibility and Disciplinary Litigation of Common 
Courts’ Judges 
31. Law on Attorneys 
32. Law on Audit Chamber 
33. Law on Conflict of Interests and Corruption in Public Service 
34. Law on Public Service 
35. Law on Reforms and Development Fund 
36. Law on Government of Georgia Structure, Responsibilities and Rules of 
Functioning 
37. Law on State Register 
38. Law on State Procurements 
39. Law on Legal Entity of the Public Law 
40. Law on Legal Acts 
41. Law on Registration of Civic Acts 
42. Law on Operational and Investigative Activities 
43. Law on Inhibition of Illegal Incomes 
44. Law on Customs Tariff and Payment  
45. Law on Customs Collections 
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46. Charter of the Human Rights and Civil Integration Parliamentary Committee 
47. Charter of the Regional Policy, Self-Government and Mountainous Regions 
Parliamentary Committee 
48. Charter of the Parliamentary Committee on European Integration 
49. Charter of the Procedural Issues and Rules Parliamentary Committee 
50. Charter of the Budget and Finance Parliamentary Committee 
51. Charter of the Parliament Staff Office 
52. Regulations of the Parliamentary Budget Office 
53. Regulations of the Parliamentary Legal Department 
54. Charter of the Government of Georgia Chancellery 
55. Charter of the Office of State Minister for Reform Coordination 
56. Charter of the Office of State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic 
Integration 
57. Charter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
58. Charter of the Analysis Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs  
59. Charter of the Special Operative Department of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs  
60. Charter of the Ministry of Finance 
61. Charter of the Financial Police of the Ministry of Finance 
62. Charter of the Customs Department of the Ministry of Finance 
63. Charter of the Tax Department of the Ministry of Finance 
64. Charter of the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Finance 
65. Charter of the Ministry of Justice 
66. Charter of the Information Bureau on Public Officials Property and Financial 
State of the Ministry of Justice 
67. Charter of the Public Register National Agency of the Ministry of Justice 
68. Charter of the Civil Register Agency of the Ministry of Justice 
69. Charter of the Legal Aid Commission of the Ministry of Justice 
70. Charter of the National Forensic Bureau of the Ministry of Justice 
71. Charter of the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Justice 
72. Charter of the National Bank of Georgia 
73. Charter of the Financial Monitoring Service of the National Bank of Georgia 
74. Charter of the Ministry of Defense 
75. Charter of the Legal Department of the Ministry of Defence 
76. Charter of the Ministry of Economic Development 
77. Charter of the State Procurement Agency of the Ministry of Economic 
Development 
78. Charter of the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Economic 
Development 
79. Charter of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources 
80. Charter of the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Environment and 
Natural Resources 
81. Charter of the Ministry of Labour and Healthcare 
82. Charter of the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor and Healthcare 
83. Charter of the Ministry of Education and Science  
84. Charter of the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Education and Science 
85. Charter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
86. Charter of the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
87. Rules of Procedures of the Constitutional Court of Georgia 
88. Rules of Procedures of the Supreme Court of Georgia Staff Office 
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89. Charter of the Prosecutor General’s Office 
90. Regulations on Permanent Private Arbitration 
 
